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CHAPTER I  
THE EUROPEAN PCLITIGAL SCENE
In 1618 Europe became em broiled in  a lo n g  and in v o lv ed  s e r ie s  
o f c o n f l i c t s  which h is to r ia n s  have termed th e  T h irty  Tears War. The 
r o o ts  o f  th e s e  c o n f l i c t s  may be tra ced  back to  th e founding o f  
P rotestan tism  in  1^19. Europe was in  a s t a t e  o f  con fu sion  and 
em otional ferm ent, most o f  which was due to  th e  r e l ig io u s  d if fe r e n c e s  
between C a th o lic s  and P r o te s ta n ts . On th e  su r fa c e , th e se  appeared 
to  be th e  two b a s ic  r e l ig io n s ,  but th e  l a t t e r  was d iv id ed  w ith in  
i t s e l f  due to  th e  advent o f  C alv in ism . Lutheranism  had spread r a p id ly  
s in c e  i t s  b eg in n in g s , but had been slow ed by th e  spread o f  th e  m oral­
i s t i c  C a lv in is t  t e a c h in g s . S in ce  l5 6 0 , th e  f lo o d  o f  th e  C ath o lic  
Counter-Reform ation had been washing back over some o f th e  areas  
which had d ev ia ted  from Rome. V isc io u s  s tr u g g le s  developed over 
whose was th e  tr u e  r e l ig io n .  The scen e  fo r  la r g e r  c o n te s ts  had been  
s e t  by th e  Peace o f  Augsburg in  19$^, which p erm itted  a r u le r  to  
d ecid e  which r e l ig io n  would be fo llo w ed  in  h is  s t a t e .  The use o f  
s t a t e  borders to  sep a ra te  r e l ig io n s  developed hatreds which had not 
p r e v io u s ly  e x is t e d .  Man could  now be hated fo r  h is  r e l ig io n  as w e ll
as f o r  h is  language, custom s, h a b its ,  or d r e s s .
In a d d itio n  to  r e l ig io u s  ferm ent cau sin g  s p l i t s  and c o n f l i c t s
in  Europe, d yn a stic  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were a part o f  th e  problem . Although
th e  grea t s tr u g g le  began as a r e l ig io u s  c la s h ,  th e r e  were d yn astic  
overton es which u lt im a te ly  came to  outweigh th e  r e l ig io u s  aims o f  th e
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p a r t ic ip a n ts .  The two p r in c ip a l d y n a stie s  were th e  Hapsburgs o f  Spain  
and th e  Empire, and th e  House o f  Bourbon in  F rance. Although both  
were C a th o lic , th ey  were eoctremely je a lo u s  o f  one another; to  th e  
dismay o f  th e  Pope, th ey  worked to  th e  detrim ent o f  each o th e r . In  
a d d itio n  to  th e s e ,  th e r e  were o th er ou tstan d in g  d y n a stie s  such as 
th e  H ohenzollerns in  Brandenburg and P ru ss ia , th e  S tu a rts  in  B r ita in ,  
th e  House o f  Vasa in  Sweden and in  Poland, th e  Oldenburgs in  Denmark, 
and th e  House o f  Orange in  th e  N eth erlan d s. IVhile th e se  a l l  p layed  
v a rio u s im portant r o le s  a t  one tim e or another during th e  g rea t s tru g ­
g le ,  i t  was th e  Bourbons and Hapsburgs who p layed  t h e ir  p arts  out to  
th e  b i t t e r  f i n a l  c u r ta in .
One other dynamic fo r c e  f e l t  during t h is  p er io d  was th e  grim 
overseas economic r iv a lr y  between th e  m aritim e s t a t e s .  Spain and 
Portugal had dominated th e  e x p lo ita t io n  o f  th e  New World and th e  East 
In d ies  and th e  r e s u lta n t  trad e w ith  th e se  a r e a s , but th ey  were now 
b ein g  s tr o n g ly  co n te sted  by th e  Dutch, French, and E n g lish . The era  
o f  c o lo n iz a t io n  was under way w ith  th e  l a t t e r  th r e e  powers v i t a l l y  
in te r e s te d  in  e s ta b lis h in g  permanent s e t t le m e n ts .  P ortugal and Spain 
had m aintained m il ita r y  o u tp osts  on th e  fa r  s id e s  o f  th e  world fo r  
over a cen tu ry . They had, however, been more in te r e s te d  in  conquest 
and e x p lo ita t io n  than in  c o lo n ie s  _se. The s tr u g g le s  fo r  trade  
and c o lo n ie s ,  p lu s th e  search  fo r  n atu ra l reso u rces  such as r ic h  min­
e r a ls ,  s p ic e s ,  f i s h e r i e s ,  new and e x o t ic  fo o d s , s i l k s ,  fu r s ,  and th e  
l i k e ,  had become in c r e a s in g ly  b i t t e r .  England, France, and Holland 
had been f ir m ly  demanding trad e  r ig h ts  in  th e  newly d iscovered  la n d s , 
w h ile  Spain and P crtu ga l had been r e fu s in g  ju s t  as s t e a d fa s t ly  to
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grant th e se  p r iv i l e g e s .  England and Spain fou gh t a lon g  war, which 
ended u n reso lved  in  l6 0 h , over t h i s  p o in t .  The r i s in g  Dutch had been 
more su c c e s s fu l in  th e  E ast I n d ie s ,  w restin g  some is la n d s  from Span­
i s h  co n tro l from which th ey  had extended t h e ir  a c t i v i t i e s .  In th e  
f i e l d  o f  oversea s o p e r a tio n s , i t  was s t a t e  v ersu s s t a t e ,  r eg a r d le ss  
o f  r e l ig io u s  a f f i l i a t i o n .  Out o f  th e  c o lo n ia l  s tr u g g le s  th ere  d e v e l­
oped th e  d o c tr in e  o f  th e  two sp h eres , which meant th a t  Europe was 
one sphere fo r  th e  op eration  o f  in te r n a t io n a l law  and th e  New World 
another; arrangements made in  one sphere d id  not n e c e s s a r ily  apply  
in  th e  o th e r . Thus, w h ile  two n a tio n s might be f ig h t in g  in  a d is ta n t  
la n d ,, th ey  could  be on am icable term s in  Europe. While th e  T h irty  
Years War began as e s s e n t ia l ly  a r e l ig io u s  c o n f l i c t  between C ath o lic  
and P ro te sta n t , i t  must be kept in  mind th a t  o th er f o r c e s ,  c h ie f ly  
d yn astic  and econom ic, were a ls o  a t  work.
The Holy Roman Empire was ru led  by a Hapsburg, M atthias ( l 6 l 2 -  
1619) ,  who c o n tr o lle d  most o f  Germany. His was a lo o s e  form o f c o n tr o l,  
however, much lo o s e r  than th e  Hapsburgs p r e fe r r e d . The Snperor was 
a c tu a lly  dependent upon th e  variou s s t a t e s  o f  th e  Empire, as he had 
no way o f en fo rc in g  h is  e d ic t s  should th e  la r g e r  p r in ces  choose to  
d is s e n t .  S in ce  th e  advent o f  P ro testa n tism , se v e r a l o f  th e  la r g e r  
s t a t e s  had adopted t h is  f a i t h ;  th e se  in c lu d ed  th e  P a la t in a te ,  Saxony, 
and Brandenburg, l& th but seven  e le c to r s  in  th e  Holy Roman Empire, 
th e  Hapsburgs were n a tu r a lly  d eep ly  concerned l e s t  another s t a t e  be  
l o s t  to  P ro testa n tism  and th e  b a lan ce o f power along w ith  i t .  On 
th e  eve o f  c o n f l i c t  th e  German world was d iv id ed  f a i r l y  even ly  between 
P r o te sta n ts  in  th e  north  and C a th o lic s  in  th e  sou th , w ith  t h i s  r e l ig io u s
u
b a r r ie r  e s ta b lis h in g  n atu ra l ten d en c ie s  toward d i s l i k e  and d is t r u s t .
I t  was on th is  r e l ig io u s  f r o n t ie r  o f  h a tred , f e a r ,  and apprehension, 
th a t th e  b a t t le  l i n e s  would be drawn w ith  th e  s t a t e s  o f  Europe choos­
in g  which s id e  th ey  thought b e s t  s u ite d  t h e ir  in t e r e s t s .  At th e  
o u ts e t ,  th e ir  ch o ic e  was in flu e n c e d  by r e l ig io u s  c o n s id e r a tio n sj  fo r  
th e  most part i t  became C ath o lic  versu s P r o te sta n t .
Spain , ru led  by P h il ip  I I I  ( l5 9 8 - l 6 2 l ) ,  was s t i l l  th e  dominant 
and most pow erful n ation  in  Europe; w ith  her v a s t  p o s se s s io n s  in  th e  
New ¥ o r ld , th e  E ast I n d ie s , p lu s  th e  Spanish N eth erlan d s, th e Franche 
Comte, th e  Kingdom o f N ap les, th e  Duchy o f  M ilan, and her c lo s e  fa m ily  
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e Holy Roman Empire, t h is  S p an ish -led  dynasty  
exerted  more o f  an in te r n a t io n a l in f lu e n c e  than m erely th a t o f  a 
s in g le  s t a t e .  Sp ain ’s war w ith  England had been ended by James I  
(1603- 1625) sh o r t ly  a f te r  h is  a c c e ss io n  to  th e  th ron e, le a v in g  th e  
ov erseas economic q u estio n  s t i l l  unanswered. Ending t h i s  war was th e  
primary a c t  o f  James, th e  man o f p eace , and Spain , through th e  d ex ter ­
i t y  o f  her s ly  ambassadors, managed to  keep England o f f  b a lan ce in  
her fo r e ig n  r e la t io n s  throughout h is  whole tw enty-tw o-year r e ig n .
In t h i s  way Spain kept England n eu tra l when she m ight have been a 
determ ined eneiqy. Spain m aintained her p o s it io n  as th e  most pow erful 
n a tio n  in  Europe by l in in g  her c o f f e r s  m th  go ld  and s i lv e r  from th e  
New World. She fin an ced  her m il ita r y  p r o je c ts  and economic aims in  
t h i s  manner, r e ly in g  on th e  seem ingly  en d less  stream  o f w ealth  from 
a cro ss  th e  s e a s .
The Dutch had r e v o lte d  a g a in s t  th e  o p p ressiv e  Spanish  r u le  in  
th e l a s t  h a lf  o f  th e  l6 t h  cen tu ry . Through t h e ir  own v a lia n t  e f f o r t s
and w ith  o u ts id e  help  from England and France, the^r c lea red  th e  seven  
northern prov in ces and e s ta b lis h e d  a r e p u b lic . At th e  tr u c e , declared  
w ith  Spain in  l6 0 9  and known as th e  Twelve Years Truce, th e  N etherlands  
was p a r t it io n e d . The seven northern p r o v in c e s , th o se  th a t  formed th e  
Union o f U trech t in  1^79, became Dutch, w h ile  th e  ten  southern prov­
in c e s  remained under Spanish  r u le  and were known as th e  Spanish  
N eth erlan d s. The P r o te sta n ts  in  th e  south  e i th e r  f le d  north  to  th e  
new rep u b lic  or recanted  and became C a th o lic , w ith  th e  r e s u l t  th a t  
th e  number o f  P r o te s ta n ts  in cr ea se d  in  th e  north  w h ile  th e  Spanish  
N etherlands became s o l id ly  C a th o lic , a lthough  sm all m in o r it ie s  encisted  
in  both  a rea s . The Dutch however, were not u n ited  P r o te sta n ts  as 
t h e ir  f a i t h  was s p l i t  between Lutheranism  and Calvanism .
S in ce th e  s ig n in g  o f  th e  Twelve Years Truce th e  Dutch had be­
come in c r e a s in g ly  stro n g er  and were a b le  to  stand a lo n e . The Dutch, 
in  f a c t ,  were engaging in  tra d e  and h o s t i l i t i e s  in  th e  E ast In d ies  
which Spain resen ted  because i t  cu t in t o  her tra d e  in  t h i s  a rea . The 
D utch, through t h e ir  rapid  r i s e  in  commerce, were a ls o  resen ted  by 
England, c h ie f ly ,  as w e ll as by Denmark and Sweden. In a d d it io n , th e  
N etherlands th em selves were to o  v a lu a b le  t o  be g iven  up l i g h t l y  and 
th e r e  seemed l i t t l e  doubt but th a t  Spain would resume th e  war when 
th e  Twelve Years Truce exp ired  in  l6 2 1 .
The Spanish plan in  th e  event o f  new h o s t i l i t i e s  was to  a tta c k  
th e  Dutch from th e  south  and e a s t ,  from b a ses  in  th e  Spanish  N ether­
lan d s and from German t e r r i t o r i e s  w ith in  th e  Holy Roman Empire.^ They
^Hubert G. R. Reade, S id e l ig h ts  on th e  T h irty  Y ears War (London, 
1921, 3 v o l s . ) .  I ,  3-U.
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r e a liz e d  th a t  i t  would be too  d i f f i c u l t  to  a tta ck  from th e  sea  inasmuch 
as powerful Dutch fo r c e s  ru led  th e  North Sea and th e  E n g lish  Channel.
In a d d it io n , th ere  was no way o f t e l l i n g  in  which d ir e c t io n  England 
might move and sh e , in  any even t, cou ld  make a c t io n  im p o ss ib le  through  
th e  Channel and North Sea i f  she chose to  do so . I f  Spain were to  
conduct a land campaign a g a in st th e  Dutch ^Jithout recou rse  to  th e  sea  
la n e s ,  lo n g  m ilita r y  supply l i n e s  must be kept open from th e  M editer­
ranean north  through th e  A lp in e p a s se s ,  through French or German 
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  to  th e  Spanish N eth erlan d s. T h is , o f  co u rse , would 
req u ire  th e  consent o f va rio u s r u le r s ,  and Spain d id  not co n sid er  
t h is  im p o ss ib le  inasmuch as th e  Hapsburgs were o v erlord s over most 
o f  th e  German s t a t e s  through th e  lim ite d  powers o f  th e  Emperor M atth ias. 
There was a ls o  a m arriage t i e  between th e  Spanish Hapsburg P r in c e ss ,  
Anne, daughter o f  P h il ip  I I I ,  and th e  r u le r  o f  F rance, L ou is X III  
(161O-16U3 ) .  T his m arriage was but a temporary d e c e p tiv e  bond which 
v e i le d  th e  fe a r ,  a n im o sity , and d is t r u s t  between Bourbon and Hapsburg 
and which remained as an u nderly ing  fa c to r  in  th e  deepening European 
s i t u a t io n .  However, fo r  th e  tim e b e in g , Spain f e l t  th a t she could  
depend upon th e  coop eration  o f France.
France had been in te r n a l ly  torn  in  th e  l a s t  h a lf  o f  th e  l6 t h  
century by her r e l ig io u s  c i v i l  w ars, which were ended by King Heniy 
I 7 's  is su a n c e  o f  th e  E d ict o f  Nantes in  1^98 which granted  r e l ig io u s  
to le r a t io n  to  th e  P ro te sta n t m in o r ity . In th e  e a r ly  l? t h  cen tu ry ,
France was in  th e  p rocess  o f  recovery  and r e o r g a n iz a tio n , o f  r e b u ild ­
in g  her sh a ttered  economy, and o f r e -e s ta b lis h in g  peace among her 
lo y a l  so n s . The monarchy, though C a th o lic , found i t s e l f  p r o te c t in g
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th e  P ro te sta n t m in o r ity , th e  Huguenots, a g a in s t  th e  "wishes o f  th e  
C ath o lic  m a jo r ity . The Popes, Clement V III ( l5 9 2 - l6 0 5 )  and Paul V 
(i 6 0 5 -1621), found th em selves fa v o r in g  th e  French Bourbons over th e  
Spanish Hapsburgs b ecau se as tem poral r u le r s  over th e  Papal S ta te s ,  
th ey  resp ected  and fea red  th e  Hapsburg dom inions, and scen ted  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  expansion o f  t h i s  power in to  t h e ir  o"wn I t a l ia n  domain. 
Thus, th e  je a lo u sy  between th e  two le a d in g  C a th o lic  s t a t e s ,  France 
and Spain , was a wedge driven  in to  what should  have been th e  c le a r  
alignm ent o f  'P rotestant a g a in s t  C ath o lic  s t a t e s ,  and w h ile  th e Popes 
should have seen  i t  as t h e ir  duty to  a l ig n  th e  powers over which th ey  
were th e  nominal s p ir i t u a l  head, th ey  did n o th in g . The Bourbons were 
a lso  in  a p o s it io n  to  deny, i f  th ey  ch ose , th e  Spanish aim o f  recon­
quering th e Dutch N eth erlan d s. Spain cou ld  be b locked  by sea  as w e ll  
as by la n d , and t h i s  co n s id e r a tio n  did  l i t t l e  t o  make th e  Hapsburgs 
happy over t h e ir  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  France.
Should France b lo ck  her supply l i n e s  to  th e  n orth , Spain would 
then have to  seek  ro u tes  fa r th e r  e a s t ;  even though th e  rou te  were 
through th e  S t .  G otthard, th e  V a l t e l l in e ,  or Brenner p a s se s , th e  north­
ern p art o f  th e  ro u te  must needs p a ss  through th e  German s t a t e s  o f th e  
Empire. At f i r s t  g la n ce  t h i s  was not a problem inasmuch as th e  Empire 
was headed by an A ustrian  Hapsburg, M atth ias, whose p o l i t i c a l  and 
r e l ig io u s  sym pathies were o s te n s ib ly  th e  same as th o se  o f th e  Spanish  
branch o f  th e  d yn asty . There w ere, however, a few  fla w s in  th e  Span­
i s h  s t r a t e ^ .  The Rhine was n ecessary  to  Spain fo r  rap id  and easy  
tra n sp o rt o f  her fo r c e s  enroute to  F la n d ers. The Rhine flow ed through  
t e r r it o r y  ru led  by th e  Count P a la t in e , F red er ick , one o f  th e  seven
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e le c to r s  o f  th e  Holy Roman Empire, and he was a P r o te s ta n t . Farther  
to  th e  e a s t  la y  Saxony, another e le c to r a te  ru led  t y  a P r o te s ta n t .
The P a la t in a te  could  b lock  Spanish e f f o r t s  along th e  Rhine to  reach  
th e  N eth erlan d s. I t  would be p o s s ib le  to  go around th e  P a la t in a te  
t o  th e  e a s t ,  but Saxony, ru led  by a P r o te sta n t , would be in  a p o s it io n  
to  make t h is  move hazardous. There were a ls o  sm a ller  German P ro te sta n t  
s t a t e s  which could  cause tr o u b le  should th e  occasion  ever a r i s e .  The 
p rosp ect may have made even pow erful Spain h e s i t a t e ,  had not another  
development come about w ith in  th e  Empire which em broiled Spain and 
much o f  Europe fo r  th e  n ext t h ir t y  y e a r s .
Bohemia, a r e la t iv e ly  sm all p rov in ce in  Hapsburg hands fo r  
alm ost one hundred and tw enty y ea rs  and peopled  p r in c ip a lly  by Czechs, 
dominated th ree  o th er p rov in ces in  c lo s e  proxim ity  to  h er, S i l e s i a ,  
L u sa tia , and M oravia, over whom th e  Bohemian King had so v ere ig n  r ig h t s .  
In 1618, r e l ig io u s  s t r i f e  was common to  th e  area  w ith  C a th o lic s , Luth­
eran s, C a lv in is t s ,  and th e  U tra q u ists  founded by John Hus, c o n te s t in g  
fo r  supremacy. The monarchy was C ath o lic  w h ile  th e  g rea te r  p a rt o f  
th e  n o b i l i t y  were Lutheran, and y e t  th e  n o b i l i t y  supported th e  monar­
chy out o f  fe a r  o f  th e  C a lv in is t  m in o r ity . C ath o lic ism  was th e  
o f f i c i a l  r e l ig io n ,  w h ile  th e  o th er th r e e  were granted t o le r a t io n .  
Emperor R udolf I I  ( l5 ^ 6 - l6 l2 )  attem pted to  withdraw t h is  to le r a t io n  
from th e  P ro te sta n ts  in  I 6O9, but even th e  C a th o lic  n o b i l i t y  would 
not support t h i s  move and th e  Emperor was fo rced  to  grant a l e t t e r  
o f  m ajesty which guaranteed P r o te sta n ts  t h e ir  r ig h t  to  w orship .
R udolf I I ,  both  th e  King o f  Bohemia and Holy Roman Emperor, 
had made Prague h is  im p er ia l c a p it a l .  He was succeeded in  l 6 l 2  by
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h is  brother M atth ias, who a lthough a ls o  wearing both  crowns, moved 
th e  im p eria l c a p ita l  to  Vienna. The Bohemians resen ted  t h is  move, 
f e e l in g  th a t  they  were b ein g  downgraded in to  an A ustrian  p rov in ce . 
M atth ias, a t h is  co ro n a tio n , was a lread y  an e ld e r ly  man and, in  addi­
t io n ,  had no h e ir  or any p ro sp ects  o f  ever having one. The Hapsburg 
cfynasty decided  th a t  another Hapsburg, Archduke Ferdinand o f S ty r ia ,  
although not in  th e  d ir e c t  l i n e  o f  s u c c e s s io n , would be th e  su ccesso r  
to  both  crowns o f  M atth ias. S in ce t h i s  would not p resen t much o f  a 
problem w ith in  th e  h ered ita ry  dom inions o f  th e  Hapsburgs, th e  Spanish  
head o f th e  fa m ily . King P h ilip  I I I ,  r e a d ily  con sen ted , on th e  con d i­
t io n  th a t  Ferdinand, as King o f  Bohemia, would l e t  Spanish troop s
p ass through and a s s i s t  them through th e  German s t a t e s  northward to
2
th e  N eth erlan d s. T his su c c e ss io n  p resen ted  a d if f e r e n t  problem in  
Bohemia and in  th e  Empire i t s e l f ,  inasmuch as here th e  crowns were 
e l e c t iv e .  The v iew s and a c t io n s  o f  th e  C ath o lic  Ferdinand toward 
P rotestan tism  and popular government in  S ty r ia  were w e ll known and 
th e  Bohemians were not l i k e l y  to  go along w ith  t h i s  u p s ta r t .  So, in  
order to  g iv e  Ferdinand th e  advantage o f  having th e  r ig h t  o f  su c c e s ­
s io n  w h ile  th e  Emperor was s t i l l  a l i v e ,  M atthias brought p ressu re to  
bear upon th e  P r o te sta n t Czechs and con sp ired  to  have Ferdinand  
e le c te d  as h is  su ccesso r  to  th e  Bohemian throne in  June I 617.
By May I 618 th e  C zechs, who were b e t te r  organ ized , overthrew  
th e  Emperor's r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  in  th e  well-known " d e fen estr a tio n  o f  
Prague," The r e v o lt  o f  th e  Czechp ran in to  le a d e rsh ip  d i f f i c u l t i e s
^C. V. Wedgwood, The T h irty  Y ears War (London, 1938j repub. 
1 9 5 7 ), p . 7 0 .
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and th ey  f in a l l y  accepted  m ilita r y  help  from th e  P a la t in e  E le c to r ,  
F red erick , and th e  Duke o f  Savoy, to  hold o f f  th e  im p eria l armies 
moving to  suppress them. F rederick  had a plan hy which he hoped to  
e s ta b lis h  peace in  Bohemia.^ He aimed a t  having th e  P ro te sta n t Union, 
o f  which he was head, form an arny, and w ith  t h i s  p lu s  Bohemian fo r c e s ,  
persuade th e  E le c to r  o f  Saxony, John George, to  jo in  th e  movement and 
thus prove to  th e  Emperor M atthias th a t th e  P r o te sta n ts  were u n ited  
and would u se  arms i f  n ecessa ry . Thus, P ro testa n tism  would be guar­
anteed in  Bohemia, and th e  Empire would have a warning a g a in st  any 
a c tio n  d ir e c te d  toward th e  German P r o te sta n t s t a t e s .
On 20 March l 6 l 9  th e  Emperor M atthias d ied , thereupon p r e c ip i­
ta t in g  another c r i s i s ,  namely, a m eeting o f  th e  seven  e le c to r s  o f  
th e  Holy Roman Empire to  s e le c t  a new Emperor. T his m eeting was 
c a l le d  t o  meet a t  Frankfort-on-M ain in  m id-August. A few  days b efore  
t h i s  im p er ia l m eeting , th e  Bohemians met to  e l e c t  t h e ir  new k ing w ith  
only th e  E le c to r s  o f  th e  P a la t in a te  and o f  Saxony under c o n s id e r a tio n . 
F rederick  o f  th e  P a la t in a te  was e le c te d  k ing  by one hundred and f o r t y -  
s ix  v o te s  to  sev en .^  A few  days l a t e r ,  and w ith ou t th e  news from 
Bohemia having been r e c e iv e d , Ferdinand o f  S ty r ia  was unanimously 
e le c te d  as th e  new Holy Roman Emperor, w ith  even th e  absent F re d e r ick ’ s 
deputy v o tin g  fo r  him. Ferdinand had been deposed by v o te  in  Bohemia 
and e le c te d  to  th e  im p eria l throne a t  th e  same tim e .
F rederick  h e s ita te d  b r ie f ly ,  not su re o f  ju s t  which a c t io n  he
^ Ib id . ,  p . 79 . 
^ I b id .,  p . 89.
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should pursue. He f e l t  th a t h is  q u arrel w ith  th e  Empire was one o f  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n s id e r a tio n s  w h ile  th e r e  was a moral is s u e  a t  s ta k e  in  
Bohemia. He b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  l a t t e r  outweighed th e  former and in  
September l 6 l 9  F rederick  agreed to  accep t th e  Bohemian crown. This 
was an open a c t  o f  d e f ia n c e  and c o s t  him th e  fr ie n d sh ip  o f  M axim ilian, 
th e  C ath o lic  Duke o f  B avaria . In moving to  Bohemia and ta k in g  armed 
fo r c e s  w ith  him, F rederick  l e f t  th e  P a la t in a te  and th e  Rhine exposed; 
Spain and th e  Empire soon moved to  a tta c k . In Ju ly  l6 2 0 , M aximilian  
o f  B avaria , w ith  th e  arnçr o f th e  C a th o lic  League commanded by Count 
T i l l y ,  a ttack ed  Bohemia, and Marquis Ambrogio Sp in o la  le d  Spanish  
fo r c e s  up th e  Rhine from th e  Spanish N eth erlan d s. By November, Fred­
e r ic k , having been e a s i ly  d e fe a te d , s lip p e d  away toward Brandenburg. 
Even th e  P ro testa n t E le c to r  o f  Saxorgr had turned a g a in s t  him and 
Spain now occupied h is  beloved  P a la t in a te .
No P ro te sta n t s t a t e  had come forward to  save F rederick  and 
th e  Bohemians from d e fe a t ,  as th e  P ro testa n t p r in ce s  b e lie v e d  th a t  
th e armed s tr u g g le  would end w ith  th e  s a c r i f i c e  o f  F red er ick . Now, 
suddenly, th e  o th er  European powers r e a l iz e d  th e  danger o f  Spanish  
troop s ho ld in g  th e  P a la t in a te  and th e  R hine. Spanish as w e ll as 
A ustrian  Hapsburg power was now in  a p o s it io n  to  c o n so lid a te  i t s  
p o s it io n  and p o s s ib ly  extend i t s  domains northward to  th e  B a l t i c .
So now began th e  d esp era te  a l l ia n c e s  to  b lock  th e  e f f o r t s  o f  th e  
Hapsburgs; th o se  rendering  r a i l ita iy  or monetary a s s is ta n c e  were Den­
mark, France, England, Brandenburg, and th e  U nited  P ro v in ces . France, 
now under th e  guidance o f  C ardinal R ic h e lie u , f e l t  in  p a r t ic u la r  th a t  
th e  Hapsburgs were e n c ir c l in g  h er. R ic h e lie u  began to  sp in  th e  web
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o f  h is  a l l ia n c e  system ; l62ij. th e r e  were a l l ia n c e s  between France 
and H olland; England then jo in ed , as d id  Sweden, Denmark, Savoy, and 
V en ice , w h ile  Brandenburg a l l i e d  h e r s e lf  t o  H olland. The V a lt e l l in e ,  
th a t s t r a te g ic  v a l le y  between Milan and A u str ia , through which th e  
Spanish le g io n s  moved n orth , was occupied  l:y Savoy and V enice in  
l a t e  l62i|.. A lso , in  th e  sp rin g  o f  1625 , th e  Duke o f  Savoy e n c ir c le d  
Genoa and prevented  i t s  u se  by Spain . The "Spanish Road" between  
th e  M editerranean, th e  P a la t in a te ,  and F lan d ers, was now b lock ed .
Seven y ea rs  o f  va r ied  f ig h t in g  had now passed  w ith ou t any d e c is io n  
being reached; th e  wars were expanding in to  areas o th er than th a t o f  
Germany. The b lock in g  o f th e  V a l t e l l in e ,  however, had d iv id ed  th e  
Hapsburg dominions from one another, throw ing them on th e ir  own r e ­
so u rces . I f  th e  northern s ta t e s  cou ld  p roperly  form a jo in t  m il i ta iy  
fo r c e ,  th e  tim e was r ip e  fo r  some d e c is iv e  s tr o k e .
Ever s in c e  F rederick  had been driven  from Bohemia and h is  home­
la n d , th e  P a la t in a te , a l l  o f  Europe had watched c lo s e ly  to  see  what 
cou rse  o f  a c t io n  James I  o f  England would tak e in  t h is  v i t a l  m atter  
concerning h is  on ly  daughter, E liza b e th , and her husband, th e  P ala­
t in e  E le c to r . S in ce coming to  th e  E n g lish  throne from S cotland  in  
1603, James had kept England out o f  war and in  so d o in g  had allow ed  
h is  m ilita r y  and naval fo r c e s  to  s e r io u s ly  d e te r io r a te .  James co n sid ­
ered h im se lf  e s s e n t ia l ly  a man o f  peace and d es ired  no fu r th er  r o le  
fo r  h im se lf  than th a t  o f  "Peacemaker" among th e  European powers. He 
had l e n t  h im se lf  as "mediator" in  peace t r e a t i e s  between Sweden and 
Denmark, and Sweden and R u ssia , but now he was faced  w ith  th e  p rosp ect  
o f  h is  own daughter being pushed from her throne t y  C ath o lic  fo r c e s
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and made to  f l e e .  When F rederick  accepted  th e  Bohemian th ron e, James 
made i t  knoian to  a l l  th e  r u le r s  o f  Europe th a t  he had not known or 
even su sp ected  t h is  p r o je c t .^  James was determ ined to  s ta y  out o f  
t h is  entanglem ent and stubborn ly  r e s is t e d  a l l  p ressu re  to  go to  th e  
aid  o f  h is  daughter. He d id , however, countenance th e  sending o f  two 
thousand troops under th e  command o f S ir  Horace Vere in  1621 to  a id  
th e D utch.^ These troop s were n ot to  rep resen t England, however, nor 
would they  be paid  by her; they  were in  th e  s e r v ic e  o f  th e  U nited
P rovinces and were so supported and p a id .
James, a much more a s tu te  in d iv id u a l than he has o ften  been 
co n sid ered , r e a l iz e d  th a t  England was in  a poor p o s it io n  to  do b a t t le  
w ith  Spain or th e  Empire e ith e r  on lan d  or on s e a . T h erefore, a n o t­
a b le  change in  B r i t is h  p o lic y  took  p la ce ; p r io r  to  t h i s ,  James had 
no p o lic y  o th er than h e s i t a t io n ,  v a c i l l a t i o n ,  and in d e c is io n .  S in ce  
th e  end o f  th e war w ith  Spain in  l60U , James had endeavored to  work 
am icably w ith  th e  Hapsburgs, s e e in g  c le a r ly  th a t  th e  p ro sp ects  o f :war 
were u n favorab le . Y e t, somehow, F red erick  and E liza b e th  must be 
r e s to r e d  to  th e  P a la t in a te ,  so  James decided  to  u se  diplomacy and 
m arriage as h is  means. His aim was to  marry h is  so n , C harles, th e  
P rin ce o f  W ales, to  a Spanish  In fa n ta , and w ith  f r ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  
thus e s ta b lis h e d , th e  new King o f  Spain , P h il ip  IV, who had come to
th e  throne in  1621, would in f lu e n c e  th e  new Emperor Ferdinand to
^Samuel Rawson G ardiner, H istory  o f  England (London, 1883, 10  
v o l s . ) .  I l l ,  2U.
*̂ WedgTTOod, T h irty  Years War, p . I l l ,  quoting  A. W ilson, The 
H istory  o f  Great B r ita in  (London, l6 3 3 ) ,  p . 136 .
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r e s to r e  F rederick  to  th e  P a la t in a te .  As ea r ly  as l 6 l 7 ,  th e  Spanish  
Ambassador to  England, Don Diego Sarm iento de Acuna, Count o f  Gondo- 
mar (156 7 -1 6 2 6 ), had in flu en ce d  James and dangled th e  Spanish marriage 
b efo re  him as a r ic h  p r iz e .  In 1622, James took  a c t io n  to  secure t h i s  
plum by sending the newly created  Earl o f  B r is to l  to  Spain to  arrange 
th e  match. T his d id  n ot prove to  be f a s t  enough and in  February o f  
1623, th e  im p atien t Pbince C h arles, along w ith  George V i l l i e r s ,  th e  
Duke o f  Buckingham (159 2 -1 6 2 8 ), h is  f a th e r 's  cou rt f a v o r i t e ,  went to  
Madrid to  p er so n a lly  woo th e  In fa n ta .
The Spanish King, P h il ip  IV, and h is  c h ie f  m in is te r , Don Gaspar 
de Gusman, Count o f  O liv a r e s , cou ld  n o t, however, s e e  any great advan­
ta g e  to  be gained fo r  Spain by p ressu r in g  th e  Emperor to  r e s to r e  
F rederick  to  th e  P a la t in a te .  They had no o b je c t io n  to  drawing out 
th e s e  p seu d o -n eg o tia tio n s  as lo n g  as p o s s ib le  to  keep England f r ie n d ly ,  
however, and thus h o ld in g  a p o t e n t ia l ly  pow erful enemy a t  bay. Pope 
Gregory X¥ a ls o  hoped th a t ,  through Spain , b e t te r  c o n d itio n s  might be 
secured fo r  C a th o lic s  in  Great B r ita in , and s ta te d  th a t  u n le s s  t h is  
came about he would not grant th e  requ ired  d isp en sa tio n  to  perm it th e  
m arriage. Gregory XV d ied  in  1623 and was succeeded  by Urban V III , 
who was ju s t  as in te r e s te d  in  promoting t h i s  A nglo-Spanish  m arriage. 
l# i i le  th e  r e a l a t t i tu d e  o f Spain toward th e  m arriage appears to  have 
been one o f  delay  and d ecep tio n , th e Popes were apparently  s in c e r e  
in  t h e ir  aims a lthough  they  were e v id e n tly  unaware o f th e  s tren g th  
o f  P r o te sta n t f e e l in g s  in  England. • Q uite n a tu r a lly , th e  Popes b e lie v e d
^ S ir C harles P e tr ie ,  D iplom atic H istory  llj.92-1713 (London, 
1 9 h 9 ) ,  pp. 1 2 6 -2 7 .
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th a t  th e  marriage would e v en tu a lly  le a d , through th e  requirem ents in  
th e  d isp en sa tio n  and th e  c h ild r e n , to  th e  return  to  C ath o lic ism  o f  
th e  re ig n in g  fa m ily  in  England. I-/hile James no doubt was r ig h t  in  
h is  attem pt a t  an understanding w ith  Spain concerning th e  war in  Ger­
many, he would have had to  agree to  co n cess io n s  to  E n g lish  C a th o lic s  
which would have gone a g a in s t  th e  sen tim en ts o f  h is  p eop le; had t h is  
come about he might have been on dangerous ground concerning th e  
s e c u r ity  o f  h is  crown.
L ate  th a t  summer, Buckingham, f i n a l l y  r e a l iz in g  th a t  th ey  had 
been duped ly  Gondomar and O liv a res , convinced C harles o f  t h i s  f a c t ;  
t h ^  returned to  England in  October sham e-faced and w ith  rage in  
th e ir  h earts  toward Spain . Upon t h e ir  re tu rn , a l l  England went w ild  
w ith  joy  a t  th e  r e a l iz a t io n  th a t th ere  would be no C atho lic  marriage 
fo r  th e  h e ir  to  th e  th ro n e . Parliam ent now demanded a c tio n  o f  some 
s o r t  a g a in st  Spain and th e  Emperor. lÆth C harles and Buckingham a ls o  
p ressu r in g  him, James f i n a l l y  gave way, p erm ittin g  an a l l ia n c e  to  be 
made w ith  th e  o th er P r o te sta n t powers to  rega in  th e  P a la t in a te  and 
r e s to r e  F rederick  to  h is  th ron e. Twenty thousand s o ld ie r s  were con­
sc r ip te d  and sen t to  th e  U nited  P rovinces under th e  command o f  E rn est, 
Count M ansfeld, an o u tstan d in g  German p r o fe s s io n a l s o ld ie r .  These 
E n g lish  l e v i e s  were again  to  be under th e  command and c o n tr o l o f th e  
U nited  P ro v in ces . Parliam ent had been clam oring fo r  naval a c t io n ,  
but James stubborn ly  r e fu se d , in s i s t in g  in s te a d  upon m ilita r y  a c tio n  
in  th e  P a la t in a te .
In th e m idst o f  th e se  p rep a ra tio n s , James I  d ied , on 2? March 
1625 , C harles I ,  on a c c e ss io n  to  th e th ron e, advised  by Buckingham,
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and if ith  th e  support o f  Parliam ent and th e  E n g lish  p eo p le , made 
immediate p lan s fo r  a naval ex p ed itio n  a g a in s t  Spain . T heir p o lic y  
was a co n tin u a tio n  o f th a t  o f James, but th ey  in tended  more d ir e c t  
a c tio n  a g a in st Spain than th e h e s ita n t ,  in d ir e c t  typ e  propounded by 
th e  l a t e  so v ere ig n .
In r e tr o sp e c t  i t  may be seen  th a t th ere  were se v e r a l c o n tr ib ­
u t in g  fa c to r s  f o r  th e  lo n g -d e la y ed  d e c is io n  fo r  England to  wage war 
a g a in s t  Spain. The r e l ig io u s  is s u e  o f C ath o lic  v ersu s  P ro testa n t  
was paramount and in  most ca se s  determ ined which s id e  a s t a t e  would 
take in  th e  T h irty  T ears War. There were ex cep tio n s  to  t h i s ,  such  
as Saxony, and l a t e r  France, but in  th e  main th e  T h irty  Years War 
was one o f  r e l ig io n  w ith  secondary d y n a stic  c o n s id e r a t io n s . Another 
fa c to r  was S p a in 's  d en ia l o f  tra d in g  r ig h ts  to  England in  th e  New 
World. This had been one o f  th e  reason s fo r  th e  war begun under 
E liz a b e th  and ended by James in  l60U w ith  th e  q u estio n  u n reso lved . 
Another reason was th e  d e s ir e  o f C harles I  to  r e s to r e  h is  s i s t e r ,  
E liz a b e th , t o  her P a la t in a te  th ron e. W hile C harles was no doubt as 
d is in te r e s te d  in  th e  P a la t in a te  as James had been , he f e l t  m orally  
bound to  tr y  to  recover E liz a b e th 's  th ron e. Another major fa c to r  was 
th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  Buckingham. As court f a v o r it e  and c h ie f  m in is te r ,  
Buckingham f e l t  th a t  he and C harles had been p layed  fo r  f o o ls  by 
Spain in  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  over th e  m arriage tr e a ty j  l i t t l e  doubt 
appears th a t  both  th ir s t e d  fo r  revenge . Buckingham saw h im se lf not 
on ly  as a great d ip lom at, but as a m aster s t r a t e g i s t ,  and i t  was he 
who planned th e  naval a tta ck  a g a in st  th e  c o a s t  o f Spain . The main 
d e s ir e  fo r  war o f  th e  E n g lish  p eo p le , however, was over th e  r e l ig io u s  
i s s u e .
CHAPTER I I
THE ROZAL NAVY DURING THE REIGN OF JAI-1ES I
E liz a b e th ’s p r in c ip a l le g a c y  to  James I  was th a t  great and 
powerful i n s t i t u t io n ,  th e  Rcyal Navy. In 1?88 , th e  year  o f th e  d e fea t  
o f  th e  Spanish Armada, th e  Royal Navy was a t  i t s  p in n a c le . The y ea r  
o f  th e  ex p ed itio n  to  C adiz, 1625, saw i t  near i t s  n a d ir . In I 603 
t h i s  to o l  o f  in te r n a t io n a l power f e l l  in to  the unsteady hands o f  
James I ,  who apparently  did not know how to  u se  i t  e f f e c t i v e ly ,  i f  
a t  a l l .  The Royal Navy in  I 6O3 was th e  b e s t  then a f lo a t .  I t  may 
not have been th e  la r g e s t ,  but i t  was th e  most e f f e c t i v e ,  and much 
o f  t h is  was due to  i t s  commanders and th e  men who manned th e  f l e e t .
The d e c lin e  o f  th e  Royal Navy, however, d id  not beg in  abruptly  
in  1603 , nor d id  i t  b eg in  a f t e r  t h is  d a te . The a c tu a l d e c lin e  o f  th e  
Royal Navy had begun during th e  l a s t  f i f t e e n  y ea rs  o f  E liz a b e th 's  
r e ig n , a f t e r  th e  d e fe a t  o f  th e  Armada in  l5 8 8 j  in  f a c t ,  even during  
t h is  great s p e c ta c le  sh ortages o f  powder had developed cau sin g  sh ip s  
o f th e  l i n e  to  g iv e  up t h e ir  p u rsu it  o f  th e  heavy s a i l in g  Spanish  
s h ip s . Admiral S ir  W illiam  Monson in  h is  Naval T racts d escrib ed  th e  
n e g le c t  o f  th e  Navy during th e  l a t t e r  p a rt o f  E liz a b e th ’s r u le  when 
S ir  R ichard Leveson was unable to  a tta ck  th e  Spanish trea su re  f l o t a  
retu rn in g  from th e  New World because o f  h is  weakened squadron; h a lf  
o f  h is  sh ip s  had been l e f t  in  Plymouth due to  th e  la c k  o f  s a i lo r s  to  
man them. He a ls o  spoke o f many o f  th e  o ld  E lizab eth an  s a i lo r s  p re­
fe r r in g  to  s a i l  on merchant v e s s e ls  where l i f e ,  fo o d , and pay were
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b e t te r  than in  th e  Royal Navy. The tough , famed, o ld  E lizabethan  sea  
dogs, Drake, Hawkins, F rob ish er , % n ter , G r e n v ille , and Burroughs, 
were a l l  gone by th e  beginn ing o f James S tu a r t’s r e ig n . C harles 
Howard, Earl o f  Nottingham, th e  commander in  l5 8 8 , remained Lord High 
Admiral u n t i l  l 6 l 9 .  I t  was under h is  a d m in istra tio n  th a t  th e  unscrup­
u lo u sn e ss , m a lp ra ctice , d ishonesty»  g r a f t ,  and b rib ery  in  m in is te r in g  
th e  Royal Navy reached i t s  peak. liJhile Nottingham served  in  h is  
ca p a c ity  as grand s t r a t e g is t  o f th e  f l e e t ,  i t  i s  apparent th a t  he 
took  l i t t l e  in t e r e s t  in  naval a d m in is tra tio n , o p era tio n s , or l o g i s ­
t i c s .  He was now very  o ld  and much o f  what he should have known 
escaped him. A ctu a lly  many o f  h is  tr o u b le s  can be traced  to  S ir  
Robert î'Iansell, a r e la t iv e ,  who had been appointed naval trea su rer  
in  l6 0 ii .  The tr e a su r e r , who was r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  f in a n c e s  o f  th e  
navy and charged w ith  th e ir  su p e r v is io n , p r o f ite d  p er so n a lly  from 
h is  u n d er-th e-cou n ter  d e a lin g s ,  ordering m a ter ia ls  th ree  or fou r tim es  
over fo r  th e  same purpose and t r a f f ic k in g  in  d if fe r e n c e s  in  p r ic e s  
paid  fo r  m a ter ie l and th a t  charged to  th e  Crown. C heating on a llo w ­
a n ces, frau d , embezzlement, th e  s a le  and purchase o f p la c e s ,  a l l  o f  
th e se  were charged to  M ansell and he was f i n a l l y  removed in  l6 lS  a f t e r  
fo u rteen  y ea rs  o f  corru p tion .^  Oddly enough, h is  d ism issa l d id  not 
r e s u lt  in  l o s s  o f  cou rt in f lu e n c e . In ca p a city  in  on e’ s p o s it io n  or 
d ish o n esty  d id  not bar one from th e  K ing's fa v o r , and when M ansell was 
r e l ie v e d  o f  h is  d u t ie s  as tr e a su r e r , he was made lie u te n a n t  o f  th e
^M. Oppenheim, A H isto iy  o f  th e  A dm in istration  o f  th e  Royal Navy 
and o f  Merchant Shipping in  R e la tio n  to  th e  Navy; from MDK to  MDCDi 
w ith  an In trod u ction  T reating  o f  th e  P receding P eriod  (London, 1896,
1 s t  e d . ,  rep r in ted  Ann Arbor, t i ic h . , 1 9 Ô i), pT 192 .
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A dm iralty fo r  l i f e  on a p en sio n .^  In a d d it io n , he was s e le c te d  to  
le a d  th e  A lg ie r s  ex p ed itio n  o f  16 2 0 -2 1 .
Many o f  th e  s a i lo r s  p referred  to  serv e  on privately-m anaged  
sh ip s  ra th er  than in  th e  K ing's s h ip s .  Due to  th e  poor co n d itio n  o f  
men and sh ip s , d is e a se  was an extrem ely grea t problem; th e  crews 
th em selves were o fte n  th e  dregs o f  th e  w a terfro n ts  and poor crews 
w i l l  r e s u lt  in  p o orly -op era ted  s h ip s .  The s a i lo r s  were not properly  
f e d , p a id , or quartered; even i f  t h e ir  conduct was good, severe  pun­
ishm ents were meted out fo r  th e  sm a lle s t  o f misdemeanors. F logg in g , 
k e e lh a u lin g , to n g u e-scra p in g , ducking, and w eigh ts hung around t h e ir  
n eck s, were common punishm ents fo r  bad conduct.^  As an odd c o r o lla r y ,  
psalm s were sung a t  th e  changing o f th e  w atches on sh ipboard, and 
r e l ig io u s  s e r v ic e s  were req u ired  to  be held  a t  l e a s t  tw ic e  each day, 
but such th in g s  as e d ib le  fo o d , prompt payment o f  w ages, h o s p ita l iz a ­
t io n ,  and adequate c lo th in g  fo r  th e  crews were n e g le c te d . Small wonder 
th a t men would go to  any le n g th s  to  avoid  s e r v in g  in  th e  Royal Navy 
or when p ressed  in to  s e r v ic e ,  th ey  o fte n  d e se r te d .^  Personnel employed 
as sh ip keep ers a t  th e  la r g e  naval shipyard a t  Chatham in clu d ed  t a i l o r s ,  
b ak ers, w eavers, husbandmen, b arb ers, m echanics, and many v aried  
occu p ation s o th er  than th a t  o f  experienced  naval p erso n n e l. An in ­
ven tory  a t  Chatham by Joseph Downing in  1625 s ta te d  th a t  one o f  th e
%iaiy Anne E v ere tt Green, e d . .  Calendar o f S ta te  Papers, Domes­
t i c  S e r ie s , o f  th e  Reign o f  James I ,  1611-161d. Preserved  in  the S ta te  
Paper Department o f Her M a jesty 's  P ublic Record O ffic e  (London, lB 5B ), 
7 I I I ,  w :
^Oppenheim, A dm in istra tion  o f th e  Royal Navy, p . l8 8 .
^ I b id .,  p . 1 8 7 .
20
primary reasons fo r  th e  navy b ein g  weakly manned was th a t  th e  b o a ts­
wains and gunners p ressed  persons o f  any tra d e , kept them fo r  a few  
y e a r s , and then d ism issed  them, so th a t  no care was taken to  develop  
a b le  seamen. The rep o rt fu r th er  s ta te d  th a t th e  guarding o f  the  
navy’ s sh ip s  ty  in s u f f i c i e n t  sh ipkeepers who did not know th e ir  b u s i­
ness would r e s u lt  in :  genera l c a r e le s s n e s s  o f  s e r v ic e ;  l in g e r in g  o f 
th e  crews on sh ore, and d iso r d e r ly  conduct th ere ; and damage to  the  
sh ip s  through n e g lig e n c e  or ign oran ce .^  I t  i s  apparent from th e  fo r e ­
going f a c t s  th a t  Royal Navy sh ip s were not b ein g  p rop erly  m aintained  
even when in a c t iv e .
Because merchant sh ip s formed th e  la r g e r  p art o f  th e  Royal Navy 
during tim es o f  c r i s e s ,  i t  i s  im p erative  to  co n sid er  them in  a d d itio n  
to  th e  R cyal Navy. IfJhen a c r i s i s  a ro se , as th e  th r e a t  o f th e  Spanish  
Armada in  1588, th e  so vereign  would c a l l  th e  merchant sh ip s  to  a s s i s t  
th o se  r e g u la r ly  a ssig n ed  to  th e  Royal Navy. A lthough norm ally l i g h t l y  
armed, th e  commercial sh ip s  were u su a lly  b e t te r  m aintained and were 
b e t te r  " sa ile r s"  than th e navy’ s s h ip s . Because o f  th e  poor pay and 
i l l  treatm ent r ec e iv ed  in  th e  Royal Navy, many s k i l l e d  seamen turned  
to  p r iv a te  or commercial sh ip p in g  fo r  employment. T heir ch o ice  was 
p o o rly  tim ed because England was hard h i t  by th e  f a l l i n g  o f f  o f  her 
commercial sh ipp ing during th e  re ig n  o f  James I .  I t  was a lam entable  
p eriod  fo r  th e  E n g lish  merchant m arine, fo r  th e  D utch, w ith  l e s s  
c o s t ly - b u i l t  s h ip s , low er pay fo r  t h e ir  p r iv a te  s a i l o r s ,  and cheaper 
sh ip p in g  r a te s ,  cu t h e a v ily  in to  England’ s sea  tra d e .^  In 1620 th e
^Cal. S t . P . ,  D om estic, l6 2 3 - l6 2 5 . p . I|.55.
'^Oppenheim, A dm in istration  o f th e  Royal Navy, p . 199 .
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number o f  London-owned sh ip s  had f a l l e n  to  o n e -h a lf  o f  what i t  had 
been in  p a s t  y ea rs;  many sh ip s  were so ld  to  other co u n tr ie s  fo r  want 
o f  th e ir  employment,^ The owners took s u b s ta n t ia l l o s s e s  in  s e l l in g  
th e ir  v e s s e l s ,  sometimes as much as o n e -h a lf  or tw o -th ird s  o f  the  
o r ig in a l c o s t s  o f  th e  s h ip s . The Levant Company found i t s  trad e  
ruined  by p ir a te s  in  th e  M editerranean and even more so by th e  inroads  
made by Dutch m erchants, who a ls o  c o n tr o lle d  th e  e x te n s iv e  trad e w ith  
Scand inavia . The Muscovy Company could on ly  employ two v e s s e l s  where­
as in  th e p a st i t  had been sev en teen . Most o f th e  c o a l t r a f f i c  from 
N ew castle was now borne in  fo r e ig n  v e s s e ls  and th e  H ollanders had 
a lso  taken over th e  f i s h e r i e s ,  even th o se  in  E n g lish  w a ters . The 
on ly  area in  which E n g lish  seamen m aintained t h e ir  supremacy was in  
th e  Ice lan d  and Newfoundland f i s h e r i e s ;  th e  Greenland f i s h e r i e s ,  on 
th e  o th er  hand, were b ein g  s tro n g ly  co n te sted  by th e  ir r e p r e s s ib le  
Dutch. In th e  most prosperous overseas o p era tio n , namely, th e  E ast 
In d ia  Company, England had to  fa c e  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  Dutch E ast In d ia
g
Company’ s p r o f i t s  were la r g e r  than th a t  o f her Company's. L i t t l e  
wonder, th en , th a t  many lo y a l  Englishmen turned to  p ira cy  as p r a c t i­
c a l ly  th e  on ly  way l e f t  in  which they  could  su rv iv e  w h ile  p ly in g  th e ir  
own seaman's trad e w ith  i t s  hard-earned s k i l l s .
P ir a te  s h ip s , manned by m otley in te r n a t io n a l crew s, swarmed in  
th e  M editerranean, th e  Bay o f  B isca y , th e  I r is h  Sea, and th e  E n g lish  
Channel. Complaints from sh ip  o w e r s  were c o n sta n tly  b ein g  rece iv ed
'̂ C a l. S t . P . ,  D om estic, 161I - I 618 , p . 6O7 .
^Oppenheim, A dm in istration  o f th e  R cyal Navy, p . 200 .
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and l i t t l e  was done by England to  curb th e  depredations o f  th e se  daring  
sea  r a id e r s .  S in ce  James had come to  th e  th ron e, th e  p ir a te s  had grown 
even b o ld er . The m aladm in istration  o f  th e  Royal Navy was now s e r io u s ly  
f e l t  as l i t t l e  was done by th e  few  poorly-manned and il l-m a in ta in e d  
sh ip s supposedly guarding B r i ta in ’ s sh o res . The co n d itio n  o f th e  sh ip s  
did not meet th a t o f th e  p ir a t e s .  The Royal Navy sh ip s  were o ld , f o u l -  
bottomed hulks fo r  th e  most part and could not match th e  p ir a te s  in  
e ith e r  v e s s e l s ,  equipment, crew s, or gunneiy . The V enetian  Ambassador 
to  England noted th a t  th e  Narrow Seas were in fe s t e d  w ith  th e se  se a -  
rob b ers, who had become a l l  th e  bolder "because th e  King seems to  have 
sunk in to  a le th a r g y  o f  p le a su r e s , and w i l l  not tak e  any heed o f  raat-
9
te r s  o f s ta t e ."  I f  th e  E n g lish  were slow  to  move a g a in s t  th e  p ir a te s  
in  th e  E n g lish  Channel, th e  Dutch were n o t . In I 61I  a f l e e t  was organ­
iz ed  under th e ir  Admiral Lambert to  wipe out th e s e  fr e e b o o te r s . To 
th e shame o f  th e  Royal Navy, p erm ission  was granted to  t h i s  f l e e t  not 
only to  perform p o lic e  work in  E n g lish  w a ters , but even to  en ter  I r is h  
harbors to  track  down the p i r a t e s . E n g l a n d  not on ly  stood  t h is  blow  
to  her n a tio n a l p r id e , but amnesty was o ffe r e d  to  th o se  p ir a te s  who 
were E n g lish  su b je c ts  in  th e  hope o f employing them in  th e  Royal Navy.^^ 
The p ir a te s  spurned th e  o f f e r ,  r e a l iz in g  th a t  th e  in a c t iv e  f l e e t  
o ffe r e d  l i t t l e  chance o f  employment. Between I 609 and 1616 th e
9
H oratio F . Brown, e d . .  Calendar o f S ta te  Papers and l’-îanuscrip ts. 
R e la tin g  to  E n g lish  A f fa ir s ,  E x is t in g  in  th e  A rch ives and C o lle c t io n s  
o f  V en ice , and in  Other L ib r a r ie s  o f  Northern I t a ly ,  1603-1607 (London, 
1900), X, 90.
*̂̂ C. D. Penn, The Navy Under th e  E arly S tu a rts  and i t s  In flu en ce  
on E n g lish  H istory  (London, 1 9 2 0 ), p . 8^1
^ ^ Ib id ., p . 2 6 .
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A lg er ia n  p ir a te s  captured four hundred and s ix t y - s ix  B r i t is h  sh ip s
12and made s la v e s  o f t h e ir  crew s. The l i g h t  on L izard  Head in  Corn­
w a ll ,  which acted  as a beacon fo r  m ariners, was even in  danger o f  
b ein g  ex tin g u ish ed  as cla im s were made th a t  i t  was a gu ide more fo r  
p ir a te s  than fo r  o th er s h i p s . T o  such a s t a t e  had th e  Royal Navy 
and th e  merchant marine sunk under th e  so v ere ig n ty  o f  James I ,  th e  
"Caledonian Solomon."
Among o th er th in g s  sh ip  owners and commercial ca p ta in s  b i t t e r ly  
r esen ted  was James' c a n c e l la t io n  o f  a l l  e x i s t in g  L e tte r s  o f  Marque 
and h is  subsequent r e fu s a l  to  i s s u e  more. I t  had been th e  p r a c t ic e  
o f Henry V III  and E liz a b e th  to  i s s u e  L e tte r s  o f  Marque to  p r iv a te  
sh ip pers who cou ld  arm th e ir  v e s s e l s  and defend th em se lv es . This 
document, fo r  th e p r iv a te e r , became in  e f f e c t ,  h is  p a ssp o r t, h is  
l i c e n s e ,  h is  id e n t i t y  card , and h is  com m ission. This paper, signed  
by th e  so v e r e ig n , s ta te d  th a t th e  p r iv a te e r  was not a c t in g  on h is  
own, but was a c tin g  fo r  h is  country a g a in s t  her enem ies. I t  was th e  
on ly  r e a l ev idence th a t th e  p r iv a te e r  cap ta in  had to  prove th a t he 
iras n o t a p ir a t e .  Mien captured , he would be tr e a te d  as a p r iso n er  
o f  war, a lb e i t  a p r iv a te  one, but w ithout th e  L e tte r  o f  Marque he 
would be executed  fo r  p ir a c y . James stopped is s u in g  th e s e  L e tte r s  
o f  blarque, but h is  f e l lo w -r u le r s  d id  n o t. This made i t  n e a r - fa ta l  
fo r  th e  p r iv a te e r s ,  who had to  r e sp e c t  o th er n a t io n 's  L e tte r s  o f  
Marque, w h ile  th ey  cou ld  produce none to  p r o te c t  th em se lv es . Thus,
l^Oppenheim, A dm in istra tion  o f  th e  Royal Navy, p . 1 9 8 . 
^ % i d . , p . 199.
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E n g lish  p r iv a te  sh ip p in g  operated -with grea t d isa d v a n ta g es. In y ea rs  
p a s t ,  th e  p r iv a te e r , should he lo s e  h is  property  to  an enen^, could  
take back from another th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  good which he had l o s t .  The 
E n g lish  sh ip  owner could not expect p r o te c t io n  from th e  Crown inasmuch 
as th e  Royal Navy was very  sm all and th e  K ing's sh ip s were u su a lly  
l a i d  up fo r  rep a ir s  fo r  one reason or an oth er. I t  i s  understandab le, 
th en , th a t  t h is  was a rec ess io n a r y  p eriod  in  E n g lish  tra d e  and sh ip -
. Ill p in g .
The power o f  th e  p ir a te s  continued  unchecked u n t i l  th e  s u f f e r ­
in g  London merchants and sh ip  owners took  m atters in t o  t h e ir  otm hands 
in  1617. They req u ested  s ix  Royal Navy sh ip s  be loan ed  to  them to  
form th e  n u cleu s o f  a squadron which th ey  would c o n tr o l them selves  
w h ile  underw riting  most o f  i t s  c o s t s .  The goa l o f t h i s  squadron was 
to  be an a tta ck  on th e  p ir a te  stron gh o ld , A lg ie r s ,  on th e  North A fr i­
can C oast, in  th e  hope o f  ex term in atin g  them once and fo r  a l l .  The 
merchants o ffe r e d  th e  E arl o f  Southampton fo r ty  thousand crowns i f  he 
would command th e  squadron fo r  them, but th e  Spanish  Ambassador,
Count Gondomar, who had James' ear as u s u a l, co n tr iv ed  to  b lock  and 
d elay  th e  m erchants' p la n s , not wanting an E n g lish  squadron in  th e  
M editerranean.^^ James f i n a l l y  refu sed  th e  lo a n  o f th e  sh ip s  u n le s s  
h is  own o f f i c e r s  were in  command. The merchants then  withdrew th e ir  
o f f e r  o f  p a r t ia l ly  f in a n c in g  th e  v en tu re , to  th e  s a t i s f a c t io n  o f  th e  
Spaniards, who were waiy o f E n g lish  in t e n t io n s .  % now, however, th e
^^Michael L ew is, The H istory  o f  th e  B r i t is h  Navy (London, 195?, 
1 s t  e d . ,  r e s e t  ed . 1 9 $ 9 ), p . 6^.
^^Penn, Navy Under th e  Early S tu a r ts , p . i;8.
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K ing’ s a tte n t io n  had been drami d ir e c t ly  to  th e  co n d itio n  o f  h is  Royal 
Navy, and in  1618 James ordered th e  appointment o f  a commission to  
in q u ir e  in to  i t s  co n d itio n  and a lle g e d  ab u ses. The Duke o f Bucking­
ham, James’ cou rt f a v o r i t e ,  had lon g  d e s ir e d  to  head th e  ad m in istra ­
t io n  o f  th e  navy, and h e, no doubt, g r e a t ly  in flu en ce d  James in  th e  
c r e a tio n  o f t h i s  new com m ission. In May 1618, S ir  Robert M ansell, 
T reasurer, was rep laced  by S ir  W illiam  R u s s e l l ,  a m erchant, who paid  
M ansell fo r  th e  p o s it io n .  R u s s e l l ' s  appointment was n ot l im ite d  to  
f in a n c ia l  m a tters , e s p e c ia l ly  th e  proper keep ing o f acco u n ts . In  
February l 6 l 9 ,  Buckingham bought out th e  Lord High Adm iral, th e  Earl 
o f Nottingham , who was then r e t ir e d  w ith  a s u b s ta n t ia l p en sion .
Tûth c o n tro l o f  th e  Royal Navy removed from th e  f e e b le  f in g e r s  o f  
Nottingham and th e  grasp in g  ones o f M ansell, th e  com m issioners and 
Buckingham im m ediately began to  i n s t i t u t e  reform s to  negate th e  p a st
y ea rs  o f  abuses and co rru p tio n . The com m issioner’s f i r s t  rep ort o f
17t h e ir  p lan s and f in d in g s  was tendered  to  James in  September I 619.
The rep ort s ta te d  t h e ir  p lan  o f  reducing  expenses from f i f t y - s i x  
thousand pounds to  t h ir t y  thousand pounds per year; to  in c r e a se  e f f i ­
c ien cy ; to  b u ild  two new sh ip s per y ea r; to  rep a ir  th o se  sh ip s  " rot­
tin g"  in  th e  sh ip yard s; and to  co n stru ct new docks a t  Chatham. I t  
was fu r th e r  re so lv e d  th a t  a minimum o f  t h ir t y  sh ip s  should  be main­
ta in e d  u n t i l  th e  f ig u r e  o f  fo r ty  had been a ch ieved , by th e  a d d itio n  
o f th e  two v e s s e ls  which had been ordered to  be b u i l t  each  y e a r .
l&Oppenheim, A dm in istration  o f th e  Royal Navy, p . 19U. 
^^Penn, Navy Under th e  Early S tu a r ts , pp. 5 l - 5 2 .
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The commission was p a r t ly  made up o f m erchants; in  th e  fu tu r e  i t  cou ld  
be expected  th a t  th e  Royal Navy would be run on a b u s in e s s - l ik e  b a s i s .  
T h is , f i n a l l y ,  was p r o g r e ss iv e  a c t io n .  Although i t  took  many years  
fo r  th e  Royal Navy to  recover and work i t s  way out o f th e  c u l-d e -sa c  
in to  which i t  had been b lin d ly  s a i le d ,  a t  l e a s t  i t  had a f a i r  wind 
and proper d ir e c t io n .
L ater in  th a t  f a t e f u l  y e a r , l 6 l 9 ,  Buckingham, in  h is  new r o le  
o f  Lord Adm iral, in flu e n c e d  James to  th e  ex ten t th a t  p lan s were la id  
fo r  th e  f i t t i n g  out o f  an ex p ed itio n  a g a in s t  A lg ie r s  to  wipe out th e  
p ir a te s  op eratin g  from t h i s  s t r a te g ic  harbor. A f l e e t  o f  tw e n ty -f iv e  
sh ip s  was decided  upon and work was begun to  make them ready fo r  sea . 
I t  was d iscovered  th a t  th e  sh ip s  o f  th e  Royal Navy were in  such poor 
co n d itio n  from t h e ir  y ea rs  o f  in a c t i v i t y ,  th a t i t  would tak e much 
lo n g er  than a n t ic ip a te d  to  make them seaw orthy. Because o f  t h i s  and 
th e  u su a l la c k  o f  K ing’ s money during th e  re ig n  o f  James, i t  was not 
u n t i l  October 1620, th a t  th e  f l e e t  s a i le d  under th e  command o f  S ir  
Robert M ansell, now in  Buckingham’s fa v o r . Oddly enough, t h i s  was 
th e  f i r s t  E n g lish  f l e e t  to  s a i l  th e  w aters o f  th e  M editerranean as 
a p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e ,  and i t  was a t a tim e when England’s  naval rep u ta­
t io n  was a t  i t s  lo w e st  p o in t in  her proud h is to r y .  An E n g lish  
squadron under Essex had raided  and put th e  to rch  to  Cadiz in  l5 ? 6 ,  
bu t had n ot en tered  th e  M editerranean. This new ven tu re  in  l6 2 0  did  
noth in g  to  enhance England’ s now ta rn ish ed  r e p u ta tio n . M ansell b lund­
ered from p la ce  t o  p la c e , tw ice  s a i le d  to  A lg ie r s ,  tw ic e  accom plished  
n oth in g , found no p ir a te s  to  d estroy  or even to  pursue, and f in a l l y  
returned  to  home w aters e lev en  months l a t e r .
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War clouds hung over Europe on h is  retu rn  in  1621 . M.th Fred­
e r ick  driven  from Bohemia and th e  P a la t in a te ,  James and h is  m in is ter s  
were glad  to  se e  M a n se ll's  f l e e t  retu rn  to  home w aters, d e sp ite  th e  
ignom inious f a i lu r e  in  th e  M editerranean. M ansell r ec e iv ed  th e blame 
fo r  th e  f a i lu r e  o f  t h i s  ex p ed itio n , although he had been se v e r e ly  
l im ite d  in  h is  a c t io n s  by h is  su p er io rs  a t  home and allow ed no l a t i ­
tude fo r  h is  own d e c i s i o n s . T h i s  e x p e d itio n , although a f a i lu r e ,  
marked th e  f i r s t  attem pt o f  England to  in f lu e n c e  th e European s i t u a ­
t io n  by th e  p resence o f  a f l e e t  in  th e  M editerranean. I t  i s  remembered 
fo r  i t s  f a i lu r e ,  but th e r e  i s  l i t t l e  doubt but th a t i t s  p resence i r r i ­
ta te d  Spain . A c tu a lly  th e  e f f o r t s  o f  Gondomar to  n e u tr a liz e  the  
E n glish  f l e e t  had seen  i t s  employment in  th e  l a s t  p la ce  Spain wanted 
i t —in  Spanish w aters! Spain on ly  breathed e a s ie r  when th e  f l e e t  was 
c a l le d  home. The method o f  employment o f  th e  f l e e t ,  however, only  
served  to  p o in t up th e  weakness o f  th e  E n g lish  naval a d m in istra tio n , 
i t s  in d e c is io n ,  and la c k  o f proper co n tro l over f l e e t  e lem en ts.
Of th e  sh ip s  th em se lv es , th e ir  co n d itio n  and u se  during th e
ten u re o f  James I ,  th ey  were n ot much of a th r e a t  o f  ary s o r t ,  except
during th e  l a s t  y e a r s  o f  th e  re ig n  when they  were b ein g  r e b u il t  and
new sh ip s were b ein g  added to  th e  f l e e t .  From I 6O3 to  1619, only f i v e
19t o t a l l y  new sh ip s  had been added, and two o f  th e s e  were but sm all 
p in n a ces, in  comparison to  th e  t h i r t y - f iv e  new sh ip s  added during th e
^ S ir  J u lia n  S . C orb ett, England in  th e  M editerranean, a Study 
o f  th e  R ise  and In flu en c e o f  B r it is h  Power W ithin th e  S t r a i t s , "l&03-  
1713 (bondon, 19OI1, 2 v o lsT J , I ,  11^.
19 Oppenheim, A dm in istration  o f  th e  Royal Navy, p . 202.
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20l a s t  e ig h teen  y ea rs  o f  E liz a b e th 's  r e ig n . A fter  th e  naval commis­
s io n  took over th e a d m in istra tio n  o f  th e  f l e e t  in  l 6l 9, ten  new sh ip s  
were added, two per y ea r  except in  l 62i|., th e  l a s t  a d d it io n s  during  
James' r e ig n . I t  was th e  gap o f  s ix te e n  y ea rs  in  James re ig n  during  
which th e  Royal Navy was n eg le c ted  and allow ed to  d e te r io r a te .  I t  
took th e  Royal Navy t h ir t y  y ea rs  to  recover from t h i s  n e g le c t  because  
w h ile  th e  d e te r io r a t io n  might be reco g n ized , th e  r e s u lt in g  damage to  
s h ip s , m a te r ie l, crew s, d i s c ip l in e ,  and morale cannot be rep a ired  
e a s i ly ,  e s p e c ia l ly  when such a lo n g  period  o f  tim e had been in vo lved  
during which th e  r o t had eaten  d eep ly . F ortu n ate ly  fo r  th e  Royal Navy, 
fo r  James, and p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  England, th e  Royal Navy was not s e r ­
io u s ly  c a l le d  upon fo r  a c t io n  during th e  re ig n  o f th e  "W isest Fool in  
Christendom." There i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  had i t  been c a l le d  upon i t  
would not have been a b le  to  d e l iv e r ,  as i t s  command and a d m in istra tion  
would have broken down under th e  s t r e s s e s  o f  w arfare. The work o f  
th e  com m issioners compared to  th e  con fu sion  and chaos th a t  preceded  
t h e ir  ta k in g  o f f i c e  had been m iraculous, but t h e ir  e f f o r t s  were o fte n  
hampered by la c k  o f  ro y a l d ir e c t io n  and always by la c k  o f m on^ . 
Although James had been in stru m en ta l in  th e  r e su r r e c tio n  o f  th e  Royal 
Navy and had s ta r te d  i t  on i t s  lo n g  road to  reco v ery , he must s t i l l  
bear th e  brunt o f  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  th e  co n d itio n  in to  which i t
had sunk. As e a r ly  as I 6O8 James had been aware o f  th e  p ecu la tio n s
21and m isdeeds o f  h is  Royal Navy a d m in is tra to rs . That he had chosen
^ ° I b id .,  pp. 120- 21 .
21I b id . ,  p . 2 l5 .
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to  do n oth in g , to  l e t  m atters r e s t ,  to  fa v o r  th o se  persons in vo lved  
in  th e  m aladm in istration  o f  naval a f f a ir s ,  and to  r is k  th e  se c u r ity  
o f th e  nation  i t s e l f ,  has been d etrim en ta l to  James' memory. He i s  
remembered fo r  th e s e  l a t t e r  th in g s  and not fo r  beginn ing th e recovery  
o f E ngland's l o s t  naval p r e s t ig e .  The fo reg o in g  marks th e  s ta tu s  o f  
th e Royal Navy a t th e  a c c e ss io n  to  th e  throne o f  C harles I  on 27 March 
1625 . Inasmuch as E ngland's f e l lo w  n a tio n s  had l i t t l e  regard fo r  her 
as a power in  l 62^, i t  must have been apparent to  them th a t  th e  weapon 
w ith  which C harles was about to  wage a war had been co n sid erab ly  
d u lled  and b lunted  during h is  p r e d e c e sso r 's  r e ig n .
CHA.FTER I I I  
PREPARATICWS FCR THE EXPEDITION
As e a r ly  as 1620, C harles and Buckingham had urged James to  
tak e an a c t iv e  r o le  in  th e  war sweeping over Europe. Stubbornly,
James had r e s is t e d  th e ir  in f lu e n c e , hoping th a t  a p ea ce fu l se ttlem en t  
could be reached . When C harles and Buckingham had returned  empty- 
handed from Spain in  October, 1623, a f t e r  f a i l i n g  to  arrange fo r  an 
a ccep ta b le  m arriage t r e a ty ,  t h ^  again  pleaded fo r  a war a g a in st  the  
now-hated Spaniards. The Privy C ouncil and Court had been in  alm ost 
com plete agreement w ith  th e  young, hot-b looded  p a ir ,  and y e t  James 
had r e s i s t e d .
By January l62lj., however, James had, to  a g rea t e x te n t , y ie ld e d .  
W rits had been is s u e d  fo r  a new P arliam ent. Ambassadors o f  war had 
been ordered to  Savoy, V en ice , Denmark, Sweden, and th e  co u rts  o f  th e  
north German p r in c e s .  An a l l ia n c e  had been made w ith  th e  Dutch Repub­
l i c  to  a s s i s t  them w ith  tro o p s .^  A m arriage l in k in g  C harles and th e  
French p r in c e s s , H en r ietta  Alaria, you n gest daughter o f  Marie de M edici, 
had been proposed ty  Buckingham; Lord K ensington had been d ispatched  
to  P a r is  to  sound out th e  French on th e  p r o je c t .  S p ain , alarmed a t  
th e  turn  o f  e v e n ts , had r e a l iz e d  what a h o s t i l e  E n g lish  f l e e t  in  th e  
A tla n t ic  and M editerranean could  mean, and a ls o  th a t  she had made
^Samuel Rawson G ardiner, A H istory  o f  England Under th e  Duke 
o f  Buckingham and C harles I ,  162II-1628 (London, Id?^, 2 v o l s . } ,
I ,  TÜ
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enem ies out o f  C harles and Buckingham. On 13 January l6 2 L , th e  Spanish  
Ambassadors, In o jo sa  and Coloma, had inform ed James th a t  b efo re  th e  
end o f  August, th a t p art o f  th e  P a la t in a te  occupied  by Spanish troop s  
would be turned over to  England.^ Any o th er p o in ts  in  doubt were to  
be s e t t le d  by n e g o t ia t io n . James, th e  man o f p eace, had considered  
t h is  c a r e fu l ly  and had agreed to  co n su lt  th e  Commissioners fo r  Spanish  
A f f a ir s ,  a bocfy o f  tw elve  o f  h is  le a d in g  P rivy C o u n c illo r s . The Com­
m issio n ers  had inform ed him th a t  th ere  was no reason  to  p e r s is t  w ith  
th e  Spanish p ro p o sa l. The Spanish p rop osa ls  had then  been r e fu se d . 
Buckingham had reached a g rea te r  p o s it io n  o f  power than ever b efo re;  
James had y ie ld e d  r ig h t  in to  h is  in exp er ien ced  hands. War w ith  Spain  
had been con sid ered , had been found a n e c e s s ity ,  and no other j u s t i f i ­
c a t io n  had been req u ired .
Even when James was m aster o f  h is  house, however, th ere  had been  
a d ivergen ce o f  op in ion  as to  fu tu r e  war p la n s . Commons demanded 
a g g r e ss iv e  a c tio n  a g a in s t  Spain and as l i t t l e  as p o s s ib le  in  Germany, 
w h ile  James wanted ju s t  th e  r e v e r se , l&th Buckingham and C harles in  
c o n tr o l,  th e  major e f f o r t  would be d ir e c te d  a g a in st  Spain , th e Spanish  
f l e e t s ,  and th e  West I n d ie s ,  w ith  m ilita r y  o p era tion s co n fin ed  to  a 
minor r o le  supporting  th e  Dutch R ep u b lic . When James fa ced  Commons 
in  March l62U , he re fu sed  to  ex p la in  h is  war p la n s , c la im in g  th a t  he 
was n ot dependent upon Parliam ent fo r  m il ita r y  a d v ice , but upon a 
C ouncil o f  War, which he would ap p o in t. A ll  war p lan s must be l e f t  to  
th e  King, but he promised to  c a l l  Parliam ent in  th e  autumn when he
^ Ib id . ,  p . 3 .
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would g iv e  an account o f  h is  exp en d itu res and ask t h e ir  sa n ctio n  fo r  
fu r th er  p ro secu tio n  o f  th e  war. In March, th e  Parliam ent voted  him 
th ree  hundred thousand pounds, about o n e-th ird  o f  th a t  which had been  
considered  as n ecessary  fo r  th e  contem plated a l l ia n c e s  and p r o je c ts .^
In  January, L e tte r s  o f  R ep r isa l had been granted to  merchants 
and sh ip  owners. These were eq u iv a len t to  th e  L e tte r s  o f  Marque 
mentioned in  Chapter I I ,  and had au th orized  th e  s e iz u r e  o f  Spanish  
or Dutch sh ip s  in  r e p r is a l  fo r  l o s s  o f  t h e ir  own.^ I t  had been many 
y ea rs  s in c e  t h i s  odd form o f p r o te c t io n  had been granted  to  th e  sh ip  
owners and was welcomed w ith  r e l i e f .  These a c ts  had been handled  
d if f e r e n t ly  than in  th e  p a s t , however, as th e s e  m atters were c o n tr o l­
le d  th e  A dm iralty. To ob ta in  a L e tte r  o f  R e p r isa l, th e  sh ip  owners 
had to  f i r s t  produce ev idence o f  t h e ir  l o s s e s .  Iiîhen th ey  s e iz e d  a 
Spanish or Dutch s h ip , i t  had to  be brought to  a p o rt where an Admir­
a lty  Court would judge th e  d is p o s it io n  o f  th e  sh ip  and cargo , in su r in g  
th a t th e  captor would r e c e iv e  th e  v a lu e  o f  h is  p rev ious l o s s ,  w ith  
th e  b a lan ce to  th e  Crown.
In February, in  an e f f o r t  t o  stren gth en  th e  E n g lish  f l e e t ,  th e  
Privy C ouncil d ir e c te d  S ir  John E l l i o t t  and James Bagg, v ic e  adm irals 
o f  Cornwall and Devon, to  s e iz e  a l l  E n g lish  seamen serv in g  on Dutch 
sh ip s which were in  harbors in  t h e ir  areas o f c o n tr o l.^  These tr a in e d  
seamen were to  be employed in  th e  Royal Navy now preparing fo r  a c t io n .
^ I b id .,  pp. 31 -32 .
^Acts o f  th e  Privy C ouncil o f  England 1623-1626 (London, 193h', 
m icrocard, W ashington, D. C ., 196377 33 , 6 l8 -2 0 .
^ Ib id ., 39 , 677.
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and on l 8 A p r il ,  orders were i s s u e d  to  f i t  out tw e lv e  sh ip s  o f  the  
Royal Navy.'^
On 21 A p r il a C ouncil o f  War was appointed w ith  th e  supposed  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  a d v is in g  th e  so v e r e ig n . I t s  members were men o f  
t a le n t  and a b i l i t y :  Pulke G r e v il le ,  Lord Brooke; S ir  Thomas Button;
Lord Carew, M aster o f  th e  Ordnance, and former E resid en t o f  Munster; 
S ir  Edward C e c il;  Lord C h ich ester , th e  s o ld ie r  and statesm an; S ir  
Edward Conway; S ir  O liv er  S t .  John, Lord G randison, form er s o ld ie r  
and Lord Deputy o f  Ire la n d ; S ir  John Ogle; and S ir  Horace V ere, some 
o f th e  b e s t  m ilita r y  b ra in s o f  th e  tim e. The ten th  member was S ir
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Robert M ansell. I t  must be p o in ted  out th a t  o f ten  members o f  th e  
C ouncil o f  War, n in e were s o ld ie r s ,  and on ly  one, M ansell, had any 
naval ex p er ien ce—hardly enough experienced  seamen to  p lan  an exp ed i­
t io n  which depended so much upon th e  na'vy. These men were s e le c te d ,  
no doubt, because th ey  had f a i r l y  rec en t m ilita r y  ex p erien ce  e ith e r  
in  th e  N etherlands or in  Ire la n d , and because England p o sse sse d  few  
se n io r  naval o f f ic e r s  w ith  combat ex p er ien ce . Furtherm ore, th e  
appointment o f  O gle, V ere, Conway, C e c i l ,  and M ansell, smacked of 
fa v o r it ism  a l a  Buckingham.
To p o in t up th e  odd r e la t io n s h ip s  o f th e  t im e s , England had a 
m ilita r y  a l l ia n c e  w ith  th e  Dutch R ep u b lic , and y e t  had is su e d  L e tte r s  
o f  R ep r isa l t o  be used a g a in s t  th e  H ollanders as w e ll  as a g a in s t  th e  
Spaniards. B it t e r  r i v a lr ie s  e x is te d  between th e  o v erseas commercial
^C al. S t . P . ,  D om estic, 1623-1623 , p . 217. 
7 lb id /.p . 220.
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e n te r p r ise s  o f  th e  two n a tion s and in  May, news o f  th e  Amboina massa­
cre had reached England. Amboina, an Indonesian is la n d  in  th e  M oluccas, 
the cen ter  o f  th e  c lo v e  tra d e , had been taken by th e  Dutch from Spain  
in  1607 . th e  tr e a ty  o f I 619, E n g lish  tra d ers  had been given  r ig h ts  
to  operate on th e  is la n d .®  In a d is p u te , ten  Englishmen had been 
tortu red  and put to  d eath . IVhen th e news reached England, th ere  had 
been an outcry  a t  f i r s t ,  but t h i s  d ied  away q u ick ly  as th e  p u b lic  had 
not been in te r e s te d  in  charges a g a in st  an a l l y ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  when th e  
common enerry had been C a th o lic  Spain .
In th e  co n tin u in g  naval b u ild  up, th e  C ouncil o f  ¥ar issu ed  
orders on 19 May to  f i t  out t h ir t y  merchant v e s s e l s  in  a d d itio n  to  
th e tw elv e  Royal Navy sh ip s  p r e v io u s ly  ordered to  be made ready.® On 
 ̂ June, by another tr e a ty  r e c e n t ly  n e g o tia te d , England agreed to  send 
s ix  thousand s o ld ie r s  to  th e  Dutch R epublic to  a id  them in  t h e ir  f ig h t  
fo r  independence and to  ev en tu a lly  recover th e  P a la t in a te .  Except fo r  
a form al d e c la r a tio n  England was in  f a c t  in v o lv ed  in  th e  genera l war. 
The King, however, adhered to  th e  t e c h n ic a l i t y  and h is i t a t e d ,  b efo re  
is s u in g  an open d e c la r a tio n  o f  war. He refu sed  t o  r is k  an open war 
w ith  Spain u n le s s  he knew who h is  a l l i e s  would b e . That he wanted 
France, in  p a r t ic u la r , t o  s id e  w ith  him was c le a r .  French a id  in  th e  
o v e r a ll  p r o je c t  was tem pting indeed; whether he cou ld  convince one 
C ath o lic  s t a t e  to  wage war upon another remained to  be se e n .
On 17 May, th e  Earl o f  C a r li s le  was d isp atch ed  to  P aris  to  work 
xd.th Lord K ensington, who had been th ere  fo r  some months, in  an e f f o r t
®Penn, Navy Under th e  E arly S tu a r ts , p . 107.
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to  consummate th e  p lans fo r  th e  French m arriage. The n e g o tia t io n s  
droned on through th e  summer months w ith  n e ith e r  s id e  -w illin g  to  meet 
th e  o th e r 's  demands. England p ressed  fo r  a m ilita r y  a l l ia n c e  a g a in s t  
Spain and th e  Empire, w h ile  France in s i s t e d  th a t E n g lish  C a th o lic s  
be a llow ed  to  worship in  freedom . James, upon th e  u rg in g  o f  Bucking­
ham and C harles, f i n a l l y  gave i n .  He promised P arliam ent, ho-wever, 
th a t  no such compromise would be in c lu d ed  in  any tr e a ty  w ith  France.
To g e t  around t h is  prom ise, James made th e  C ath o lic  r e l ig io u s  freedom  
is s u e  b in d in g  in  a sep a ra te  l e t t e r ,  r e c e iv in g  on ly  v erb a l prom ises 
from L ouis X III  in  exchange. To avo id  fa c in g  P arliam en t, James pro­
rogued th a t  bocfy u n t i l  26 February, u sin g  th e  excuse o f  th e  p lagu e, 
which made London an u n sa fe  p la ce  to  m eet. He hoped th a t  once th e  
m arriage was consummated and th e  b r id e  was s a fe  in  England, th e  c i r ­
cumstances o f  her coming would have been fo r g o tte n . The marriage
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tr e a ty  was sign ed  by th e  ambassadors on 10 November l6 2 L .
In a f la s h  o f  h is  o ld  s e l f  and s t i l l  d i s l ik in g  th e  id e a  o f  a 
d ir e c t  c o n te s t  w ith  Spain , James had convinced th e  C ouncil o f  War in  
October th a t  more m ilita r y  a id  should  be fu rn ish ed  to  th e  Dutch Repub­
l i c .  I t  i s  not known what arguments he used to  sway t h i s  group, but 
on 3 October and 22 November, w arrants had been is s u e d  to  empower th e  
payment o f  f i f t e e n  thousand pounds fo r  th e  c o s ts  o f  le-vying troops  
fo r  Count M ansfeld , and fo r ty  thousand pounds to  pay th e s e  s o ld ie r s  
fo r  two m o n t h s . O n  29 October orders had been is s u e d  to  le v y  tw elve
% ard iner. H istory  o f  England, I ,  112 .
^ °C al. ^ . P . ,  D om estic, 1623-162^ , pp. 3U8, 386 .
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thousand men to  be u lt im a te ly  sen t to  th e  N etherlands under M ansfeld. 
These troop s were to  be used only  fo r  th e  recovery  o f  th e  P a la t in a te .  
P lans fo r  t h is  p r o je c t ,  apparently  th e King’s own, were com pleted  
w ithout any agreement w ith  th e  German p r in c e s . James seemed to  be­
l i e v e  th a t h is  arcy sen t in to  th e  P a la t in a te  a g a in s t  Spanish , A ustrian , 
and Bavarian tro o p s , was a d if f e r e n t  m atter than a c tu a l d ir e c t  war 
Spain . The th e a te r  o f  c o n f l i c t  seemed to  m atter a great d ea l to  James. 
He expected  coord inated  a c tio n  from France to  a s s i s t  in  th e  passage  
o f  M ansfeld’ s fo r c e s ,  but France had already secured  th e  V a lt e l l in e ,  
her primary in t e r e s t ,  w ith  th e  a s s is ta n c e  o f  V enice and Savoy, and 
thus had no u se  fo r  M ansfeld or h is  tr o o p s . To th e  dismay o f  James, 
France had refu sed  to  l e t  M ansfeld lan d ; th u s , th e  l a t t e r  and h is  
wretched arny had been fo rced  t o  land  a t F lu sh in g , in  th e  N eth erlan d s, 
on 1 February l6 2 5 . This m otley arny su ffe red  from th e  o u tse t  from 
a la c k  o f  fo o d , s h e lt e r ,  and c lo th in g , and had embarked w ith  on ly  
fo u r  or  f i v e  day’ s supply o f  r a t io n s .  In th e  c o ld  and snow o f the  
c o n tin e n t , s ic k n e ss  broke ou t; by March, roughly th r e e  thousand o f
th e  o r ig in a l fo r c e  o f  tw e lv e  thousand men were capable o f  bearing  
11
arms. The p ro sp ects  o f M ansfeld’s ever reach in g  Germany w ith  t h is  
wasted fo r c e  grew dimmer every day.
In th e  m idst o f  th e s e  e v e n ts , th e  unhappy James d ied  on 27 March 
1 6 2 5 . H enceforth , C harles and Buckingham were f r e e  to  pursue th e ir  
own course w ithout in te r fe r e n c e .  On 9 May, C harles d ir e c te d  th e  
estab lish m en t o f  a Committee o f  h is  Privy C ouncil c o n s is t in g  o f
^^Donald N ic h o la s , S ecretary  N ich o las ( l5 9 3 - l6 9 9 ) His L ife  
and L e tte r s  (London, 1 9 5 5 ) , p . hO.
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Buckingham, Pembroke, Ley, Conway, and Brook, t o  ad v ise  him on fo r e ig n  
12a f f a i r s .  One o f  t h e ir  f i r s t  a c t io n s  was to  secu re a lo a n  o f  fo r ty  
thousand pounds in  Amsterdam to  a s s i s t  M ansfeld and h is  su ffe r in g  
tr o o p s . A con gress o f  th e  northern powers was to  meet a t  th e  Hague, 
but inasmuch as t h i s  had been slow  in  assem blin g , C harles made a 
sep ara te  agreement w ith  th e  King o f Denmark, who would en ter  th e  war 
w ith  a subsidy o f  t h ir t y  thousand pounds per month from England.
He made a l l  o f  th e s e  p lan s w ithout th e  a d v ise  or consent o f  P arliam ent, 
an o b s ta c le  which C harles b e lie v e d  he could  surmount through h is  p er­
sonal p o p u la r ity . Thus d id  C harles badly m isjudge th e temper o f  h is  
f i r s t  P arliam ent.
Buckingham f i r s t  expounded h is  grand iose id e a  o f  a naval a tta ck  
upon Spain in  December l6 2 i; . A fter  James^ dem ise he proposed going  
ahead w ith  t h i s  v en tu re . Twelve Royal Navy s h ip s , tw enty armed mer­
chantmen, and f i f t y  c o l l i e r s ,  to  serv e  as tr a n sp o r ts , were ordered to  
Plymouth in  June. Buckingham p ro ffered  t h ir t y  thousand pounds o f  h is  
own funds to  b eg in  th e  o p era tio n . On 5 May, th e  P rivy C ouncil sen t  
w arrants to  th e  v a r io u s co u n tie s  by which ten  thousand landsmen were 
to  be p ressed  to  serv e  as s o ld ie r s  w ith  th e f l e e t T h e  lo c a l  author­
i t i e s  were d ir e c te d  to  march th e ir  l e v i e s  to  Plymouth by 25 June. On 
l 6 May, some o f  th e  northern co u n tie s  were d ir e c te d  to  send l e v i e s  to
^^Cal. S t . P . ,  D om estic, l6 2 5 - l6 2 6 , p . 7 .  
^^ Ib id . ,  p . L l.
l ^Acts o f  th e  P rivy  C ouncil,  lj.0, hZ-kS ,
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th e  p ort o f H u ll, near th e  mouth o f  th e  R iver Humber, on th e  North 
Sea.^^ The reason  fo r  th e d iv e r s io n  was to  sh ip  two thousand o f th e se  
p ressed  men to  th e  N etherlands in  exchange fo r  two thousand seasoned  
E n glish  tro o p s , which were to  be used to  stead y  th e u n tra in ed , raw 
r e c r u it s  rep o rtin g  to  Plymouth. Buckingham did t h is  mthout'. c o n su lt in g  
th e  Dutch, who, to  h is  ch agrin , re fu sed  to  part w ith  th e  two thousand  
experienced  ïh g l i s h  troop s under th e ir  c o n tr o l. They f i n a l l y  con sen ted , 
but in s i s t e d  th a t whole companies be rep la ced , so th a t  some in e x p e r i­
enced men would be taken along w ith  th e  seasoned v e te r a n s . The Dutch 
changed th e ir  minds, however, as they  con sid ered  t h e ir  arny to  be too  
weak w ithout th e  E n g lish  v e te r a n s , and th e  o r ig in a l two thousand un­
tr a in e d  men were then  shipped to  P ly m o u th .B u c k in g h a m  a ls o  in v ite d  
th e  Dutch R epublic to  jo in  th e  naval a tta ck  on Spain; th ey  consented  
to  p rovid e twenty s h ip s . At th e  same tim e th e  Dutch in d ic a te d  th a t
th ey  would b rin g  to  t r i a l  th o se  r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  Amboina m assacre,
17a move which served  to  c le a r  away any d is se n s io n  which had e x is t e d .
On May Day l62^  C harles m arried P rin cess H en r ie tta  Maria by 
proxy in  fr o n t o f  th e  w est doors o f Notre Dame C athedral. C harles 
was rep resen ted  by th e  French Duke o f  Chevreuse, a d is ta n t  r e la t iv e  
through h is  great-grandm other, Mary o f G u ise . For th e  sake o f  a c lo s e  
union w ith  France, th e  m arriage tr e a ty  bound England to  grant r e l ig io u s  
to le r a t io n  to  C a th o lic s , a p o lic y  w hich, when known, would c o s t
^^ Ib id . ,  p .
^^Cal. S t . P .,  D om estic, l6 2 3 - l6 2 6 ,  pp. and D alton ,
L if e  o f  C e c i l , p . 125*
^^Gardiner, H istory  o f  England, I ,  173-7^ .
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Buckingham and C harles th e  p o p u la r ity  which they  momentarily enjoyed .
I t  was a r isk y  arrangement in d eed , fo r  no one knew in  which d ir e c t io n  
th e  French might tu rn . No peace had y e t  been reached between th e  
C a th o lic  government o f  France and P rince C harles Soubise and h is  
P r o te sta n t Huguenots o f  R o ch e lle . The E n g lish  p eo p le , fa v o r in g  th e  
Huguenots, c lo s e ly  watched t h e ir  treatm ent by th e  French, w h ile  th e  
French observed  th e  treatm ent o f  E n g lish  C a th o lic s . I t  seemed impos­
s ib l e  f o r  th e  two n a tio n s  to  work to g e th e r  in  harmony; excep t fo r  lo a n s  
concerning E n g lish  w arsh ips, they  never reached a s t a t e  o f co m p a tib il­
i t y .  Buckingham made a personal v i s i t  to  th e  French Court in  mid-May, 
b e lie v in g  th a t  through h is  g l i t t e r in g  presen ce he would be a b le  to  
persuade France to  a j o in t  campaign a g a in s t  Spain . L ouis X III  agreed  
to  donate one hundred thousand pounds toward th e  war expenses o f  th e  
King o f  Denmark; to  con tin u e h is  share o f  M ansfeld*s c o s t s  fo r  seven  
months more, and to  p rov id e him w ith  two thousand French ca v a liy .^ ^  
Beyond t h i s  he could not be moved. Buckingham hoped fo r  a grand 
d ip lom atic  su ccess  which would u lt im a te ly  r e s u l t  in  a tremendous 
m ilita r y  and naval v ic to r y  over Spain . He needed t h i s  d esp era te ly  
because he r e a l iz e d  th a t  he and C harles would be in  d ir e  tro u b le  when 
th e  news o f  th e  co n cessio n s to  E n g lish  C a th o lic s  reached th e  ears o f  
Parliam ent and th e  p u b lic .  But he returned  b i t t e r l y  d isa p p o in ted , 
having y ie ld e d  a g rea t d ea l w ith  l i t t l e  in  re tu rn .
On 18 June, Parliam ent f i n a l l y  m et, having been prorogued again  
by James a t  i t s  l a s t  scheduled  assem bly in  February. I t  was an
^ ^ Ib id ., p . 181.
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in c r e d ib ly  d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  which C harles now fa c e d . He must persuade 
th e Commons to  grant him fa n ta s t ic  sums o f  money to  attem pt schemes 
which th ey  knew noth ing about and on which th e ir  a d v ice  had not been  
asked. These proposed p r o je c ts ,  o f which th e  Commons were unaware, 
were extrem ely ex p en siv e . Requirements fo r  th e  next y ea r  in clud ed  
th ree  hundred and s ix t y  thousand pounds fo r  th e  King o f  Denmark; two 
hundred and fo r ty  thousand pounds fo r  M ansfeld; one hundred thousand  
pounds fo r  th e  tro o p s in  th e  N etherlands under th e  Dutch; th ree  hun­
dred thousand pounds fo r  th e  f l e e t :  a rough t o t a l  o f  one m illio n  
19pounds! This f ig u r e ,  over th r e e  tim es th e  amount o f  th e  su b s id ie s  
granted in  162U, was an unheard o f  sum. Commons was r e lu c ta n t  to  
grant supply w ithout knowing where and how i t  was to  be u sed . C harles, 
a b lin d  b e lie v e r  in  th e  d iv in e  r ig h t  o f  k in g sh ip  and h is  ro y a l p rerog­
a t iv e ,  re fu sed  to  t e l l  them an yth in g . At th e  l a s t  m eeting of P a r l ia ­
ment, James had promised an exp lan ation  o f  h is  p o l ic y ,  but Charles 
ignored  th e  prom ise and b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  Commons, through t h e ir  f a i t h  
in  him should grant th e  sums asked w ith ou t h is  having t o  fu r n ish  any
ex p la n a tio n . On 30 June he re c e iv e d  two s u b s id ie s ,  a t o t a l  o f  around
20one hundred and fo r ty  thousand pounds. T his was a b i t t e r  p i l l  fo r  
C harles to  sw allow . D esp erately  n eed fu l o f money, he was b locked  a t  
ev e iy  turn  Try h is  own stub b orn n ess. Even h is  income from tonnage 
and poundage was in  jeopar^r» S in ce  th e  days o f  Henry 71 th e  d u tie s  
on im ports and exp orts had been granted fo r  th e  l i f e t im e  o f  th e  
sovereign  in  th e  f i r s t  s e s s io n  o f h is  r u le .  I t  was proposed by S ir
^^ Ib id . ,  p . 187 . 
^ ° I b id .,  p . 200 .
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W alter E rie  o f D o r se tsh ir e  th a t  th e se  m onies, which could  be b e t te r  
used e lsew h ere , should be h eld  in  abeyance fo r  a y e a r  so th a t th e  whole 
m atter could  be s tu d ied  fu r th e r . No a c t io n  was taken in  e ith e r  d ir e c ­
t io n ,  so th ere  th e  m atter was allow ed  to  r e s t .
Buckingham then s e le c te d  S ir  John Coke to  inform  Commons as to  
th e  amounts req u ired  by C harles to  carry out h is  p o l i c i e s .  The amounts, 
though u n d ersta ted , shocked Commons; in  f a c t ,  th ey  d id  a b so lu te ly  
n o th in g . Parliam ent was then  adjourned u n t i l  1 August; i t  was to  meet 
a t Oxford because o f  th e  p la g u e . The m eeting a t  Oxford was e n t ir e ly  
f r u i t l e s s  fo r  C harles and Buckingham. I t  c o n s is te d  o f  tw elve  days o f  
argument and d eb ate, during which tim e Buckingham h im se lf  defended h is  
fo r e ig n  p o l i c i e s ,  but th e  Commons would not bend. The d if fe r e n c e  o f  
op in ion  between Parliam ent and Crown had b o ile d  down to  a power con­
t e s t  w ith  n e ith e r  s id e  prepared to  surrender i t s  r ig h t s .  Unfortun­
a t e ly  fo r  C harles, th e  Commons c o n tr o lle d  th e  purse s tr in g s  and he was 
cu t o f f  from h is  sou rces o f  revenue. On 12 A ugust, am idst grea t b i t t e r ­
n ess  and d is s a t i s f a c t io n  on both  s id e s ,  C harles prorogued th e Oxford 
P arliam ent.
On l l ;  August th e  P rivy  C ouncil met a t  Woodstock and agreed th a t
th e  f l e e t  p rep ara tion s should  co n tin u e . On 23 A ugust, they  le v ie d
c e r ta in  o f th e  c o u n tie s  fo r  an a d d itio n a l one thousand n in e hundred
and f i f t y  p ressed  men and ordered them to  be a t  Plymouth on 12 Septera- 
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h er . This body a ls o  is su e d  a warrant on th e  same date d ir e c te d  to  
mayors and s h e r i f f s  to  a s s i s t  th e fo llo w in g  gentlem en, th e  le a d e r s  in
2^A cts o f  th e  P rivy  C ou n cil, I4O, 1 3 5 -3 6 .
h i
th e  ex p ed itio n  th a i form ing, to  g e t  t o  Plymouth w ith  a l l  p o s s ib le  
speeds S ir  Edward C e c i l ,  Lord V iscount de V a le n t ia , S ir  W illiam  S t .  
L eger, S ir  Edward Harwood, and S ir  John Burroughs. On U May, Buck­
ingham had w r itten  to  S ir  Edward C e c i l ,  then se r v in g  in  H olland,
o f fe r in g  him th e  p o st o f  Lord M arshal, or second in  command, o f  the
22
ex p ed itio n  preparing to  a tta ck  Spanish sh ip p in g . This came as a 
g rea t su rp r ise  to  C e c i l ,  who had seen  l i t t l e  s e r v ic e  o u ts id e  o f  th e  
Low C ou n tr ies , a lthough  he had been appointed as a member o f  th e  
C ouncil o f  War by James in  162^. Not u n t i l  5 September d id  C e c il
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reach Plymouth, where sh o r t ly  he r ec e iv ed  an even g r e a te r  su r p r ise .
At Plymouth th e  f l e e t  p rep aration s had been going  on s in c e  the
end o f  A p r il .  S h ip s , seamen, and p r o v is io n s  were everyw here. The
merchant sh ip s , c o n s is t in g  m ainly o f  E ast Coast c o l l i e r s  and tr a d e r s ,
were rep orted  ready and had been p ro v is io n ed  w ith  bread , b eer , pork,
b e e f ,  b u tte r , ch eese , r i c e ,  oatm eal, l i n g ,  cod, and o i l .^ ^  Some o f
th e se  item s were a lreac^  s p o ile d .  Some p r o v is io n s , e s p e c ia l ly  th e
bags o f  b i s c u i t ,  were sh ort in  w e ig h t. D isea se  raged among th e
p ressed  s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  assem bled a t Plymouth, and hardly  a boat
2^
went ashore w ithout some o f  i t s  men d e s e r t in g . The sh ip s  were lea k y  
and many had d e fe c t iv e  equipment. The George was f i t t e d  w ith  s a i l s  
which had been on th e  Triumph in  1^88 w h ile  th e  shrouds had been on
^^I b id . ,  p . 137 .
^^Penn, Navy Under th e  Early S tu a r ts , p . 139 .
^^Reade, S id e l ig h t s ,  pp. i;73-7U.
25Cppenheim, A dm in istra tion  o f th e  Royal Navy, p . 219.
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th e  o ld  Garland b u i l t  in  l5 9 0 .  The L ion , under command o f th e  Bear 
Adm iral, S ir  F ran cis  Steward, was in  such poor co n d itio n  she had to  
be l e f t  behind when th e  f l e e t  ev e n tu a lly  s a i l e d . T h e  few  p r o fe s ­
s io n a l o f f i c e r s  who were th e r e  warned th e  C ouncil and Buckingham o f  
th e  typ e  o f  r e s u l t s  to  be expected  w ith  such q u a lity  o f  men, m a te r ie l,  
and p r o v is io n s . The veteran  s o ld ie r .  S ir  John O gle, was tem porarily  
in  command o f th e  tro o p s a t  Plymouth pending th e  a r r iv a l  o f  th e  Lord 
Adm iral, Buckingham, and th e  Lord M arshal, C e c i l .  A lthough Ogle 
p o ssessed  but one e y e , i t  was th a t  o f  a p r o fe s s io n a l s o ld ie r ,  and th e
more he saw o f  th e  raw, u n tra in ed  r e c r u it s  a r r iv in g  in  Plymouth, th e
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l e s s  he l ik e d  them. For some weeks p r io r  to  C e c i l ' s  a r r iv a l .  Ogle 
asked Lord Conway to  r e le a s e  him from h is  assign m en t. Buckingham, 
w e ll knowing O g le 's  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and r e p u ta tio n , o ffe r e d  him th e  p o st  
o f  c o lo n e l-g e n e r a l o f  tr o o p s , second on ly  to  Lord Marshal C e c i l .  Not 
even t h i s  lu c r a t iv e  p o st  cou ld  tempt Ogle a f t e r  s e e in g  th e  t o o ls  o f  
war provided him. In ea r ly  A ugust, Buckingham decided  th a t  he would 
not go on th e  e x p ed itio n  as supreme commander. When Ogle heard th a t  
Buckingham would n o t s a i l ,  he had no qualms about d e c lin in g  th e  ap-
p«
pointm ent o ffe r e d  him.
Mhy in  th e  f i n a l  a n a ly s is  d id  Buckingham d ecid e  to  remain a t  
home? There i s  l i t t l e  reason  to  b e l ie v e  th a t  he thought th e ex p ed itio n
^ ^ Ib id ., p .  220 .
^^Charles D a lton , L if e  and Times o f  General S ir  Edward C e c i l , 
V iscount ¥im bledon. C olonel o f  an E n g lish  Regiment in  th e  Patch Serv­
i c e ,' I 6O5- 1631, and One o f His M ajesty 's  Most Honourable Privy C o u n cil, 
I 628- I 63Ü (London, 16B^, 2 v o l s . ) ,  I I ,  11 3 .
^^Ibid., pp. 126-27.
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would f a i l ,  because i t  would have been more o f  a detrim ent to  him had 
he known t h is  and l e t  i t  happen than had he m erely c a n c e lle d  th e  
e x p e d it io n 's  p la n s . He stood  to  l o s e  more through th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  
ex p ed itio n  than had he decided  to  employ th e  men and sh ip s e lsew h ere .
A more l i k e l y  reason  was th a t h is  presen ce was requ ired  a t  th e lo n g -  
d eferred  conference to  be held  a t  th e  Hague in  th e  attem pt to  e s ta b ­
l i s h  a northern a l l ia n c e  o f powers a g a in s t  th e  Hapsburgs. The Duke 
always had grea t con fid en ce  in  h is  own a b i l i t i e s ;  perhaps, he thought 
he cou ld  do more fo r  England and h im se lf  in  th e  r o le  o f  d ip lom at. 
Although he re lin q u ish e d  command o f th e  ex p ed itio n  to  C e c il ,  Bucking­
ham r e ta in e d  th e  t i t l e  o f g en era liss im o  o f  th e  f l e e t ,  to  th e  great  
amusement o f  th e  s a i lo r s .  S ir  Edward C e c il was then p laced  in  an odd 
predicam ent 1:̂  Buckingham's sudden d e c is io n  to  o f f e r  him th e  supreme 
command o f th e  armada. To r e fu se  such an opportunity  would be throw­
in g  away any fu tu r e  advancement; in  a c c e p tin g , he would be p laced  
above many men who were h is  su p er io rs  in  rank. To counter t h i s  l a t t e r  
problem, during a v i s i t  o f  C harles and Buckingham to  Plymouth, th e  
Duke ob ta in ed  an immediate peerage fo r  C e c i l ,  who was crea ted  V iscount  
"Wimbledon, on th e  ground th a t  t h is  a d d it io n a l rank would enable him to  
b e t te r  c o n tr o l h is  su b ord in a tes.
I t  i s  ra th er  d i f f i c u l t  to  understand wt^ C e c il  was s e le c te d  to  
command t h i s  e x p e d it io n . He had no naval exp erien ce w hatsoever, y e t  
t h i s  was to  be a jo in t  la n d -se a  o p era tio n . His on ly  m ilita r y  e x p e r i­
ence had been in  th e  Low C ountries serv in g  w ith  th e  m ethodical Dutch.
He had a rep u ta tio n  fo r  b ein g  a good o f f i c e r ,  but had no ou tstan d in g  
t a le n t s  as such . He had never enjoyed an independent command, although
he had been appointed a member o f  th e  C ouncil o f  War and stood  h igh  in  
Buckingham’s fa v o r . The l a t t e r ,  however, was no measurement o f  t a le n t ,  
m erely an in d ic a t io n  o f patronage. In any e v en t, i t  was a stran ge  
b u s in e ss , th e  s h i f t in g  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and th e  rap id  r i s e  to  th e  
peerage by a stra n g er  to  th e  l im e l ig h t .
However weak h is  powers as a naval commander might have been , 
C e c il s t i l l  had a s o ld i e r ’ s eye fo r  tro o p s , and he d e te c te d  th a t some­
th in g  was wrong w ith  th o se  under h is  command a t Plymouth. He wrote to  
Lord Conway on 8 September tr y in g  to  f in d  out why th e  tro o p s had been  
le v ie d  in  th e sp rin g  fo r  s e r v ic e  in  th e  f a l l  inasmuch as no attem pt 
had apparently  been made to  t r a in  them. Buckingham a ls o  recommended 
untrained  o f f ic e r s  to  him, he com plained, o f f i c e r s  w ith  no experience  
in  th e  f i e l d  and in  whom he had no t r u s t .  The s o ld ie r s  had not been
tra in ed  in  th e  u se  o f  t h e ir  weapons which had been s to r e d  on board 
29sh ip  a l l  summer. The s o ld ie r s ,  moreover, were in  arrea rs  and th e  
farm ers o f Devon upon whom th ey  were b i l l e t t e d  had re fu sed  to  supply  
r a t io n s  to  t h e ir  unwelcome g u e s ts  as soon as th ey  d iscovered  th a t  they  
could  not pay. The c i t i z e n s  o f  th e  southern  c o u n tie s  b i t t e r l y  resen ted  
having s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  th r u st  in to  t h e ir  homes and t h is  l a t e r  
came to  be one o f  th e  p r in c ip a l gr iev a n ces  a g a in s t  C h a r les . The pen­
n i l e s s  r e c r u it s  formed in to  hungry bands rov in g  about th e  cou n trysid e  
k i l l i n g  and e a tin g  sheep b e fo re  t h e ir  oim er’ s ^yes.^^ Such was th e  
arny th a t  England was going to  send fo r th  to  war. T h ^  were an
^% al. S t .  P . ,  D om estic, l6 2 5 - l6 2 6 ,  pp. 100-101 . 
3 ° I b id .,  p . 9? .
u n d isc ip lin e d  rabb le even b efore  boarding sh ip . Sm all wonder th a t  
C ec il requested  th ree  thousand a d d it io n a l troop s and asked fo r  an
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immediate p ress  o f  f i v e  hundred men to  rep la ce  th o se  s ic k  and d eserted .
In resp on se , on 12 September, th e  P rivy  C ouncil is su e d  orders to  four
southern co u n tie s  fo r  an immediate le v y  of f i v e  hundred p ressed  men,
32to  be d e liv e r e d  to  Plymouth as soon as p o s s ib le .  T his was, however, 
a ca se  o f  to o  l i t t l e ,  too  l a t e .
By th e  tim e th e se  s o ld ie r s  s e t  s a i l  England broke w ith  Spain . 
C harles r e c a lle d  h is  a gen t, Trumball, from h is  p o s t  a t  B ru sse ls  in  th e  
Spanish N eth erlan d s, th e  l a s t  agent r e s id in g  in  Hapsburg dom inions. 
L e tte r s  o f  Marque were is su e d  t o  th o se  p r iv a te e r s  w ish in g  to  prey upon 
Spanish sh ip p in g . C harles was s t i l l  in te r e s te d  in  th e  northern s e r ie s  
o f a l l ia n c e s ;  d e sp ite  h is  d ir e c t  a c t io n  a g a in s t  Spain , he had no id e a  
o f  abandoning th e  o r ig in a l goa l o f  r e s to r in g  F red erick  ISLttelsbach to  
th e  P a la t in a te .  Thus, th e  id e a  o f an a tta c k  a g a in s t  th e  c o a s t  o f  
Spain to  a s sa u lt  Spanish sh ip p in g , in c lu d in g  th e  annual trea su re  f l e e t  
from Spanish America, must be con sid ered  as p art o f th e o v e r a ll  p lan  
c en ter in g  on th e  P a la t in a te .  C harles, through th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  Buck­
ingham, th e  m aster s t r a t e g i s t ,  had, no doubt, b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  f l e e t  
a c tio n  would c r ip p le  Spanish power; t h is  d iv e r s io n  would pave th e  way 
fo r  M ansfeld, th e  Dutch, th e Danes, and th e  north German p r in ces  to  
reconquer th e  P a la t in a te .  T ruly, th e  id e a  o f  r e s to r in g  F rederick  to  
th e  P a la t in a te  had been th e  on ly  reason  C harles and Buckingham could
3^I b id . ,  p .  98.
^^Acts o f  th e  Pt"ivy C ou n cil, ijO, 172 .
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produce fo r  beginn ing a war a g a in s t  Spain . T heir t o o l ,  through which  
th ey  hoped to  b eg in  t h i s  chain  r e a c t io n , was f i n a l l y  ready. On 5 
October 162^, th e  f l e e t  departed Plymouth harbor and stood  out to  
se a .
CHATTER 17 
THE 70TAGE
On th e  a ftern oon  o f  5 June th e  g rea t f l e e t ,  a f t e r  having s e t  
s a i l  in  th e  morning, returned to  Plymouth Sound. The wind had s h if t e d  
to  th e  southw est and had begun to  blow hard. C e c i l ,  a f t e r  c a r e fu l ly  
co n s id er in g  th e  s h i f t  in  th e  wind, chose to  return  ra th er  than r is k  
th e  sh ip s  in  th e  fo u l  and m isty  w eather. He was a ls o  f e a r f u l  o f  
running on to  th e  Bddystone Rocks, which l i e  some tw elv e  to  f i f t e e n  
m iles  ou t in  th e  Channel. He w as, moreover, concerned l e s t  th e  f l e e t  
would be blown up th e  Channel in  th e  o p p o site  d ir e c t io n  to  th a t  i n i  
which i t  wished to  s a i l ,  i f  th e  wind remained southw est and mounted 
in  im te n s iiy ,  as th e  s a i lo r s  in d ic a te d  i t  would.^
%  th e  next morning, however, th e  wind so in cr ea se d  in  v e lo c i t y  
th a t  th e  open Plymouth Sound i t s e l f  seemed to  be u n sa fe . C e c i l ,  a f t e r  
c o n su lta t io n  w ith  some o f  h is  E n g lish  and Dutch c a p ta in s , decided  th a t  
th e  f l e e t  should  make an o rd erly  movement in to  Plymouth harbor fo r  
fu r th er  p r o te c t io n . He, th e r e fo r e , gave orders as to  which sh ip s  and 
in  what order should move f i r s t ,  a ls o  d ir e c t in g  th a t  no one would go 
ashore w ithout h is  p erm iss io n . tJh ile C e c il was making up h is  mind, 
se v e r a l sh ip s moved toward th e  in n er  san ctu ary , and soon th e  r e s t  f o l ­
lowed in  w ild  co n fu sio n , j o s t l in g  and jock ey in g  fo r  p o s it io n  to  get  
in  as soon as p o s s ib le .  Ho a t te n t io n  had been paid  to  C e c i l ' s  in s tr u c -
^John G la n v i l le ,  The Voyage to  Cadiz in  1625, ed . A lexander B. 
G rosart (Camden S o c ie ty , London, I 8ÏÏ3) , p . 8 .
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t io n s  in  t h e ir  rabid  d e s ir e  to  seek  s a f e t y .
L ater th a t  same day, C e c il r ec e iv e d  a cu rt l e t t e r  from S ir  John
Coke, one o f  th e  King’ s p r in c ip a l s e c r e ta r ie s  o f  s t a t e ,  who had remained
in  Plymouth to  o v ersee  th e  departure o f th e  f l e e t .  No news o th er than
th e  departure o f  th e  f l e e t  would be welcome. Coke s ta te d ,  and C e c i l ' s
honor was in v o lv ed  in  th e  retu rn  o f  th e  f l e e t  fo r  having l i s t e n e d  to
th o se  who pretended th e  s a fe ty  o f  t h e ir  s h ip s .  Wars req u ire  hazards
to  be taken  and i f  th e  s a fe ty  o f  sh ip s  were h is  primary concern , th ey
2
should  have been l e f t  a t  Chatham. In  rep ly  to  t h is  rebuke, C ec il 
wrote Coke th a t  th e  on ly  orders which had been obeyed ty  h is  ca p ta in s  
were th o se  th a t he had p e r so n a lly  fo llo w e d  up. A ssuring  Coke th a t  he 
would not w aste another hour or m inute, he prom ised not to  r e ly  upon
3
th e  ad v ice  o f  ca p ta in  or m aster o f  any o f  h is  v e s s e l s  in  th e  fu tu r e .  
Because th e  winds remained con trary  fo r  s e v e r a l more days the f l e e t  
remained in  th e  harbor, whereupon on 8 October C e c il r ec e iv e d  another  
sharp rebuke from Coke. Word had reached th e  se c r e ta r y  th a t  S ir  
Thomas Love, ca p ta in  o f  th e  Anne R oyal, C e c i l ' s  f la g s h ip ,  had is su e d  
orders to  th e  f l e e t  in  h is  own name and th a t  t h is  had been p a r t ia l ly  
r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  con fu sion  in  th e  f l e e t  two d ^ s  e a r l ie r .^  Coke 
r h e to r ic a l ly  asked C e c il th a t  i f  th o se  next to  him, such as Love, 
usurped h is  a u th o r ity , what obed ience cou ld  he exp ect from th o se  
fa r th e r  down th e  chain  o f  command? He a ls o  inform ed C e c il th a t th e
C al. Ht. P . ,  D om estic, 162^-1626, p . 119 . 
I b id .
\ % penheim. A d m in istra tion  o f th e  Royal Navy, p . 220.
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f l e e t  was u n d isc ip lin e d  because o f  a la c k  o f  orders from i t s  commander; 
ad vised  him to  c a l l  h is  cap ta in s to g e th er  and inform  them as to  whose 
orders they  would fo llo w  in  th e  fu tu r e . R eplying th e  same day, C e c il  
inform ed Coke th a t  th e  f a u l t  o f  Captain Love had been through ig n o r ­
ance ra th er  than arrogance; he then  thanked th e  se c r e ta r y  fo r  h is  
sound a d v ic e .
I'Thile th e  f l e e t  was s t i l l  ly in g  to  in  th e harbor, C e c il d iscovered  
th a t th e  L ion , f la g s h ip  o f th e  Rear Adm iral, S ir  F ran cis  Steward, was 
ta k in g  water so badly th a t i t  had to  be docked fo r  r e p a ir s .  For some 
u n d isc lo sed  reason  C e c il a ls o  decided  th a t Steward should remain be­
hind w ith  th e  L ion; in  so d o in g , he removed th e  one se n io r  commander 
who had had ary prev ious naval ex p er ien ce .^  W illiam  F e ild in g , Earl o f  
Denbigh, was then advanced to  th e  p o s t  o f rear adm iral; h is  p r in c ip a l  
q u a l i f i c a t io n  was th a t  he had married Susan V i l l i e r s ,  s i s t e r  o f  th e  
Duke o f  Buckingham. Ju st b e fo re  noon on th a t  same day, 8 October, th e  
wind became fa v o ra b le  and a l l  sh ip s  were ordered to  make s a i l .  Because 
o f  th e  low  t id e  and th e  crowded harbor, th e  f l e e t  d id  not c le a r  th e  
harbor u n t i l  between f i v e  and s ix  o 'c lo c k  th a t a ftern o o n . The f l e e t  
was now d iv id ed  in to  th ree  squadrons: th e  a d m ir a l's , v ic e  a d m ira l's , 
and rear  a d m ira l's , commanded r e s p e c t iv e ly  by C e c il on th e  Anne R cyal,
th e  Earl o f  E ssex on th e  S w iftsu r e , and th e  Earl o f  Denbigh on th e  S t .
6
Andrew.
The m ilita r y  fo r c e s  were organ ized  in to  ten  reg im en ts, each
^Penn, Navy Under th e  Early S tu a r ts , p . 70 .
A
-S ee  Appendix A fo r  b io g ra p h ica l d a ta .
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about one thousand stro n g , under th e  command o f  th e  fo llo w in g  o f f i ­
c e r s;  th e f i r s t .  S ir  John Proude in  th e  absence o f  th e  Duke o f  Buck­
ingham; th e  second , C e c il;  th e  th ir d .  S ir  Henry Power, V iscount 
V a len tia ;  th e  fo u r th . S ir  Robert D ever eux, Earl o f  Essex;"^ th e  f i f t h .
S ir  'Williara S t .  Leger; th e  s ix t h .  S ir  C harles R iche; th e  seven th . S ir  
Edward Conway; th e  e ig h th . S ir  Edward Hanrood (o r  Harewood); th e  n in th . 
S ir  John Burgh (Burroughs); and th e  te n th . S ir  Henry Bruce.^ Each 
regim ent was fu r th e r  organ ized  in to  e lev en  com panies, ;d.th th e  excep­
t io n  o f  th e  Duke’ s reg im ent, which con ta in ed  ten  com panies. There 
were a ls o  ten  la r g e  b rass cannon, a lo n g  w ith  many sm a ller  f i e l d  p ie c e s ,  
>d.th f i f t y  h orses a ssig n ed  to  p u ll  t h i s  a r t i l l e r y ,  and approxim ately  
th e  same number o f  th e u se  o f  th e  c h ie f  land  commanders.^
On 3 October w h ile  s t i l l  in  Plymouth harbor, C e c il had prepared  
a s e t  o f in s tr u c t io n s  "for th e  b e t te r  government o f h is  m ajesty ’ s f l e e t ."  
These in s tr u c t io n s ,  a lthough  w r itte n  b efore  th e  f i r s t  s a i l in g  o f  th e  
f l e e t ,  had not been d e liv e r e d  to  th e  p r in c ip a l s h ip s , and t h is  was 
e f fe c te d  on 9 October a t  s e a . The in s t r u c t io n s ,  gen era l in  n atu re, 
are remarkable in  th e  thoroughness o f  t h e ir  coverage, a lthough appar­
e n t ly  based in  p art on e a r l ie r  r e g u la t io n s  by S ir  ’Æ lliam  Gorges, and
10
^Note: In G la n v i l le ’ s Voyage to  C adiz, p . 2 , E ssex has th e  
th ir d  regim ent and V a le n tia  th e  fo u r th , w h ile  th e  Appendix, p . 122 , 
l i s t s  them in  r e v e r se  ord er . Inasmuch as regim ents were assign ed  ty  
rank, th e  form er i s  assumed to  be c o r r e c t .
See Appendix B fo r  o f f i c e r ' s  r o s t e r .  
^ G la n v ille , Voyag 
^ ° I b id .,  pp. 1 -7 .
% la n v i l l . yage to  C adiz, p . 3 .
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la t e r  by S ir  W alter R a le ig h . C e c i l ,  a s o ld ie r ,  w as, no doubt, advised  
by S ir  Thomas Love in  preparing th e s e  in s t r u c t io n s ,  although much was 
taken from th e  Duke o f  Buckingham's in s tr u c t io n s  to  C e c il .
Two days l a t e r ,  on 11 October, a second , condensed s e t  o f  in -
12s tr u c t io n s  was is su e d  to  the commanders. That same day, a calm
having s e t  in ,  C e c il  summoned a C ouncil o f  War to  meet on board th e
Anne Royal to  d ec id e  upon a course o f  a c t io n  to  be fo llo w ed  should a
s e a - f ig h t  develop w ith  à Spanish f l e e t  or any oth er enemy. At th e
C ouncil m eeting . S ir  Thomas Love read , w ith  C e c i l ' s  approval, a new
13s e t  o f  in s tr u c t io n s  which Love had drawn up. Probably both C ec il  
and Love were in stru m en ta l in  w r it in g  th e se  in s tr u c t io n s  although Love 
i s  c r e d ite d  w ith  th e  work. Love was an e x c e l le n t  sh ip  c a p ta in , but 
th ere  was noth ing in  h is  record to  in d ic a te  th a t  he had ever commanded 
a sh ip  in  a s e a - f ig h t .  These in s t r u c t io n s ,  in s t ig a te d  ty  C ec il because  
he did not b e l ie v e  th a t th e  f i r s t  s e t  provided an adequate order o f  
b a t t le  such as he had been accustomed to  in  th e  m il ita r y  s e r v ic e ,  
rev e a l th a t a m il ita r y  mind was in v o lv ed  in  th e ir  p rep a ra tio n . I t  
would be a m ethodical m ilita r y  mind th a t  iTOuld exp ect s a i l i n g  sh ip s  
to  move in  f ix e d  l i n e s ,  to  p resen t b road sid es th ree  sh ip s  a t  a tim e, 
and then  to  r e t i r e  so th e  next th ree  sh ip s  cou ld  f i r e .  In th e  17th  
century no two w arships were b u i l t  a l ik e ,  s a i le d  a l ik e ,  or handled  
a l ik e ,  which would alm ost preclu de th e ir  s a i l i n g  in  th e  f ix e d  form a-
^^See Appendix C. 
^^See Appendix D. 
^^See Appendix E.
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t io n s  p rescr ib ed  by th e s e  f ig h t in g  in s tr u c t io n s .^ ^  There i s  much to  
be s a id  th a t i s  fa v o r a b le , however, p a r t ic u la r ly  th a t  o f an organ ized  
b a t t le  p lan , in  th e  c a r e fu l p r o v is io n s  fo r  mutual support, and a r e ­
serv e  held  back u n t i l  needed. These in s tr u c t io n s  are m ilita r y  in  
sco p e , w ith each sh ip  in  th e  f l e e t  a ssig n ed  to  a c e r ta in  squadron, 
d iv is io n ,  rank, f i l e ,  and s t a t io n ,  much in  th e  manner o f m ilita r y  
u n it s .  A fter  much d is c u s s io n  among th e  commanders and sh ip  c a p ta in s ,  
i t  was decided th a t th e r e  was much good in  th e se  a r t i c l e s C o n s e ­
q u en tly , th ere  were some a d d itio n s  and a lt e r a t io n s  u n t i l  C ec il and th e  
whole C ouncil passed  and confirm ed them.
At th e  C ouncil o f  ¥ar h eld  on th e  h igh  se a s  on 11 October,
C e c il ordered th a t  r a t io n s  fo r  s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  be reduced so th a t  
f i v e  men would be consuming th e  amount norm ally a l lo t t e d  to  four.^^  
This move, r e f l e c t in g  a la c k  o f  con fid en ce  on th e  p art o f  C e c il ,  b e­
tr a y s  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  f l e e t  had been p oorly  p ro v is io n ed  b efore  
le a v in g  Plymouth. A commander norm ally would employ t h i s  type o f
^S ir J u lia n  S . C o rb ett, e d . .  F ig h tin g  In s tr u c t io n s  1530-18 l6  
(London, 1 9 0 5 ) , pp. 5 2 - 6 l .  C orbett quotes th e  "Journal o f  th e  Van^" 
guard (E sse x ’ s F la g sh ip ) ,"  when E ssex ’ s f la g s h ip  a c tu a lly  was th e  
S w iftsu r e . Vanguard not a ssig n ed  to  Cadiz E xp ed itio n .
in t e r e s t in g  s id e l ig h t  concerning A r t ic le  17 o f  the f i r s t  
s e t  o f  in s t r u c t io n s ,  regard in g  th e  d isp la y  o f  red , b lu e , and w hite  
pennants to  in d ic a te  squadrons, appears w herein S ir  J u lia n  C orb ett, 
in  h i s  F ig h tin g  I n s tr u c t io n s , c la im s th a t t h i s  i s  th e  f i r s t  known 
o cca sio n  o f  co lored  f la g s  b e in g  used in  t h i s  manner. M. Oppenheira, 
in  h is  A dm in istra tion  o f  th e  Royal Navy, s t a t e s  th a t  th e  Cadiz f l e e t  
o f  l5 9 6  had fou r  la r g e  f l a g s ,  one w h ite , one orange ta w n ^ , one b lu e ,  
and one crim son, which in d ic a te d  th e  four squadrons o f  th e  f l e e t .
He says th a t  " th is  appears to  have been th e  e a r l i e s t  d is t in c t io n  o f  
squadrons by f l a g s ,  a fterw ards shown by th e  red , w h ite , and b lu e .
I t  would appear th a t  th e  Cadiz f l e e t  o f  l5 9 6  should bear t h i s  honor.
^ ^ G la n v ille , Voyage to  Cadiz, p . 23 .
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measure on a homeward-bound voyage, w ith  p r o v is io n s  running low , c e r ­
ta in ly  not a t th e  beginning o f  a voyage, i f  th e  f l e e t  were adequately  
v ic tu a le d . An a c tio n  such as t h i s  would be bound to  have a d etr im en ta l 
e f f e c t  on th e  morale o f  th e  s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s ,  who would im m ediately  
sen se  som ething am iss, and cause doubts about t h e ir  le a d e r s .
The next day th e  f l e e t  ran in to  a heavy storm which la s t e d  fo r  
two days and caused a g rea t deal o f  damage to  s h ip s , men, and m a te r ie l.  
The Anne Royal su ffe red  a sprung mainmast, one man l o s t  overboard, her  
lo n g  boat smashed, and two heavy cannon, broke lo o s e  cau sin g  damage 
b efo re  b ein g  s e c u r e d . The Long Robert foundered w ith  one hundred 
and s e v e n ty - f iv e  s a i lo r s  and s o ld ie r s  l o s t .  A lo n g  boat crew o f the
C onvertive was a ls o  l o s t  w h ile  a ttem p tin g  to  p ick  up men o f  th e  Long 
18R obert.
At a C ouncil o f  Mar c a l le d  on I 8 October, i t  was d is c lo s e d  by
th e  v a r io u s  commanders rep o rtin g  to  C e c i l ,  th a t a g rea t many o f th e
s h ip s ’ sm all b oats had been damaged by th e  tem p est. Great q u a n t it ie s
o f  fu s e s  and gun powder had been soaked, bread and o th er p ro v is io n s
ru in ed , p lu s  mary o f  th e  sh ip s  le a k in g  b a d ly . I t  was a ls o  brought to
l i g h t  th a t  many o f th e  muskets were d e f e c t iv e .  Some did  not have
touch h o le s  through which th e  powder in  th e  f i r in g  chamber was to  be
ig n ite d ;  b u l le t s  provided d id  not p roperly  f i t  th e  weapons; and b u l le t
19moulds cou ld  not be found w ith  which to  make more ammunition. One
^7I b id . ,  p . 2 l|. 
^^ Ib id . ,  pp. 26. 
^ ^ Ib id ., p . 28.
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wonders whether C e c il s le p t  prop erly  th a t  n ig h t , i f  he had a t a l l  
thus f a r .
On th e  morning o f 19 October th e  h igh  land  around Cape Mondego
on th e  Portuguese Coast was s ig h te d . That same day th e  v ic e  admiral
and rear adm iral w ith  about fo r ty  sh ip s  re jo in e d  th e  main f l e e t ,
having been separated  in  th e  recen t b low . One o f  th e  rear ad m ira l's
sh ip s  had captured a sm all Portuguese c a r a v e l, th e  m aster o f  which
s ta te d  th a t he had heard th a t  th e  Spanish f l e e t  from B r a z il would be
p r o te c t in g  th e  tre a su r e  f l e e t  from th e  New World, th a t  a f l e e t  was
preparing in  Spanish p o r ts  fo r  th e  same purpose, and more d is tu r b in g ,
th a t  he had heard some two months b e fo r e  o f th e  great f l e e t  o f  over
20
one hundred s a i l  preparing in  E n g lish  p o r t s .  This news was ra th er
p ertu rb in g  to  C e c il ,  inasmuch as he had counted upon su r p r ise  b ein g
one o f  h is  major fa c to r s  in  conducting  th e  E n g lish  a tta c k , wherever
i t  might ta k e  p la c e . To prevent news o f th e  f l e e t ’s s a i l i n g  le a k in g
o u t, a l l  s h ip s ,  o ther than th o se  o f  th e  R cyal Navy, had been refu sed
21
perm ission  to  le a v e  E n g lish  p o rts  from 31 August to  li;  October,
22
a f te r  th e  f l e e t  had been a t sea  f o r  s ix  d ays. Because o f  th e  tim e
elem ent, th e  s ix -d a y  s t a r t ,  and th e  g rea t storm , i t  was not b e lie v e d  
th a t news o f  t h e ir  s a i l in g  had y e t  reached Spain . There was no reason  
to  doubt th e  word o f  th e  Portuguese m aster, who had come to  th e  f l e e t  
seek in g  w ater , b ecau se , had he so d e s ir e d , h is  f a s t  s a i l i n g  ca rv e l
^ ° I b id .,  p . 31 .
^^A cts o f  th e  Privy C ou n cil, LO, lS l - ^ 2 ,  and C a l. S t . P . ,  
D om estic, 1 6 2 ^ ? 6 2 6 , p . 193*
22A cts o f  th e  P rivy  C ou n cil, I).0, 200-201 .
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cou ld  e a s i ly  have o u ts a i le d  any sh ip  in  th e  E n g lish  f l e e t .  Even though  
word o f  th e ir  p rep ara tion s had f i l t e r e d  out through in t e l l ig e n c e  chan­
n e ls ,  i t  was not con sid ered  p o s s ib le  th a t  th e  news o f t h e ir  s a i l in g  
cou ld  have gone b efo re  them.
The next day in  th e  v i c in i l^  o f  Cape S t .  V in cen t, a t  P o r tu g a l's
southw estern  t i p ,  C e c il  c a l le d  another C ouncil o f War, t h is  tim e to
21d ec id e  upon th e  o b je c t iv e  which t h ^  should f i r s t  p u rsue . One o f  
th e  primary handicaps under which C e c il su ffe r e d  was th e  absence o f  
any approved p lan  o f  a c t io n  when th e  f l e e t  l e f t  England. I t  seems 
in c r e d ib le  th a t a f l e e t  o f  t h i s  s iz e  would be sen t out w ithout a d e f in ­
i t e  o b je c t iv e ,  but such was th e  ca se  in  t h i s  e x p e d it io n . A C ouncil o f
War had been h eld  a t  Plymouth w ith  both th e  King and Buckingham p r esen t. 
L isb on , C adiz, and San Lucar, th e  seap ort fo r  S e v i l l e ,  had been c o n s i­
dered as p o in ts  o f  a t ta c k , but th e  f in a l  d e c is io n  had been l e f t  fo r  
C e c i l ' s  shipboard C ouncil o f  War to  d ecide a f t e r  a r r iv a l  in  th e gen­
e r a l a rea . The fo llo w in g  c la u se  in  th e  K ing's l e t t e r  o f  in s tr u c t io n s  
to  C e c il ex p la in s  in  p a rt how th e  f l e e t  came to  s a i l  w ithout a d e f in ­
i t e  o b je c t iv e :
And though th a t  which we have th e  l e a s t  in  contem plation  
i s  th e  tak in g  and s p o i l in g  o f  a town, y e t  i f  you s h a l l  f in d  
any r ic h  town, th a t  w ithout any grea t hazard you may ta k e ,
you may do w e ll to  remember th e  grea t c o s t  we have been a t in
t h i s  f l e e t , —attem pt th e  ta k in g  o f th e  town, and, b e in g  g o tten , 
be very c a r e fu l fo r  th e  ga th erin g  to g e th e r  and p o s se s s in g  o f  
th e  r ic h e s  towards th e  d efray in g  o f th e  c o s t  o f  th e  f l e e t .  ^
Here i s  seen  th e  r id ic u lo u s  p ic tu r e  o f  C harles sending out a
25see Appendix F fo r  l i s t  of members. 
^^Dalton, L if e  o f  C e c i l ,  pp. l5 8 -6 0 .
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g rea t f l e e t  hoping to  capture tr e a su r e  w ithout any great r i s k .  Appar­
e n t ly ,  he expected  h is  admiral to  d estro y  Spanish sh ip p in g , capture  
th e  tr e a su r e  s h ip s , sack a town i f  one were found a v a ila b le ,  a l l  
"without any great hazard." VJhile y e t  in  England and having rece iv ed  
th e se  in s t r u c t io n s ,  C e c il ,  a f t e r  f in d in g  how he was bound ty  th e ir  
term s, had in s i s t e d  upon th e  fo llo w in g  c la u se  being in se r te d :
And th a t  although we g iv e  you a s t r i c t  care o f  th e  p r e se r ­
v a tio n  o f  our navy, y e t  i t  i s  not our meaning th a t  thereby  
you s h a ll  have ary doubt to  undertaking any e n te r p r ise  th a t  
may be dangerous, so lo n g  as i t  i s  ty  th e  ad v ice  o f  th e  
c o u n c il o f  war, fo r  we know very  w e ll th a t  th e r e  i s  no great 
e n te r p r ise  can be taken w ithout danger; but on ly  we do by 
th e s e  recommend th e  care  o f our f l e e t  to  you so  much as in  
you l i e t h .
This f in a l  c la u se  i s  s p e c ia l ly  noted in  th e  K ing's in s tr u c t io n s  as 
having been "put in  by co n sen t, but w ith  th e  a d v ice  o f ny Lord C e c il ."  
So, fo r  th e  o u t s e t ,  C e c il was hampered in  h is  conduct o f th e  op eration  
by having to  ab ide by th e  d e c is io n s  o f h is  Council o f  War, a l l  o f  whom 
were subord inate to  him. % i l e  p la c in g  th e  commander on th e  same l e v e l  
w ith  h is  u n d e r lin g s , he was s t i l l  charged w ith  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  
th e  conduct o f  t h is  e x p e d it io n . One can only ask why would C e c il ,  
used to  m i l i t a iy  command, accep t such a p o st w herein h is  hands were 
t i e d  by h is  su b o rd in a tes. Perhaps i t  was an e f f o r t  t o  evade r e sp o n s i­
b i l i t y .  I t  i s  l i t t l e  wonder th a t C ec il had a d i s c ip l in e  problem  
b ecause h is  ju n io rs  could  e x e r c is e  co n tro l over him through the C ouncil 
o f  ¥ a r .
In  h is  in s tr u c t io n s ,  C e c il had been g iven  th ree  p r o je c ts  as
fo llow s:
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1 , F irst, to destroy the King of Spain's shipping,
2, Secondly, to possess some place of importance in  h is  
country.
3 , Thirdly, to hinder h is commerce and esp ecia lly  the 
arriving of the p late  f le e t  as the principal project.
There i s  l i t t l e  doubt that the King, Buckingham, and la ter , Cecil, 
were strongly influenced by the previous successful attacks on Cadiz. 
Sir Francis Drake had sa iled  into the Bay of Cadiz in  1587 and remained 
inside for th ir ty -s ix  hours, during which time he destroyed and cap­
tured thousands of tons of shipping* He p ractica lly  annihilated the 
Cadiz d iv ision  of the Armada, then preparing, wreaked considerable 
havoc in  the storehouses and dockyards, and revictualled  h is entire  
squadron with the captured supplies. Drake had then taken up station  
o ff  Cape S t. Vincent, prevented the Spaniards from concentrating their  
scattered squadrons, raided the coastal trade, and proceeded to destroy 
the fish er ies  along the coast* He occupied Sagres, on the tip  of Cape
St. Vincent, for several weeks, had h is ships cleaned, fumigated,
27pumped dry, and gave h is men a rest on shore* In 1596 th is action
was repeated by an expedition under the command of the Earl of Essex,
Lord Thomas Howard, and Sir Walter Raleigh. After a s t i f f  fig h t only
decided by the superiority of the English gunnery, the Spanish merchant
f le e t  was destroyed, the c ity  sacked and burned, and a considerable
28amount of treasure was brought home to England.
The foregoing had been successful twice within liv in g  memory*
G lanville, Voyage to Cadiz, pp. 32-33.
27G. J . Marcus, A Naval History of England, the Formative Cen­
tu ries (Boston, Toronto, 1961 ) , pp. Ô9-90.
^^Ibid., p* 120.
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Now, in  1625, C e c il c a l le d  a C ouncil o f War on 19 October, to  d iscu ss  
th e  variou s p o s s i b i l i t i e s  which th e  p resen t ex p ed itio n  might undertake. 
Having a lread y  passed  L isbon , San Lucar and Cadiz were d isc u sse d , as 
w e ll as G ib ra lta r  and Malaga. The sh ip  ca p ta in s p o in ted  out th a t  th e  
entrance to  San Lucar, S e v i l l e ' s  p ort a t  th e  mouth o f  th e  G uadalquivir  
R iv er , had many sand bars and th a t  th e  la r g e  Royal Navy sh ip s could  
on ly  en ter  th ere  during th e  h igh er  sp rin g  t id e s .  Subsequently , G ib ra lta r  
and Malaga were d iscard ed  and a l l  a t te n t io n  was focu sed  on th e  Bay o f  
C adiz. S t .  Mary Port (Puerto de Santa M aria), on th e  n orth eastern  s id e  
o f th e  bay, was decided  upon as a lan d in g  s i t e  because o f  i t s  e x c e lle n t  
low  sh o re , and once th is  was tak en , i t  would be on ly  tw elv e  m iles  north  
along th e  co a st  to  San Lucar should opportun ity  a r is e  to  s t r ik e  in  
th a t  d ir e c t io n .  Spanish sh ip s  and g a l le y s  were c e r ta in  to  be found 
in  th e  Bay o f Cadiz and th e se  were to  be d estroyed  ty  naval a c t io n .
C e c il th en  ordered, w ith  th e  a d v ice  and consent o f th e  C oun cil, th a t  
th e  whole f l e e t  was to  bear in  fo r  S t .  Mary Port and execu te  a la n d in g .
He fu r th e r  ordered th a t  th e  V ice  Adm iral, E ssex , and h is  squadron would 
le a d , fo llo w ed  ty  h is  own squadron, and then  by th e  Rear Adm iral, Den­
b ig h , and h is  squadron. C e c il d eclared  th a t  he in ten d ed  to  take S t .
Mary P ort c h ie f ly  to  resupply th e  f l e e t  xvLth fr e s h  w ater , and th a t  
when th e  f l e e t  had come to  anchor, he would a d v ise  what next would be 
done. The Council o f  War was then  d is s o lv e d , th e  f l e e t  made s a i l  fo r
th e  Bay o f  C adiz, a r r iv in g  a t  th e  entrance to  th e  bay about th ree
29
o 'c lo c k  on a Saturday a ftern o o n , 22 October 1625.
^ % la n v il le .  Voyage to  C adiz, pp. 3 3 -36 .
CHAPTER 7  
THE ATTACK
In I 62S,  Cadiz was one o f  th e  two p r in c ip a l sea p o rts  o f  sou th ­
w estern  Spain , th e  o th er  being  S e v i l l e .  Known in  v a r io u s  languages  
as Cades, C a le s , C adice, Cadix, C adis, and Gades, i t  was s itu a te d  on 
th e  low , rocky, lim e sto n e  ex trem ity  o f  a narrow, sandy p en in su la  or 
s p i t  p r o je c t in g  about f i v e  m iles  in to  th e  A t la n t ic ,  in  a northw est­
e r ly  d ir e c t io n  from th e  I s l a  de Leon. The is la n d ,  o f  which i t  was a 
p a r t , was separated  from th e  mainland by a narrow channel known on 
i t s  southern end as th e  R io S a n ti P e tr i  and on th e  north as th e  Car- 
raca Channel.^ The isthm us and headlands on th e  mainland to  th e  
north  n early  en c lo se  th e sp len d id  bay, over t h ir t y  m iles  in  c i r c u i t ,  
to  which Cadiz owes i t s  commercial im portance. The ou ter  bay, a f ­
fo rd in g  e x te n s iv e  anchorage vary in g  in  depth from s ix  to  ten  fathoms 
o f w ater, s tr e tc h e s  from th e  promontory o f  Rota to  th e  mouth o f  th e  
Rio de San Pedro, a d is tr ib u ta r y  o f  th e  G uadalete R iv er , which en ters  
th e  bay o p p o site  C adiz. The in n er  bay, guarded a t i t s  narrow entrance  
by F ort Puntal on th e  isth m u s, a ls o  p rov id es good anchorage, although  
in  sh a llow er w ater. The en tran ce from th e  A t la n t ic  to  th e  bays i s  
somewhat o b stru cted  by low  sh e lv in g  ro ck s , Los Cochinas and Los 
Puercas, j u s t  north o f  th e  c i t y ,  and by s h i f t in g  mud banks d ep o sited  
by th e  r iv e r s .
^See map on fo llo w in g  page.
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The c i t y ,  on ly  s ix  to  seven m iles  in  circu m feren ce, was pecu­
l i a r l y  r e s t r ic t e d  ty  i t s  p o s it io n ,  b e in g  p r a c t ic a l ly  hemmed in  ty  th e  
sea  and surrounded t y  a f o r t i f i e d  w a l l . I t  p o sse ssed  on ly  one land  
e x i t ;  a ga te  le a d in g  to  th e  isth m u s. The f o r t i f i e d  w a ll around Cadiz 
had been la r g e ly  red esign ed  and r e b u il t  fo llo w in g  th e  s u c c e s s fu l ra id
in  1596 under th e  le a d e r sh ip  o f  Robert Devereux, Earl o f E ssex , and
2
was now a more form idab le s tr u c tu r e . Higher and stren gth en ed , i t  had 
gun b a t te r ie s  a t  in t e r v a ls  on a l l  seaward s id e s ,  p lu s tr e n ch es , gun- 
p o r ts , and b a stio n s  to  r e p e l in vad ers on th e  s id e  fa c in g  th e  isth m u s. 
The gen era l a ir  o f  c le a n l in e s s ,  due p a r tly  because th e  houses were 
whitewashed every y e a r , w as, however, d e c e p t iv e , as th e  drainage o f  
th e  lo w -ly in g  c i t y  was q u ite  inadequate; and r e fu s e ,  thrown over th e  
sea  w a lls ,  c o l le c t e d  in  heaps a lon g  th e  sh o re . The w ater supply was 
a ls o  p oor. Any w ater, o th er  than th a t  c o l le c t e d  in  c is t e r n s  from 
th e  r o o f s ,  had to  be brought in to  Cadiz from th e  I s l a  de Leon or th e  
m ainland, as no known sp r in g s  or o th er sou rce o f  fr e s h  w ater e x is te d  
at th e  tim e. The la c k  o f  w ater, as w e ll as th e  absence o f  garden 
space to  grow v e g e ta b le s ,  tended to  make Cadiz an easy mark fo r  a 
s ie g e  inasmuch as th e r e  was no n atu ra l way to  produce food and drin k .
I t  was upon t h is  p la c id  bay and seren e  c i t y  th a t  C e c il and h is  
C ouncil o f  War decided  to  expend th e  armed might o f  England. I t  w i l l  
be remembered th a t  th e  K ing’ s C ouncil o f  War c o n s is te d  o f  ten  members, 
nine o f  whom p o sse sse d  m il ita r y  ex p er ien ce , th e  te n th  member, M ansell, 
coming from th e  R cyal Navy. In  s e le c t in g  le a d e r s  fo r  t h i s  e x p e d itio n .
^D alton, L ife  o f  C e c i l , p . 172 .
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th e  C ouncil o f  War had com pletely  n eg lec ted  to  appoint anyone id.th 
naval ex p er ien ce . I t  would appear th a t  th e  C o u n c il’ s s tr u c tu r e  was 
r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  t h is  err o r . Thus, i t  was th a t t h i s  armada went in to  
t h i s  a tta c k  le d  com pletely  by landsm en. The Adm iral, C e c i l ,  th e V i c e  
Adm iral, E ssex , th e  Rear Adm iral, Denbigh, and th e  V ice Admirals o f  
th e ir  squadrons. Lords Delaware, V a le n t ia , and Cromwell, were a l l  o f  
m ilita r y  ex p er ien ce . T heir p rev ious tim e a t sea  c o n s is te d  o f  c r o ss in g  
from England to  H olland, or to  Ir e la n d , as p assen gers I
I t  was on a Saturday, about th r e e  o 'c lo c k  in  th e  a ftern oon , 
when th e  E n g lish  f l e e t  a rr ived  a t  th e  Bay o f  C adiz. The entrance to  
th e  bay was s l i g h t ly  more than th r e e  m iles  wtide, from th e  c i t y  across  
to  th e  n ea rest p o in t , th e  c a s t l e  o f  Santa C a ta lin a , j u s t  w est o f S t .  
I4ary P o r t. The V ice  Adm iral, E ssex , was le a d in g  h is  squadron in  th e  
S w iftsu r e ; according to  t h is  v e s s e l ’ s jo u rn a l, he was one and a h a lf  
le a g u e s  ahead. T his was a t a c t i c a l  error on h is  p a r t . Twelve g a l l i e s  
were seen  anchored o f f  S t .  Mary P o rt, th e  p r in c ip a l o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  
f l e e t ,  w ith  tw elve to  fo u r teen  sh ip s  anchored o f f  C adiz.^  E ssex , 
r e c a l l in g  th e  g lo r io u s  deeds o f h is  noble s ir e  in  t h i s  same bay tw en ty -  
nine y ea rs  b e fo r e , s a i le d  r ig h t  a t  th e  sh ip s  anchored o f f  C adiz, le a v ­
in g  h is  squadron to  fo llo w  as b e s t  t h ^  co u ld . I t  cannot be sa id  th a t  
Essex had disobeyed  h is  orders in  dashing upon th e  Spanish sh ip s in  
th e S w iftsu r e , fo r  A r t ic le s  7 and 10 o f  th e  o r ig in a l f ig h t in g  in s tr u c ­
t io n s  is su e d  ty  C e c il had provided fo r  h is  v ic e  adm iral or rea r  adm iral
^Journal o f  th e  S w iftsu re  in  C a l. S t . P . ,  D om estic, l6 2 ^ - l6 2 6 , 
p . 170; on m icrofilm . Her M ajesty’ s P ub lic  Record O ff ic e ,  67 , r e f .
S .P . 16/ 1 1 .
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ta k in g  independent a c t io n  should th e  opportunity  a r i s e .^  However, i t  
would appear th a t E ssex , as squadron commander, should have brought 
h is  squadron in to  th e bay as a u n it ,  thus p erm ittin g  more e f f e c t iv e  
u se o f  th e ir  f i r e  power than m erely one sh ip  making a head-on a tta c k .  
E ssex  was fo r tu n a te  th a t  th e Spanish sh ip s  d id  not o f f e r  b a t t le  b e­
cause in  th e  sh ip s  ly in g  o f f  Cadiz were w arships o f  th e  Admiral o f  
N aples and h is  v ic e  adm iral, $2 and I;2 guns, r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  compared 
to  th e  lj.2 o f  th e  S w iftsu r e . The Spaniards, ra p id ly  aware o f th e  
squadrons behind th e  S w iftsu r e , q u ick ly  cu t t h e ir  c a b le s  and f le d  down 
th e  bay ahead o f  th e  v ic e  adm iral, up in to  th e  Trocadero Channel, a 
narrow waterway le a d in g  to  th e  town o f P ort Royal (P uerto  R e a l) . The 
Spanish sh ip s  moved up t h i s  channel as fa r  as th ey  co u ld , th r u st in g  
t h e ir  prows in to  narrow l i t t l e  c r e e k s , hoping th a t th e  E n glish  sh ip s  
would not f o l lo w . The A dm iral, C e c il ,  had now en tered  th e  bay, and 
s e e in g  h is  su bord inate  in  p u rsu it  o f  th e  Spanish sh ip s , crowded a l l  
s a i l  on to  th e  Anne R cyal w h ile  sh o u tin g  orders r ig h t  and l e f t  fo r  th e  
oth er  sh ip s  to  jo in  th e  c h a se . The Anne Royal s a i le d  r ig h t  through  
E s s e x 's  r e lu c ta n t  squadron which showed no in c l in a t io n  to  f i g h t .  Only 
two Royal Navy sh ip s  came up to  jo in  in ,  th e  Rainbow and th e Reforma­
t io n , but when E ssex saw th e  Spanish sh ip s  evading him, he merely  
dropped anchor o f f  C adiz. E ssex la t e r  sa id  he had not r ec e iv ed  any 
orders to  chase and capture any Spanish s h ip s , but m erely to  anchor 
in  Cadiz Bay and aw ait fu r th e r  orders from C e c il .^  According to  h is
^See Appendix C.
^Journal o f  th e  S w iftsu r e , 22 O ct. l6 2 ^ . G la n v il le ,  Voyage to  
C adiz, p . 38 , says So" guns fo r  th e  form er.
^DaltOft'j L if e  o f  C e c i l ,  p . I 6I;.
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sta tem en t, he xras then g u ilt y  o f  d iso b ed ien ce , fo r  he had been ordered  
to  anchor o f f  S t .  Maiy P ort on th e  o th er  s id e  o f th e  bay. In any ev en t, 
had Essex chosen to  b rin g  h is  squadron in  as a u n it ,  he would have had 
a much b e t te r  opportun ity  to  spread out and head o f f  th e  f l e e in g  Span­
is h  s h ip s .
As th e  S w iftsu re  had swept p a st  C adiz, th e  guns o f  th e  c i t y  had 
f ir e d  a t  h er, as had th e  f le e in g  Spanish s h ip s , but no damage had been
in cu rred . The S w iftsu re*s accu ra te  gunners, however, managed to  s in k
7
one g a l le y  b e fo re  th e r e s t  escaped . The c i t y ’s guns kept up a spor­
ad ic f i r i n g  a t  th e  other E n g lish  v e s s e l s  w ithout s u c c e s s .  A ll  E n glish  
squadrons then  entered  th e  bay and c a s t  anchor, th e  squadrons o f C ec il 
and E ssex b efo re  C adiz, w h ile  D enbigh's anchored o f f  S t .  Mary P ort, 
th e l a t t e r  b ein g  th e  on ly  one in  th e  agreed-upon p o s i t io n .  C e c il  
im m ediately had th e  s ig n a l f l a g  hung out which summoned a C ouncil o f  
War to  be h eld  on th e  Anne R oya l. This p r a c t ic e  o f c a l l in g  a tim e-  
consuming C ouncil o f War upon any o cca s io n  in d ic a te s  th e  weakness and 
poor q u a lity  o f  th e  e x p e d it io n 's  command s tr u c tu r e . Here an a tta ck  
was h a lte d  w h ile  th e  c o u n c il lo r s  assem bled to  d isc u ss  how to  proceed . 
Even th e  assem bling o f th e  group consumed sev era l hours as D enbigh's 
squadron lo c a te d  on th e  fa r  s id e  o f  th e  bay, requ ired  th e use o f  a 
sm all boat which was rowed se v e r a l m iles  to  and from th e  Anne R oya l. 
Preplanned moves w ith  o p tio n s  should  have been e s ta b lis h e d . An agreed-  
upon system  o f  s ig n a l f la g s  cou ld  have in d ic a te d  which p lan  or op tion  
was to  be put in to  o p era tio n . Another t a c t i c a l  e rro r , which th e  sh ip  
ca p ta in s  must c e r ta in ly  have been aware o f ,  was th e  en try  in to  th e  bay
7Journal o f th e  S w iftsu r e , 22 O ct. 1625 .
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a t h igh  t id e ,  thus en ab lin g  th e  Spanish sh ip s  to  f l e e  in to  the Troca­
dero Channel, a move which th ey  cou ld  not have made a t low  t id e .^  
E n g lish  seamen should have known t h i s ,  b ein g  fa m il ia r  w ith  the Euro­
pean t id a l  p a tte r n s , because even John G la n v i l le ,  se c r e ta r y  to  th e  
adm iral, knew o f t h i s  and so recorded i t  in  h is  c a r e fu lly -k e p t  jo u rn a l. 
C e c i l ,  a landsman, was poorly  ad vised  by h is  sh ip  c a p ta in s . They had 
known a l l  about th e  t id e s  and sand bars a t  San Lucar and th e  beaches  
a t S t .  Mary P ort, but th ey  were unable to  mention th e  t id e s  in  th e  Bay 
o f  Cadiz to  th e ir  commander.
While th e  C ouncil o f  War was g a th erin g  on th e  Anne R oyal, a man 
named Jenkinson came aboard a t  th e  r is k  o f  h is  l i f e ,  as th e  guns o f  
Cadiz f ir e d  a t  him as he came out to  th e  f la g s h ip .  He, a master o f  
an E n g lish  sh ip  load ed  w ith  f i s h  ly in g  o f f  C adiz, happened to  be in  
th e  c i t y  tr y in g  to  s e l l  h is  cargo when th e f l e e t  a rr iv ed .^  Jenkinson  
brought in t e l l ig e n c e  th a t  th e  a r r iv a l  o f  th e  f l e e t  came as a com plete  
s u r p r is e ,  th a t Cadiz was l i g h t l y  g a rr iso n ed , poorly  prepared, and th e  
p eop le  were alreacfy blaming th e  Count de O livares f o r  provoking th e  
E n g lish  in to  making t h i s  a t t a c k . T h e  Englishman fu r th e r  advised  
th a t  most o f  th e  sh ip s  which had f le d  up th e  Trocadero Channel were 
from N ap les , l a t e l y  arr iv ed  fo r  s p e c ia l  s e r v ic e  in  Spain , but th a t  th e  
main Spanish f l e e t ,  which had been in  B r a z i l ,  was now in  e ith e r  Malaga 
or G ib r a lta r . The l a t t e r ,  i f  tr u e , was o f  grea t im port, fo r  G ib ra lta r
% la n v i l le .  Voyage to  C adiz, p . 39 .
^Tbid. ,  p . I4O. D a lton , L i f e  o f C e c i l , p . l 6^, says th e E n g lish  
v e s s e l  was loaded  w ith  s a l t .  The form er would appear c o r r e c t , fo r  i f  
th e  m aster were s e l l in g  h is  cargo , i t  would be f i s h ,  not s a l t .  The 
I s l a  de Leon’ s c h ie f  product was s a l t .
^ % la n v i l le .  Voyage to  C adiz,  p . IiO.
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la y  but one hundred sea  m iles  away. Jenkinson a ls o  reported  th a t news 
had reached Cadiz ju s t  th e  n igh t b e fo re  about th e  huge f l e e t  preparing  
a t Plymouth and o f th e  E n g lish  King’ s v i s i t  to  th e  f l e e t ,  but th ere  
had been no news o f  where th e  f l e e t  was to  s a i l  or when i t  would de­
p a r t . Thus, one o f th e  ca rd in a l p r in c ip le s  o f war, th a t o f  " su rp rise ,"  
had been ach ieved  by th e  f l e e t ,  but what advantage, i f  any, could  
r e s u lt  from th e  prompt e x p lo ita t io n  o f  t h i s  p r in c ip le ?
The C ouncil o f  ¥ar recogn ized  th a t th ey  had su rp r ised  the de­
fen d ers o f  C adiz; th a t  th e  town was not w e ll-p ro v id ed  fo r ;  and th a t a 
sudden a ttack  might carry th e  c i t y  b efore  i t  cou ld  be r e in fo r ced  w ith  
men, ammunition, and r a t io n s ,  th o se  elem ents req u ired  fo r  a prolonged  
d e f e n s e . T h e  sh ip  ca p ta in s p o in ted  o u t, however, th a t  i t  would be 
unw ise to  c o n su lt  or th in k  o f attem pting  to  tak e  Cadiz b efo re  a s a fe  
harbor had been provided  fo r  th e  s h ip s , which were th e  c h ie f  bulwark 
o f  England and th e  on ly  hope o f  th e  e x p e d it io n ’s s a fe  re tu rn . They- 
recommended th a t  F ort Puntal be taken a t  once as t h i s  area  not on ly  
provided th e  b e s t  anchorage, but was w ith in  range o f  th e  f o r t ' s  guns.
I t  was fu r th er  decided  th a t  noth ing more would be done toward e f f e c t  
in g  a tro o p -la n d in g  in  th e  v i c in i t y  o f S t .  Mary P ost inasmuch as i t  was 
now reported  th a t  th e  w aters in  th a t area were to o  sh a llo w , b ein g  but 
te n  or tw elve  f e e t  a t  h igh  t id e  and f i v e  or s ix  f e e t  a t  low  t id e .
T his would req u ire  th e  sh ip s  to  remain fa r  out and th e  troop s to  be 
rowed ashore over a le n g th y  d is ta n c e . I t  was, th e r e fo r e , reso lv ed  
th a t  an immediate se a  bombardment be launched a g a in s t  F ort P u n ta l.
^^Ibid., p. l i l .
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F ive  Dutch s h ip s , th ree  Royal Navy s h ip s , and tw enty New C a stle  c o l -
12
l i e r s ,  were s e le c te d  fo r  th e  ta s k . The Dutch sh ip s  moved in  and 
began th e bombardment o f th e  f o r t ,  but th e  ebb t id e  prevented th e  
la r g e r  Royal Navy sh ip s  from jo in in g  them. The E n g lish  c o l l i e r s ,  
ta k in g  advantage o f th e  now -gathering darkness, made no move to  jo in  
th e  Dutch s h ip s , a lthough  th ey  had been ordered to  do s o . The Dutch 
sh ip s  f ir e d  over f i v e  hundred rounds a t  th e  f o r t ,  w ith  unknown e f f e c t ;  
th e  f o r t  retu rn in g  a r a t io  o f  about one round to  te n  Dutch. Two o f  
th e  Dutch sh ip s ran aground during th e f i g h t ,  and b ein g  s ta t io n a r y  
t a r g e t s ,  were s e r io u s ly  damaged by th e  f o r t ' s  gun f i r e .
On th e  fo llo w in g  morning, 23 October, th e  Dutch Adm iral, W il­
liam  de N assau, came on board th e  Anne Royal and com plained b i t t e r ly  
to  C e c il th a t he had not r e c e iv e d  any a s s is ta n c e  from th e  assign ed
E n g lish  sh ip s  and th a t  th e  f o r t  might have been taken  had th e  com-
1 2manders o f  th e  c o l l i e r s  fo llo w ed  t h e ir  o rd ers . Here again  th e  weak­
ness o f  th e  E n glish  command s tr u c tu r e  i s  ev id e n t as apparently  th ere  
had not been any check or fo llo w -u p  made once th e  orders had been  
is s u e d . There were n in ety -tw o  E n g lish  v e s s e l s  p r e se n t , p lu s f i f t e e n  
Dutch, so from th e  tim e o f th e  bombardment o f  Puntal in  th e  ea r ly  
evening o f  th e  2d, u n t i l  th e  morning o f  th e  23d, a l l  E n g lish  v e s s e ls  
sim ply remained a t  anchor. I t  would appear th a t  inasmuch as only  
tw en ty -th ree  E n g lish  v e s s e ls  had been ordered in to  th e  a tta ck  on 
P u n ta l, th a t some o th er  sim ultaneous a c t io n  cou ld  have been undertaken.
An extrem ely se r io u s  t a c t i c a l  b lunder had been made by th e  Eng­
l i s h  commanders. A ll  sh ip s  o f  th e  f l e e t  had en tered  th e  Bay o f Cadiz
^^Journal o f  th e  S w iftsu r e , 22 O ct. 1925.
69
and had come to  anchor. Wo e f f o r t  was made to  p rovid e s e c u r ity  o f  
any ty p e . Had a Spanish f l e e t  appeared from th e  S t r a i t s ,  the E n g lish  
would have been b o t t le d  up in  th e  bay where maneuver would have been  
s e v e r e ly  r e s t r i c t e d ,  a llo w in g  an o u ts id e  f l e e t ,  to  ivindward, to  enjoy  
th e t a c t i c a l  advantages o f m an eu verab ility  and co n cen tra tio n  o f f i r e  
power on th e  E n g lish  sh ip s  as th ey  emerged from th e  bay a few a t a 
tim e. To make m atters w orse, Spanish g a l le y s  crep t up th e  w estern
shore o f  the I s l a  de Leon under cover o f  darkness th a t  f i r s t  n igh t;
11ty  morning Cadiz had a g a rrison  o f four thousand s o ld ie r s .  By th e ir  
f a i lu r e  to  take adequate s e c u r ity  m easures, th e  c i t y  now had a stron g  
g a rr iso n  to  defend i t .  Had one squadron, or even p art o f  one squadron 
remained on p a tro l o u ts id e  th e  bay, th e s e  rein forcem en ts could have 
been prevented  from reach ing Cadiz by s e a . However, rein forcem en ts  
could have reached Cadiz along th e  narrow isthm us because o f  th e  Eng­
l i s h  f a i l u r e  to  put a fo r c e  ashore upon a r r iv a l to  cu t t h i s  l i f e  l i n e  
le a d in g  to  th e  c i t y .  The p r in c ip a l o f  "surprise"  was thus l o s t  fo r  
not c u t t in g  t h is  p en in su la  and f a i l i n g  to  tak e  adequate s e c u r ity  meas­
ures to  prevent rein forcem en ts a r r iv in g  by se a . Landings could have 
beeen made on e i th e r  s id e  o f th e  isthm us during th e  n ig h t , and th e  
i n i t i a l  a tta ck  on th e  whole complex should  have been made a t  n igh t  
from th e  seaward s id e  o f  th e  is la n d  which would have provided even a 
more com plete su r p r is e . The a r r iv a l  o f  th e  f l e e t  should have been 
coord inated  so as to  a r r iv e  a t  n igh t ra th er  than bow ling in to  th e  bay 
in  broad d a y lig h t . The a r r iv a l came a t a most inopportune tim e, in  
l a t e  a ftern oon  so th a t l i t t l e  could be accom plished p r io r  to  n ig h t f a l l .
^^D alton, L if e  o f  C e c i l , p . 172 .
70
In th e  c o ld , e a r ly , morning l i g h t  o f  23 Ootober, C e c il had to  
fa c e  th e  hard f a c t  th a t h is  command was f a l t e r in g  and th a t  h is  orders  
had not been fo llo w e d . He f i n a l l y  ordered th e  c o l l i e r s  to  advance 
and a tta ck  Puntal upon th r e a t  o f  d eath . The c o l l i e r s  r e lu c ta n t ly  
moved up behind th e  Dutch and th e  Royal Navy sh ip s  now in v o lv ed  in  
th e  co n tin u in g  a tta c k  on P u n ta l, but th e s e  h e s ita n t  w arriors remained 
in  th e  background, f i r i n g  over th e  Royal Navy s h ip s , w h ile  keeping  
them between th em selves and F ort P u n ta l. T heir f i r e s  were com pletely  
in e f f e c t u a l ;  C e c il ordered them to  cea se  f i r e  a f t e r  one round stru ck  
th e  S w iftsu re  in  th e  s te r n , passed  through th e  g rea t ca b in , th e  cap­
t a i n ' s  ca b in , and lodged  in  th e  m a ster 's  c a b i n . I n  t h i s  heavy 
engagement. C aptain George Raymond o f  th e  Great Sapphire, th e  s h ip 's  
m aster, Mr. Kenton, and se v e r a l seamen were k i l l e d . D e s p i t e  th e  
s i le n c in g  o f  most o f  th e  f o r t ' s  guns by th e  Rc^al Navy, Puntal gave 
no s ig n  o f surrender. About noon, Spanish g a l l i es were seen  moving 
from Cadiz across  th e bay to  S t .  Mary P ort, and a lthough  they  were 
pursued and f ir e d  upon, th e  s w if t  l i t t l e  g a l l i e s  could  not be cau gh t.
I t  was b e lie v e d  th a t  th ey  had ca r r ie d  much o f  th e  removable w ealth  
o f th e  c i t y ,  and s te p s  were taken  to  prevent any recu rren ce . Here 
again  was la c k  o f  f o r e s ig h t ,  as t h i s  should have been a n t ic ip a te d .
Around four o 'c lo c k  in  th e  a ftern oon  C e c il  ordered S ir  John 
Burroughs' Regiment a sh o re . The la n d in g  was to  be made between Cadiz 
and P u n ta l. One boat t r ie d  to  make a lan d in g  d ir e c t ly  beneath P u n ta l' s
^^Journal o f  th e  S w iftsu r e ,  23 Oct. l6 2 3 .  
^ ^ G la n v ille , Voyage to  C adiz, p . It3.
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w a lls ,  r e s u lt in g  in  th e  deaths o f s e v e r a l o f f ic e r s  and men fo r  t h is
"I ^
foo lh ard y  a c t .  The a c tu a l lan d in g  then  was made some d is ta n c e  o f f  
towards C adiz. IJhen th e  defenders o f  Puntal saw th e  la r g e  fo r c e  th a t  
had landed and was dep loy ing  towards them, t h ^  q u ick ly  surrendered. 
The remainder o f  th e  garrison  were a llow ed  to  march out w ith  th e  
honors o f  war because o f th e ir  g a lla n t  d efen se  o f  th e  f o r t ,  and they  
ra p id ly  d isappeared towards C adiz. C e c il then  ordered a g arrison  o f  
two hundred E n g lish  s o ld ie r s  under C aptains Gore and H il l  to  en ter  th e  
f o r t  and hold  i t .  An in s p e c t io n  o f  th e  f o r t  d is c lo s e d  th a t although  
i t  was d esign ed  to  serv e  as a gun p latform  fo r  t h ir t y  or fo r ty  guns, 
only e ig h t  were a c tu a lly  mounted, li&th th e  f o r t  secu red , th e  inner  
harbor cou ld  be used as a f l e e t  anchorage as w e ll as th e  ou ter harbor, 
w ith  a l l  sh ip s s a f e ly  out o f  cannon sh ot o f  th e  tow n. C ec il then  
ordered th a t  a l l  reg im en ts, a r t i l l e r y ,  and h orses be put ashore; t h is  
work la s t e d  throughout th e  n ig h t . By Monday morning, 2k  O ctober, a l l  
s o ld ie r s  were ashore except fo r  s ix  or e ig h t  hundred men in  th e  rear  
ad m ira l's  squadron r id in g  a t anchor b efo re  S t .  I l̂aiy P o rt.
The e x p e d itio n  o f l5 9 6  had gone through alm ost th e  id e n t ic a l  
p a tte r n . D a y lig h t a r r iv a l , co n feren ce , w a it u n t i l  th e  next day to  
a tta c k , la n d in g  between Puntal and Cadiz; but th e  g a rr iso n  of F ort 
Puntal had not w aited  fo r  them and r e t ir e d  to  th e  c i t y .  From then  on, 
however, th e  Cadiz ven tu re o f 1^96 was d i f f e r e n t .  A sm all fo r c e  had 
been sen t towards Cadiz and th e  Spaniards had come cu t to  meet i t ,  and 
driven  i t  back towards P u n ta l. The main E n g lish  f o r c e ,  ly in g  in  w a it .
^^Ibid.
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had f a l l e n  upon them and as th e  Spaniards r e tr e a te d , th e  le a d in g  Eng­
l i s h  fo r c e s  had fo llo w ed  so c lo s e ly  th a t  th ey  had been a b le  to  s c a le  
th e  c i t y  w a lls  a long w ith  th e  l a s t  o f  t h e ir  beaten  f o e .  They had
thus gained quick  a ccess  to  th e c i t y  and i t  f e l l  ra p id ly  in to  E n g lish
, . 17hands.
In 1625, C e c il c a l le d  a c o u n c il o f th e  c o lo n e ls  on shore to  
meet a t  Fort Puntal to  d ec id e  upon th e  b e s t  course o f  a c t io n  to  pursue. 
A rumor developed th a t enemy fo r c e s  were marching toward Cadiz; C e c il ,  
as commander, b e lie v e d  h is  p resen ce  would be b e s t  served  vjith th e  
troop s m eeting t h i s  new enemy. He appointed Denbigh as admiral to  
a c t  as such during h is  and E sse x 's  absence on sh ore , and in s tr u c te d  
him to  go on board th e  S w iftsu r e , c a l l  a C ouncil o f  War to  determ ine  
how th e  fo llo w in g  th r e e  p o in ts  should  be re so lv e d : to  make p ro v is io n  
fo r  fee d in g  th e  land fo r c e s  w h ile  th ey  were on shore; to  lo o k  a f t e r  
th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e  E n g lish  sh ip s;  how th e  sh ip s  which had f le d  up th e  
Trocadero Channel might be a t t a c k e d . T h e  C ouncil o f War which Den­
b igh  h eld  d ir e c te d  th a t th e  commanders o f  a l l  whips which had sen t  
s o ld ie r s  ashore should send th a t  many r a t io n s  to  th e  beachhead, a 
t o t a l  q u an tity  to  cover a p eriod  o f  seven  days. The f i r s t  th r e e  days'
r a t io n s  were bread and c h eese , th e  l a s t  four days' bread and b e e f ,
19w ith  beer or c id e r  as d rin k . Each ca p ta in  was to  b r in g  th e se  pro­
v is io n s  to  th e  commander a t  F ort Puntal as soon as ready, and to  
secu re  a r e c e ir t  when d e liv e r e d . The commander o f  Funtal was to  is s u e
. H. F ir th , An E n g lish  Garner, S tu art T ra c ts , 1603- I 693 
(W estm inster, 1 9 0 3 ), pp. l i u - l ô .
^ % la n v i l le ,  Voyage to  C adiz, p . ?0
l ? I b id . ,  p . 22.
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th ese  p r o v is io n s  to  th e  troop u n it s  upon r e q u e st , and a c a r e fu l account 
was to  be kept o f  amounts is su e d  and to  whom. On th e  second p o in t r e ­
ferr ed  to  th e  C oun cil, i t  was decided  th a t a l l  sh ip s  o f th e  ad m ira l's  
squadron would group them selves near th e  Anne Royal a t anchor between 
Cadiz and P u n ta l. The sh ips o f  th e  v ic e  ad m ira l's  squadron would gather  
about th e  S w iftsu re  near Fort P u n ta l, and th e  rear ad m ira l's  sh ips  
would remain near th e  S t .  Andrew, a t  anchor near Santa C ata lin a  p o in t .  
For the th ir d  p o in t , th e  C ouncil o f  War deemed i t  a shame th a t th ese  
v e s s e ls  up Trocadero Channel had been n eg lec ted  so lo n g . I t  was con­
sid ered  p o s s ib le  th a t  should a Spanish f l e e t  a r r iv e  o f f  C adiz, th a t  
th e  ex p ed itio n  might be attacked  from two s id e s ,  having tb c fa c e  th e  
f l e e t  o u ts id e  th e  harbor as w e ll as th o se  sh ip s  up Trocadero Channel.
Of th e  p o in ts  co n sid ered , th e l a t t e r  was judged to  be th e  most im port­
ant o f  a l l .  I t  was decided  th a t  S ir  Samuel A r g a li , a c t in g  v ic e  adm iral 
o f  th e  f l e e t ,  would le a d  an a tta ck  a g a in s t  th e  Spanish sh ip s  in  th e  
Trocadero Channel; p rep aration s soon began to  ready th e  sh ip s  fo r  t h i s  
purpose. How th e  a tta c k  would be accom plished was to  be l e f t  to  th e  
judgment o f  th e  commanders o f  th e  sh ip s  in v o lv e d .
At t h is  same Council m eeting th e  problem o f  how to  supply th e  
land fo r c e s  x-ri-th powder and sh ot was d is c u s se d . The C ouncil cou ld  
have s e t t l e d  th e  problem then  and th e r e , but chose not to  do so be­
cause i t  was not one of th e  th ree  p o in ts  which C ec il had d ire c ted  them 
to  c o n s id e r . They a ls o  b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  problem was th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
o f V iscount V a le n tia , Master o f th e  Ordnance, d e s p ite  th e  f a c t  th a t
2 °Ib id ., p. 52.
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21V a le n tia  was on shore commanding h is  regim ent. The Council apparently  
p referred  to  operate on ly  w ith in  c e r ta in  l im i t s  which had been p re­
scr ib ed ; to  go beyond th e se  l im i t s  or to  tak e independent a c t io n  did  
not seem to  occur to  them. The su ccess  o f th e  whole ven tu re might 
hinge on one o f th e se  a c t io n s ,  but t h ^  p referred  to  jeo p a rd ize  t h is  
su ccess  ra th er  than to  extend them selves in  ary way.
In th e  ex p ed itio n  o f  1^96, a f t e r  th e  fo r c e s  had been landed  
between F ort Puntal and C adiz, S ir  Conyers C lif fo r d , ivLth a brigade  
o f th r e e  reg im en ts, had been sen t to  th e  narrow est p a rt o f  th e sandy
isth m u s, ju s t  beyond Puntal toward th e  main part o f  th e  I s l a  de Leon,
22to  b lo ck  any enetiy fo r c e s  coming from th a t  d ir e c t io n .  C lif fo r d ,  
however, e ith e r  m isunderstanding h is  orders or having been d i s s a t i s ­
f i e d  w ith  th e  minor r o le  a ss ig n ed  to  h is  command, had pushed on to  th e
extreme ea stern  s id e  o f  th e  is la n d ,  th ree  le a g u e s  away, and had occu -
23
p ied  th e  Suazo b r id g e , th e  on ly  b rid ge  to  th e  m ainland.
In 1625, C e c i l ,  w ith  seven  or e ig h t  reg im en ts, marched so u th ea st  
down th e  isthm us and by n ig h t f a l l  was sev era l m ile s  in to  th e  bocfy o f  
th e i s la n d ,  supposedly on h is  way to  th e  Suazo b r id g e , where he ex­
p ected  to  meet th e  Spanish  f o r c e s . T h e  hour b ein g  l a t e ,  C ec il 
decided  to  remain in  h is  p resen t p o s it io n  fo r  th e  n ig h t .  To prevent 
th e  Spanish fo r c e s  in  Cadiz from a tta c k in g  h is  command from th e  rea r .
^ ^ Ib id ., p . 56 .
^ % ir th , S tuart T ra c ts , p . 113-
^^Sir J u lia n  S . C o rb ett, The S u ccessors o f Drake (London, 1 9 1 6 ),
p. 99.
^ ^ l a n v i l l e .  Voyage to  C adiz, p . 56 .
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he ordered the regiments of Sir John Burroughs and Sir Henry Bruce to
return to the isthmus and also for them to keep the road open to his 
25p osition . Upon halting, i t  was discovered that the so ld ier's knap­
sacks were empty and the whole command was without food. This did not 
particularly worry Cecil at the moment because he knew that he had 
l e f t  orders for the ration supply problem to be resolved by Denbigh 
and the Council of War. He naturally expected probisions to be on 
their  way up to his hot, dusty, tired , and th irsty  command. IVhat Cecil 
did not know, however, was that when the rations on the ships had been 
delivered to Fort Puntal, the commander had refused to accept them, 
saying that he had not been given any orders to th is  e f f e c t . F u r ­
ther delays were caused ty an ambush conducted by sold iers from Cadiz 
attacking the men and horses that were f in a lly  beginning to move 
rations towards C ecil's  command. Thus, C ecil, the uninformed com­
mander of the land forces, knew nothing of the long delsys nor of 
the shoddy way in  which his orders had been carried out. Cecil has
been vastly  c r itic ized  over the centuries for taking troops inland
27without an adequate ration supply. There was a colonel general, 
nine colonels, and innumerable captains and lieutenants in  C ecil's  
command. The commander bears the resp onsib ility , but should not be 
charged with every d e ta il. John G lanville, in  his journal. The Voyage 
to Cadiz, states that many of the sold iers did not bring rations with
^^Ibid. ,  p. 59.
^̂ Ibid. ,  p. 5 8 .
27palton, L ife of C ecil, p. 1 78 .
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them, or e lse  they had consumed at one meal those rations which should
28have served them for  several days. This would in d icate  that much of 
the fa u lt  lay  with the individual so ld ier . This, a lso , shows a lack of 
control in  the lower le v e ls  of command.
In any event, C ecil believed that provisions were enroute. When 
a large  supply of wine was discovered in  some houses adjacent to th e ir  
camp s i t e ,  C ecil order that a butt (barrel) be made availab le to  each 
regiment so that the men might refresh  them selves. The so ld ie r s , t ir ed  
and hungiy, promptly drank more than they should have, becoming drunk 
and unmanageable. The o ff ic e r s  were unable to  control thaa, despite  
persuasion, commands, th rea ts , and f in a lly  blows, to  which the so ld iers  
paid no a tten tio n . C ecil ordered that a l l  remaining barrels be broken, 
but the men dipped up the flow ing wine from the c e lla r s  with th e ir
29h ats. By morning, the en tire  command was s ick , disorganized, demor­
a lized , and u n fit  fo r  even the sim plest sort of duty. C ecil ca lled  a 
council of h is  co lo n e ls , and considering the unserviceableness of the  
troops, th e ir  lack  of provisions, and the unlikelihood o f the Spaniards 
attacking, i t  was agreed that i t  would be f u t i l e  to  march to the Suazo 
bridge and that i t  would be b etter  to  return to  the isthmus. There­
fo re , C ecil and the arny retraced th e ir  steps to  Puntal, having accom­
plished  nothing in  th e ir  f r u it le s s  quest.
Undue s tr e ss  had been placed on securing the Suazo bridge, 
probably because i t  had been occupied by S ir Conyers C lifford , perhaps
2 % la n v i l le ,  Voyage to  C adiz, p . 60 .
^ ^ Ib id ., pp . 59- 60 .
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by mistake, in  the expedition of 1^96 . Charles Dalton claimed that 
the "bridge ought to  have been occupied by the English before the eneny 
had time to  send succour across i t  to  Cadiz. . . . Whatever C ec il's  
reasons were fo r  going to the bridge, i t  certa in ly  was a p osition  he 
ought to  have had in  h is own hands from the very f i r s t . A d m i r a l  
Sir William Honson, w riting in  h is Naval Tracts, made the same claim; 
because he had been on the previous expedition, which had been a 
blundering success, he was unable to r e s is t  h is acid comparison of 
the two v e n t u r e s . C e c i l  had, undoubtedly, been influenced by the 
ta c tic s  o f the previous expedition. There can be no sound ta c t ic a l  
reasons fo r  a force  of th is  s iz e  to attempt to  secure the Suazo bridge. 
Should a force such as C ec il's  reach the bridge and attempt to prevent 
i t s  use to  the Spanish forces, or to destroy i t ,  crossings could be 
made at other p o in ts . Eneny forces could have crossed the Rio Santi 
P etri and endangered the flanks or rear of the English forces concen­
trated  at the bridge, or landings could have been made from the seaward 
sid e of the islan d  to cut o ff  the forces at the bridge. Crossings 
could have been effected  using fish in g  boats which are read ily  a v a il­
able in  the area. Rivers have never been an e f fe c t iv e  barrier to  
m ilitary fo rces , and the Rio Santi Petri was neither wide nor deep 
from the bridge to i t s  southern mouth, although i t  was reportedly
32
navigable from i t s  northern mouth to  the bridge. A l ig h t  cavalry
^^Dalton, L ife  of C ecil, p. I 8 1 .
31John Churchill, ed ., C hurchill' s Voyages. A C ollection  of 
Voyages and Travels, Some now f i r s t  Printed from Original Manuscripts 
(London, 170%) I I I ,  23lu
^^Corbett, Successors of Drake, pp. 103-0%.
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u nit would have been the most e f fe c t iv e  force to use against the 
bridge. This type of u n it could have reached the bridge quickly from 
the isthmus, destroyed i t ,  and then retired . This would have only a 
delaying e f fe c t ,  but would have been the b etter  ta c t ic  in  th is  sort 
of s itu a tio n  so as to  gain s u f f ic ie n t  time to  turn the command's f u l l  
e ffo r t  against Cadiz. The e f fe c t  of surprise, which had in i t ia l ly  
been on the sid e of the English, had been d issip ated  by the in d ecision , 
council meetings, and delays, allow ing the c ity  to be reinforced while 
the h esitan t English command accomplished next to  nothing. Once the 
Spanish had reinforced th e ir  garrison, there was no reason for them 
to  o ffer  b a tt le  as they were secure, and th is  i s  ju st  the exact ta c tic  
which they employed. They knew that the English force , with but ten  
thousand so ld ie r s , could accomplish l i t t l e  on the I s la  de Leon. The 
reinforced Spanish garrison defending the w alls of Cadiz in  a lim ited  
area due to  the narrowness o f the isthmus, would have been able to  
su ccessfu lly  defend because the English had to come a t the c ity  from 
only the shore side and in  a confined space, thus lim itin g  the attack­
ing force while giving the advantage to  the defenders behind stout 
w a lls . The Spanish ta c t ic  o f o ffer in g  no resistan ce  was ex cellen t  
inasmuch as they had the English forces actu a lly  contained on the 
is la n d .
M ille these events were taking place on land, Denbigh played 
the ro le  o f admiral o f the f l e e t .  On the morning o f 25 October he 
ca lled  a Council of War to  meet on board the Anne Rcyal. The Council 
directed S ir  Samuel A rgali, the v ice  admiral, to  use h is squadron in  
an attack upon the ships in  Trocadero Channel, which they supposedly
19
had been preparing for.^^ The Dutch ships were a lso  in v ited  to  p a rti­
c ip a te . I t  soon developed that there were so many sa ilo r s  of A rgali's  
squadron ashore that the ships were undermanned. I t  proved necessary 
to  have the commander at Fort Puntal round up these men, n otify ing  
them that fa ilu r e  to board th e ir  ships involved the death penalty. 
Another instance of the lack of control on the part of sh ip 's  o f f i ­
cers for  permitting so mary sa ilo r s  to  go ashore.
C ecil came on board the Anne Royal about two o'clock  in  the 
afternoon and directed  that no more so ld iers  be sent ashore unless he 
so ordered. This i s  the f i r s t  in d ication  that a change o f plan was 
about to  develop. C ecil then returned to shore, leaving the sea- 
conanand s t i l l  in  Denbigh's hands.
As soon as wandering s a ilo r s , t id e ,  and wind would permit. 
Argali moved h is squadron in  the d irection  of the Trocadero Channel.
A Dutch boy, who had been held prisoner on one of the ships in  the 
channel, was taken along as guide. He had escaped to  the English 
f l e e t .  Upon reaching the entry to  the channel, i t  was discovered that 
the Spaniards had already sunk four ships across i t ,  leaving but a 
narrow opening through which one ship could pass. The ships farther  
up the channel were so disposed that th e ir  broadsides could be con­
centrated on th is  narrow o p e n i n g . I t  was further suspected that 
Spanish a r t i l l e iy  was a lso  planted ashore covering the same en tiy .
The commanders of the v e sse ls  supporting the Royal Navy ships showed 
a backwardness in  complying with A rga li's  commandsj d iscretion  here
^ % la n v il le .  Voyage to  C adiz,  p . 63 .
^^tlbid., p. 6h.
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outweighed valor as far as Argali was concerned, and consequently no 
attack was forthcoming.^^
C ecil again consulted with h is  co lon els and members of the 
Council o f War as to  whether or not they could break o ff  th e ir  f u t i l e  
plan with honor, and reembark the troops. I t  was held that i t  would 
not be a matter of dishonor, because no attack  had been made on Cadiz 
i t s e l f .  The town of Cadiz was considered to be too strongly fo r t i f ie d  
to  take without a long s ie g e , for which the f le e t  was not provisioned. 
The c ity  would be too d i f f ic u l t  to  attack as only one narrow avenue of  
approach along the isthmus was fe a s ib le . Because of th is ,  the defend­
ers would have a decided advantage, and while the town might be taken 
through sieg e  and starvation , the f l e e t  was in  no b etter  p osition  than 
the townspeople with regard to food and water. The English so ld ie r s ,  
untrained and in  no condition to  conduct open warfare, were u n fit  for  
ary future m ilitary  p l a n s . T h e  decision  was thus made to  try and 
in tercep t the Spanish treasure f l e e t .
Sir Thomas Love reported to  C ecil that while on the long and 
fru stra tin g  march, he had noted ten or twelve tuna fish in g  boats 
along with a great supply of nets and corks near the southern edge of 
the inner bay. C ecil determined to  destroy th is  m ateriel, but to  save 
the boats for  use in  the f l e e t .  On the morning of 26 October, seven 
or eigh t regiments were marched back to  th is  place and the above was 
accomplished.^^ C ecil a lso  ordered Denbigh to  issu e  a warrant to  a l l
^^Tbid. ,  p . 6S. 
^^Ibid., pp. 52-56.
37Ib id . ,  p. 6 7 .
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ship captains and pursers to meet him at Puntal in  the afternoon to  
determine the status o f provisions in  every ship , thereby securing a 
b etter  understanding of th e ir  condition and to  decide how to  proceed 
in  the future.
At th is  time, Denbigh received a message from Argali, s t i l l  
watching at the mouth of the Trocadero Channel. He had not made an 
attack and was not about to , but because h is honor was involved he 
would not leave h is post u n til  ordered to  do so . He requested that 
several ship captains be sent to  h is  p osition  to  determine whether 
or not an attack would be considered p o ss ib le . Denbigh, believ in g  
th is  to  be reasonable, ordered S ir Thomas Love and S ir M chael Geere 
to  view the problCTi, These gentlemen did not perform th is  serv ice  for
th e ir  compatriot, and C ecil, hearing of the a f fa ir ,  sent a warrant to
A rgali re liev in g  him of h is  assignment inasmuch as he believed  in  h is  
wisdom, va lor, and in teg r ity .^
C ecil decided that he wanted to  garrison Fort Puntal and attempt 
to  keep i t  permanently. This would have been an unfortunate move on 
h is part as there i s  no reason to  b e liev e  that the English would have 
been able to  defend i t  against superior Spanish fo rces , which were 
bound to  appear, C ecil was, fortu n ately , overruled by the Council of
¥ar. The Council, in  one of i t s  few wise d ec isio n s, believed  that
the fo r t  could not be held; that i t  was of no great importance to  
hold i t ;  a strong f l e e t  would be required to do so; i t  would not give  
England command of any real Spanish te rr ito ry , and i t  would not
3 8 ib id ., p . 72.
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e ffe c t iv e ly  hinder the enemy as he could s t i l l  use the Bay of Cadiz
39out of command of the f o r t 's  guns.
I t  was decided to  remove the eight cannon from Fort Puntal, 
the English taking s ix ;  the Dutch were rewarded with two for th e ir  
v a lia n t e f fo r ts . As mar  ̂ ships as p o ssib le  were now brought in  c lo se  
to  Puntal, and the d i f f ic u lt  task o f embarking the expedition began. 
Thus, because of in d ecisio n , h es ita tio n , poor adm inistration, lack of 
cooperation, misunderstanding, and pure incompetence, the English 
e ffo r ts  on the I s la  de Leon came to naught.
3 9 ib id ., p . 71.
CHAPTER VI 
RETREAT, RETURN, AND RECRBONATICNS
The English f le e t  lay  p a tien tly  in  the Bay of Cadiz. The sick  
and t ir ed  sold iery began to  reembark on the afternoon of 27 October, 
the work progressing through the n ight. Vi/hen the c it iz e n s  of Cadiz 
perceived the change in  English plans, they fired  o ff  th e ir  cannons 
and muskets in  triumphal v o lley s  o f r e l ie f .^  The horses, a r t i l le r y ,  
and provisions were shipped on the morning of the 28th, -with great 
care being devoted to the horses so that the Spanish could not claim
that the English had f le d  in  such haste that th e ir  horses were l e f t
2
behind. Once a l l  were boarded, the f l e e t  moved to  the mouth of the 
bay, dropped anchor, and awaited a favorable wind. As soon as the 
Anne Royal dropped her hook, C ecil ca lled  a Council o f War.
After deliberation , the Council resolved that the f l e e t  should 
put to  sea in  an e ffo r t  to  in tercept the Spanish treasure f l e e t .  The 
follow ing reasons were advanced; th e ir  ch ie f strength was in  the f l e e t  
at sea; no harbor would now be sa fe  fo r  them where shipping might be 
found to  attack; while the sea was fr ien d ly  to  them as w ell as to  
th e ir  fo e , the shores were fr ien d ly  only to the eneay; a contrary 
wind might keep the f le e t  long in  harbor, which could be disastrous 
i f  they were trapped; the treasure f le e t  must soon arrive, or e lse  i t
^Journal of the Swiftsure, 27 Oct. 1625. 
^G lanville, Voyage to  Cadiz, p. 75.
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-would not be coming th is  year.^ Several questions re la tin g  to -water, 
a point of rendezvous, and the d isp o sitio n  of sick  and wounded men 
were raised , but i t  was deemed wise to  d iscuss these matters with the  
captains and masters and then hold another Council of War the fo llow ing  
day. On the 29th i t  was decided that the en tire  f le e t  should cru ise  
some s ix ty  leagues west of Cape S t . Vincent, remaining between th ir ty -  
s ix  and one-half degrees and thir-ty-seven and one-half degrees north 
la t itu d e , while waiting for the treasure f l e e t .  I f  strong westerly  
winds developed, forcing the ships in to  the S tr a its , the rendezvous 
point would be at Budgeroe (Burge), ju st west of Malaga.^ Should 
southerly winds force the ships northward, the rendezvous would be at 
the I s le s  o f Bayon, on the west coast of G alicia , where fresh  water 
might be obtained.^ Concerning water fo r  departing the Bay of Cadiz, 
several ship captains a lleged  that there were only two fresh  water
w ells  in  S t. Mary Port which could take care of but a few ships in  a
6
day. Much precious time would be lo s t ,  and water could not be ob­
tained without landing forces in  strength . The decision  was made to  
s a i l  without fresh  water. The f l e e t  would thus put to  sea again with­
out ha-ving procured fresh  water sin ce leav in g  Plymouth three weeks 
before. Inasmuch as the en tire  f l e e t  would be s a ilin g  in  the d irec­
tion  of England when departing the Bay of Cadiz, no decision  was made
3 lb id . , pp. 76- 7 7 .
^Budgeroe; Assumed to  be Burge, a place marked on an l8 th  
centuiy map, ju st west o f Malaga, as i f  i t  had a tower on a h i l l ,  
which would make a good sea-mark. G lan v ille , Voyage to  Cadiz, p. 78.
^Journal o f the Sw iftsure, 29 Oct. l625.
^ G la n v ille , Voyage to  C adiz, p . 79 .
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as to  the d isp osition  of the s ick  and wounded men, other than that 
they would be sent home at the f i r s t  convenient opportunity. The 
horse ships would accompany them. That same morning the f le e t  sa iled  
out of the Bay of Cadiz.
C ecil was ca lled  upon to  s e t t le  a question o f precedence which 
had arisen  among V alentia, Cromwell, and Delaware, involving th eir  
squadron id e n tif ic a tio n  f la g s .  Cecil proposed, in  h is peculiar h e s i­
tant manner, that the matter be se tt le d  by the Council of ¥ar, but 
the Council refused to do so , saying that i t  had a l l  come about by an 
act of C e c il 's ,  when he had assigned S ir Francis Steward's f la g  to  
Delaware before leaving Plymouth. Valentia and Cromwell were v i s ­
counts, while Delaware was but a baron, and the former believed they 
should have had precedence. C ecil was f in a lly  forced to  a makeshift
decision  to appease Valentia and Cromwell. The matter remained un-
7
reso lved .
At another Council of War, held on 1 November on board the Anne 
Royal, inquiry determined that numerous seamen were i l l .  Of two hun­
dred seamen on the Sw iftsure, s ix ty  were indisposedj of two hundred 
and f i f t y  on the S t. Andrew, th ir ty ; o f two hundred and twenty on the 
S t . George, s ix ty ; of one hundred and eighiy on the Bonaventure, f i f t y ;  
of one hundred and eighty on the Convertive, f i f t y ;  and o f two hundred 
and f i f t y  on the Rainbow, s ix ty .^  The Council decided that the twelve 
most unserviceable ships would return to England carrying the s ick ,  
the wounded, and the horses as soon as Cape Sts Vincent was cleared .
7Ib id . ,  pp. 83-88. 
^ Ib id ., p. 90.
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At th is  sarae Council, S ir John Proude accused Captain Squibb, of the 
Lion, of cowardice and neglect of duty in  several past action s, while 
the Earl o f Denbigh accused Captain Qxenbridge, of the Dragon, of 
f ir in g  on fo r t if ic a t io n s  without orders a t Santa Catalina point in  
the Bay o f Cadiz. No action was taken, although punishments had been 
recommended by the accusers.
The Council o f War, meeting again on the Anne Royal on h Novem­
ber, decided that the f l e e t  would remain at sea u n til 20 November,
9
and then return to England. S electing  a date was necessary to  pre­
vent ships from returning to England on th e ir  own should they become 
separated from the f l e e t .  A ll ships were provisioned fo r  a period 
longer than t h is ,  but the captains and masters who claimed to  know 
the most about Spain’s merchant marine said that the treasure f le e t  
was either in  port, would arrive at the very la te s t  by the l$ th , or 
would not come at a l l  th is  year. The captains were a lso  informed that 
t h ^  had not been follow ing the sa ilin g  in stru ction s issued  to them at 
sea on 11 October; they were ordered to do so under threat of imprison­
ment. A password, “S t. George," was devised to  prevent strange ships 
from f il t e r in g  through the f le e t  under cover of darkness and gettin g  
away I t  was further ordered that an inventory be conducted in  each 
ship to determine the number and name of those sick  and wounded to  be 
returned to  England. The condition of each ship, i t s  water, and pro­
v is io n s  would a lso  be reported.
During the Council meeting. S ir John Wattes, Captain of the S t.
^Journal o f  th e  S w iftsu re , k Nov. 1625. 
^ % la n v ille , Voyage to  Cadiz, p . 97.
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Andrew, proposed an attack on the Pladeiras inasmuch as the f le e t  was 
alreacfy so far south. He said he should be h ea rtily  sorry to have to  
return home without having performed some s e r v i c e . T h e  islands  
were r ich , he contended, and would y ie ld  good p illa g e  towards r e lie v ­
ing the King’s costs o f the expedition, and would encourage the s o l­
d iers and sa ilo r s  a fter  th e ir  i l l  bargain at Cadiz. He further stated  
that i t  would be dangerous to  rendezvous in  the S tra its  near I'lalaga 
because of the aroused enençr, opposed to  the weakened condition of 
the f l e e t .  A lso, that the l^ladeiras l i e  b etter  for a stra igh t wind 
for England than from the area o f f  the S tr a its . The Captains and 
masters on the Council, however, negated the proposal on several 
grounds. They claimed that there were any number of fo r ts  w ell stored  
with ordnance in  the Madeirasj that so ld iers  and ammunition were 
placed in  such a manner as to  hinder the f l e e t ' s  approaches to land; 
there was no harbor at a l l ,  only some wide and unsafe roads ly in g  
dangerously open to  the winds; that the seas were very deep and the  
best p laces to  anchor are mostly in  water of th ir ty  fathoms or more; 
that the landing of men would be d i f f ic u lt  because of the high surf 
on the beaches; and that there i s  but one p lace to  land out of shot
o f the fo r ts  and the way from there to  the ch ie f town i s  so narrow
12that an army could be cut o ff  while using i t .  A fter hearing these  
a lleg a tio n s , the Council took no further action , leav in g  the matter 
unresolved.
^^Ibid. ,  pp. 97-98. 
l^ Ib id ., pp. 98-99.
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On 9 November, the f le e t  was in  the la titu d e  of th irty-seven  
degrees, th e ir  appointed s ta tio n . C ecil issued in stru ction s as to  
how the squadrons were to function during th e ir  wait for the Spanish 
treasure f l e e t .  Thqy would cru ise  between th ir ty -s ix  and th irty-seven  
degrees north la titu d e , with the squadrons spread out in  a rough l in e ,  
y et within s igh t of one another. I t  was estimated that the l in e  of 
ships would extend over a degree of la titu d e  roughly, or c lo se  to  
seventy m iles. A ll ships were ordered to  lower s a i ls  and heave to  
each morning, to  observe a l l  around carefu lly  for an hour or two, and 
then se t  s a i l .  A ll ships were given permission to chase any suspected 
enemy sh ips, and a system of recognition sign als was devised by strik­
ing or ra isin g  to p sa ils  to  prevent the ships from chasing each other 
n eed lessly . A ll captains were ordered to remain in  th e ir  squadron 
d iv is io n s , except in  a chase, and to  report daily to  th e ir  squadron 
admirals. Failure to fo llow  these orders would resu lt  in  removal from 
command and disgrace.
On th e  1 1 th , C e c il  had th e  f l a g  hung out fo r  a C ouncil o f  ¥ar, 
but due to  th e  d is p e r sa l o f  th e  f l e e t ,  th e  e n t ir e  group cou ld  not be 
brought to g e th e r . There were about t h ir t y  sh ip  ca p ta in s  on board th e  
Anne Royal when Lord Delaware a rr iv ed  w ith  news th a t  th e  s ic k n e ss  had 
spread so g r e a t ly  among h is  men th a t  u n le s s  he were provided  w ith  
rep lacem en ts, h is  sh ip , th e  &fc. George,  cou ld  not be c o n tr o lle d .  C e c il  
c a l le d  th e  ca p ta in s  to g e th e r  and ordered th a t  each would provide two 
h ea ltb y  men fo r  th e  George w h ile  they would take back two s ic k  men
^ ^ I b id .,  pp. 1 0 3 -1 0 5 .
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from her. V’Jhile th is  may have seemed a sen sib le  move to C ecil in  the 
l ig h t  of his tim es, should the sickness prove to  be communicable, he 
had provided the best means of spreading i t  through at le a s t  one-third  
of h is  f l e e t .  That same day C ecil dispatched the twelve ships to  
England with s ick  and wounded men rounded up from the widely dispersed  
ships of the f l e e t . A l l  s ick  and wounded personnel were not evacu­
ated because some ships could not be located , and the rough seas and 
blustery weather made transfer from ship to ship very d i f f ic u l t .
"While the p estilen ce  in  the f l e e t  may have been caused îy  a 
variety  of circumstances, there appears to be l i t t l e  doubt that much 
of i t  stemmed from the consumption of spoiled  food and drink. Sir 
George Blundell wrote to  the Duke of Buckingham on 3 November that 
"every man cryes out for v ic tu a ll ,  and some drink beverige of sider  
that stinkes worse than carrion, and have no other drink; i t  hath 
throTOe down so many men that in  some shippes t h ^  have not enough to  
trim there sayles."^^ Sir M chael Geere wrote to h is son, "I greve 
to wright of many other abewses as in  our v i t t i l s ,  our f le sh e , cut at 
halfe the kynges allowance, & that so stinks that I presume hathe ben 
the cawse of the deathe & sickness wch i s  amongst us; no dog of par- 
rish  Garden I thinke w ill  eate it .* ’^  ̂ The poor san ita tion , spoiled  
provisions, men liv in g  under crowded shipboard conditions, lack of 
fresh  water, and the improper preparation of food, must have a l l
\̂ b i d . ,  p. 106.
^^Dalton, L ife  of C ec il, p . 206.
l ^Cal. S t. P ., Domestic, 162^-1626, p. l?^ , on microfilm P.R.O. 
698, S .P .n 3 / l l .
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contributed immeasurably to  the sickness found in  the f l e e t .
On the iL th , S ir William S t. Leger and Captain Porter of the 
Convertive n o tified  C ecil that they did not have s u ff ic ie n t  men to  
h o ist or take in  th e ir  s a i l s .  They would have to  l e t  the ship drive 
before the wind unless more men could be obtained. C ecil directed  
that some o f the ships which had not provided men for  the George 
under sim ilar circumstances would send one man each to the Convertive.
On 17 November, the Earl of Essex appeared with h is  squadron, 
having been separated from the main f le e t  for  a f u l l  week by adverse 
winds. His ship, the Sw iftsure, had but th ir ty -th ree  men in  sound 
condition out of a complement of two hundred and f i f t y  s e a m e n . A  
Council of War, ca lled  th is  same day, discussed how to  proceed on 
the 20th, s a i l  to  the I s le s  of Bayon, or d irectly  for  England. After 
a lengthy debate, the Council decided that the f le e t  should s a i l  for  
England, but those ships in  d ire need of water could go independently 
to  Bayon. The Councillors a lso  decided that the f le e t  should imme­
d ia te ly  run as northerly a course as p o ssib le . Thus, the f le e t  
actually  began i t s  homeward voyage on 17 November.
The next day was co ld , rainy, and b lu ste iy . Because th is  con­
d itio n  held u n til 2 December, the homeward-bound f le e t  became widely
scattered . The sickness a lso  increased. One hundred and th ir ty  men
19on the Anne Royal, for  example, were not f i t  fo r  duty. The number 
of f a t a l i t i e s  increased and th e ir  bodies were disposed of over the
^^Glanville, Voyage to  Cadiz, p. 109. 
^^Ibid. ,  p. 113.
^^Ibid. ,  p. 1 1 6 .
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side in  the trad ition  of the sea . After a day of f a ir  -winds, the temp­
est began anew on the Uth and continued to blo-w hard. About four 
o'clock  in  the afternoon of the 8th, the lookout on the Anne Royal 
sighted the S c illy  I s le s ,  ju st o f f  Land's End in  Cormfall, the south- 
westernmost point in  England. They were qu ite alone. The winds were 
from the southeast, however, and the Anne Royal was to ta lly  unable to  
touch any part of England. Th^ desperately made s a i l  fo r  Ireland, and 
put in to  the harbor at K insale, County Cork, on 11 Decmber. The Anne 
Royal did not have enough men to  lower her s a i ls  and consequently the 
noble gentlemen on board had to  perform th is  necessary task with the 
assistan ce of th e ir  servants. There were one hundred and s ix ty  sick
men on boardj one hundred and thir-ty had died and had been cast over- 
20
board. The Anne Rcyal had over s ix  fe e t  of water in  her hold;
estim ates were that she could have survived but a d ^  or two longer 
21at sea . C ecil remained in  K insale, along with S ir Thomas Love, 
while the Anne Rcyal -tjas being r e f it te d . Due to  the magnitude of the 
work required, the commander of the i l l - f a t e d  expedition did not reach 
London u n til  2 I'larch l626 .
Meanwhile, the Earl of Essex arrived at Falmouth in  Cornwall 
on 5 December on the Swiftsure with several other ships of his squad­
ron. The Swiftsure had but forty  men f i t  for  duty and could not be
22moved from Falmouth. One of Essex's sh ip s, the Mary Constant, had
^*^Dalton, L ife  of C ec il, p . 193. 
^^Glanville, Voyage to  Cadiz, p. 120.
^% al. S t. P ., Domestic, l6 25 -l626 , p. 171.
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foundered in  the gale with the lo s s  of one hundred and twenty men.
Only the sh ip 's  o f f ic e r s , plus two arny o f f ic e r s , managed to  survive.
As soon as he landed, Essex hurried to  court to  inform Buckingham and 
the King of the reasons for  the expedition 's fa ilu r e .
During December l62^ and January l626 , the battered ships of 
the storm -shattered, disease-ridden f le e t  came staggering home, the 
next seemingly in  worse condition than the previous one. As the un­
steady, under-manned ships reeled  in to  whatever port they could reach, 
the so ld iers  and sa ilo r s  were taken ashore and b il le te d  upon the people 
in  the surrounding areas. These men were in  te r r ib le  condition, s ick , 
diseased , l i t t l e  or no c loth ing, weak, d ir ty , and p en n iless . S ir John 
E lio t , Vice Admiral of Devon, in  w riting to  Secretary Conway, gives 
the follow ing description  of the p lig h t of the so ld iers  and sa ilo r s  
in  the Plymouth area:;
The m iseries before us are great, and great the complaints 
of want and i l ln e s s  of the v ic tu a l. There i s  now to be buried 
one Captain B o lle s , a landsman, who died since th e ir  coming 
in , and with much g r ie f  expressed the occasion of h is  s ick ­
ness to  be scarcity  and corruption of the provisions. The 
so ld iers  are not in  b etter  case. They are in  great numbers 
continually  thrown overboard, and yesterday f e l l  down here 
seven in  the s tr e e ts .  The r e s t  are most of them’wea^ and 
unless there be a present supply of c lothes there i s  l i t t l e  
hope to  recover them in  the p laces where they are lodged.
Despite several pleas to the Privy Council by the Commissioners at
Plymouth fo r  money with which to  c lo the and provision these men,
l i t t l e  was done u n til the follow ing February when the necessary funds
25were made a v a ila b le .
^ ^ a lto n . L ife  o f C ecil, p. 19U.
S t. P ., Domestic, l625-l626 , p . l8b .
^^Ibid., p. 251.
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As early as 29 Ootober, when the f le e t  departed the Bay of 
Cadiz to  begin i t s  f r u it le s s  search, the various noble leaders of 
squadrons and ships had begun w riting dispatches to  the Duke of Buck­
ingham and Secretary Conway informing them of what was transpiring on 
the expedition. This was unfortunate because many versions of events 
were depicted, often  slanted by the ro le  of the w riter . At the con­
clusion  of the voyage, th is  volume increased as each w riter sought 
to  ju s t ify  h is  own a ction s, often  at the expense o f some other member 
of the expedition. The majority o f those w riting to  Buckingham upon 
th e ir  return did so rather than face  him. S ir M.lliam S t . Leger said  
that he was ashamed to face  e ith er the King or B u c k i n g h a m . S i r  
John Burroughs, w riting to Buckingham, had sim ilar views;
The i l l  success of th is  journey makes us so ashamed th at, 
fo r  my part, I  am afrayde to appear to  yow but in  paper, and,
I  am sen sib le  that ny reputation must be blemished amidst the 
throng, y e t  comforted that your grace i s  so w ise and ju st as 
to  aske account of eveiy man's part, and, where yow find  
most fa u lts  there to  lay  most censure, and then I  hope i f  
others fin d  pardon I  may be i n c l u d e d . ^7
A ll of these gentleuen were quick to  place the blame for the fa ilu r e
of the expedition on anyone but them selves. A ll the other leaders
would f ly  to  the Duke with open mouths to  blame C ecil, S ir  William St.
Leger wrote, y e t  those that blamed C ecil the most were not blameless
th en selves. He personally was ashamed, moreover, fo r  other men's
action s, but not for  h is  own. In another le t t e r  to  Buckingham, S t.
Leger blamed the Council of War for  not wanting to do anything; they
^^Ibid. ,  p. 180, and on microfilm, P.R.O. 698, S.P . l6 /8 .
^^Dalton, L ife  of C ec il, pp. 238-39.
Cal. S t. P ., Domestic, 1625-1626. p. l 8 l .
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neglected the King's serv ice  and they never decided anything with judg­
ment or courage. C ecil, furthermore, did not possess the q u a lit ie s  of 
29a general.
S ir  Michael Geere, in  w riting to  h is  son, accused C ecil of 
merely going to  sea a fter  Cadiz to  waste tim e, and that th is  resu lted  
in  many unnecessary deaths plus r isk  to  the s h i p s . P e c u l i a r  as i t  
may be. S ir  Michael Geere was the only d ere lic t  o ff ic e r  singled  out 
by C ecil in  h is  le t t e r s  to  Buckingham ànd to  Conway. C ecil sa id , "I 
cannot forbears to l e t  you know that of a l l  the kings Captns Sr Michael 
Geere hath carried him selfe worst in  h is Maties serv ice , and hath much 
deceaved ny expectation."^^ One would assume that C ec il, o f a l l  the 
people on the expedition, would have the most complaints and in d iv id ­
uals to  name for  d ere lic tio n  of duty. Instead, Cecil singled  out only 
Geere for d irect c r it ic ism  trtiile having p ra ise  for sev era l.
C ecil was c r i t ic a l  in  general, however, of several members.
He confessed to Secretary Conway on 27 February l626 , upon h is arrival 
at Plymouth from Kinsdale:
Thus you see how i l l  fortune hath haunted u s. But that 
which troubleth me most i s  to  have so many come home before 
me, in  so unfortunate a jo u rn ^ , when there are so many mouths 
open to  do i l l  o f f ic e s ,  and untruth hath most c r e d it t , and 
maketh most impression at the f i r s t .  By two kinds of people 
e sp e c ia lly , which I  only suspect. The f i r s t  i s  such as did 
rather envie the greatness o f ny coraaund then p i t t i e  the 
greatnes of ny cares and paines. The other are such as have 
suffered much m iserie and wante, and could not have so much
29 ib id .
^^Ibid. ,  p . n h t  and on m icrofilm  P.R.O. 698, S.P . 16/ 1 1 . 
3 lG la n v ille , Voyage to  Cadiz, p . x lv .
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as they desired, nor do what they l i s t e d ,  I  must confesse  
there was never any thing that did trouble me more at ny 
going out then that I  had not meanes to  give everyone con­
ten t; for although i t  was not ny fa u lt ,  y e t I  knew i t  would 
f a l l  on me; for they durst not la y  i t  upon any one e ls ,  and 
being f u l l ,  u tter  i t  t h ^  must. And i t  i s  one of the dan- 
gerousest pointe in  coraraaund to commaund without mory, and to  
have l i t l e  raony to content them, for there i s  nothing that 
w ill  make a man more hated or slandred than that; for to  
punish and not to  paye i s  ever receaved in  an armie to  t i r -  
annie. But i f  h is Matie have receaved any serv ice  by i t ,  I  
sh a ll carry ny cross ch ea refu llie , fo r  that I  su ffer  for  h is
sa k e . 32
Poor C ecil! He apparently never wished to  offend anyone and had tr ied  
to appease a l l .  Too new to  the middle n o b ilily , he had not had s u f f i ­
c ien t time to  learn to  use the power o f h is new s ta tio n  before sa ilin g  
on the expedition. C ecil, in  addition to acquiring a new t i t l e ,  that 
of Viscount %mbledon, had a lso  received a nickname, "Viscount S it -  
s t i l l ,"  before he was even able to  return to  England and defend him­
s e l f . C e c i l  had been surprised, no doubt, at having been raised  to  
a viscountcy suddenly in  the previous September. He apparently was 
not s a t is f ie d  with the name "Mmbledon, " although he had se lected  i t  
him self. He had appended the follow ing to a dispatch to  S ir John Coke 
w ritten on board the Anne Royal in  November 1625, begging Coke to  pro­
cure a t i t l e  change for him:
I  am to  make an humble su ite  to your Honor, that in  regard 
h is Matie was pleased ly  ny Lord Duke’s meanes, to  give me 
the choice of what place I  desired ny viscountship , which (at  
f i r s t )  I  did choose of Mmbledon, that now, upon b etter  con­
sideration , I  may have i t  to  bee Lord C ecyll, Vycount Latymer, 
because i t  was the antient T it le  of ny grandfather by ny mother’s
^^Ib id . ,  pp. x l iv -x lv .
^^Robert F. lA lliam s, ed .. The Court and Times of Charles the 
F ir s t  (London, I 8L8 ,  2 v o ls .)  I ,  72.
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sid e , and now extinguished. This Favour, i f  you can procure 
raee, you sh a ll for ever bind raee to bee your servant.
Inasmuch as no changes were made in  h is  o f f ic ia l  t i t l e ,  i t  must be
assumed that e ither Coke would not take any action , or that C ecil >ra.s 
out o f favor. I t  was probably the la t t e r ,  for C ecil was denied access 
to  the King for  over two months a fter  h is  return. On 28 April he 
wrote to  Buckingham complaining b it te r ly  about not being able to  see  
h is  sovereign to  present h is sid e  of the expedition’s s t o r y . H o w ­
ever, C e c il’s t i t l e  was not the element which concerned him most. He 
was r igh t in  the middle of a national tempest and i l l  winds were be­
ginning to  blow.
Parliament met on 6 February. I f  the a ffa ir s  of the realm had 
been in  a poor s ta te  when the previous Parliament had refused to  grant
supplies to  the monarch, they were now in  a worse condition. A public
inquiry was being demanded in to  the condition of the troops at Plymouth 
and the abject fa ilu r e  of the Cadiz expedition . Complaints had arisen  
in  the past few months, the principal one being Buckingham’s attempt
to  pawn the crown jew els in  Amsterdam in  an attempt to  ra ise  money to
carry out h is  and Charles’ p o l i t ic a l  schemes. The Commons determined 
to  attack the man. Lord Admiral Buckingham, because he was considered 
to  be the cause of the recent national d isgraces. A leader was neces­
sary whom the Commons would support, and soon one appeared. I t  was
S ir John E lio t .
Sir John, in  h is p osition  as Vice Admiral of Devon, had seen
^^Dalton, L ife  of C ecil, p . 219. 
^ % id . ,  pp. 255-56.
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the Cadiz expedition s a i l .  He had a lso  witnessed i t s  ignominious 
return, plus the condition and treatment of the troops. He was a 
sincere p a tr io tj h is sense o f national pride had been deeply hurt by 
th is  disgrace to  English arms. He had been a great friend of Bucking­
ham's and was, consequently, reluctant to  do anything that would harm 
the Duke's p osition j y e t England's lo s s  of honor wounded h is  pride and 
stung him in to  attacking h is  erstw hile fr ien d . At the beginning of 
the parliamentary sessio n , he rendered a strong speech asking that an 
accounting be made for a l l  monies supplied sin ce 1623, claiming that 
mismanagement o f public a ffa ir s  had cost thousands of l iv e s  in  Holland, 
the P alatin ate, and on the Cadiz expedition.
Having aroused the members of Commons by h is  bold words, Sir  
John went on to  the disgraces which had la te ly  occurred to the armed 
fo rces. He did everything but name the author o f England's misfortunes. 
His f ie r y  words follow ;
And now. S ir , I  beseech you, cast your e^es abouti View 
the s ta te  we are in ; consider the lo s s  we have received; 
weigh the wrecked and ruined honour of our nation. Oh, the 
incomparable hopes of our most ex ce llen t sovereign, checked 
in  th e ir  f i r s t  designI Search the preparation; examine the 
going forth ; l e t  your wisdoms travel through the whole action , 
to  discern the fa u lt ,  to  know the fa u lty . For I  presume to  
say, though no man undertook i t ,  you would fin d  the Ancient 
Genius of th is  kingdom r is e  up to  be the accuser! Is  the 
reputation and glory of our nation of a small value? Are 
the w alls and bulwarks of our kingdom of no esteem? Are the  
numberless l iv e s  of our lo s t  men not to  be regarded? I  know 
i t  cannot so harbour in  an English thought. Our honour i s  
ruined, our ships are sunk, our men perished; not ty  the 
sword, not by the eneny, not by chance; but, as the strongest 
predictions had discerned en tire  design; he had the whole 
command by sea and land; and y e t  he thought i t  su ff ic ie n t  to
3&John F o rster , S ir  John E l io t : A Biography, l5 9 0 -l6 3 2  (London, 
l8 6 5 , 2 v o l s . ) .  I ,  U79, n ote. ""
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put in  h is  deputy and stay at hoinel That for which the whole 
kingdom must be troubled was not thought worthy of h is person; 
but a deputy, a su b stitu te , must discharge i t ;  and what en­
couragement that might give to  the a ffectio n s of the people,
I  leave to a l l  men that have reason to determine. But was 
th is  our f i r s t  miscarriage? Before th is .  S ir , we had the 
action  of Count M ansfeldt, and that was so m iserable, and the  
men there sent so managed, as we can hardly say they went.
Sure i t  i s  that t h ^  did nothing, and y e t  how few returnedÎ 
The handful lik ew ise  which iTas sent to  the P alatin ate, not 
seconded nor supplied, i t  i s  known what fortune they achieved.
I  might speak a lso  of the action  to A lgiers and others of that 
nature, and ask who i t  was that in  a l l  these had the king's  
ear at p leasure, and fashioned reports and propositions at 
h is w ill?  We might r^em ber, too , besides these actions and 
engagenents, the tr e a t ie s  and negotiations that have been; the  
in f in i t e  expense they have cost and the nothing they have re­
turned. Nothing, but lo s s  and dishonour to our nation! And 
from i t  a l l  such discouragements might w ell a r ise  now, con- . 
sidering the abuses of m inisters y et too potent, as , should 
a supply not be forthcoming a t th is  tim e, might ju s t ly  make 
apology fo r  the su b je c t .38
Though S ir John E lio t  attacked Buckingham in  Commons, he was
favorably in c lin ed  toward S ir  Edward C ec il, "a su b stitu te ."  He f e l t
that C ecil should have had b etter  employment because of h is years of
serv ice  and experience. E lio t  said that " fa c il ity  was the greatest
prejudice he was subject to , which rendered him credulous and open to
those that were a r t i f i c i a l l  and obscure. IVhereby he became exposed,
and subservient to  th e ir  w i l l s ,  and was drawne to  tread those paths
39
which themselves refu s'd  to  walk in ."  I t  i s  thus apparent that S ir  
John did not blame C ecil for  the expedition 's fa ilu r e , but put the  
blame on Buckingham and the preparaticns for  the vcyage.
Statements had been made by members of the expedition as to  the 
poor quality of men supplied, the spoiled  p rovision s, the tainted
38
PP' 517-18.
^ ^ Ib id ., p . Uii9.
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drink, and the leaky condition of the ships o f the f l e e t ,  James Bagg, 
one of the principal provisioners at Hymonth, wrote to Buckingham in  
defense, claiming that had the expedition been su ccessfu l, i t  would 
then have been said  that never before had an army and f le e t  been b etter  
manned, armed, provisioned, and clothed. But now, he sa id , these  
claims are made to  cover th e ir  own shame, and he urged the Duke not 
to l i s t e n  to th e ir  c o m p l a i n t s . T h e  provisioners of the f le e t  and 
the naval dockyard o f f ic ia ls  responsible for  the condition of the 
sh ips, should have been included in  the o f f ic ia l  inquiry, but were 
able to evade apy involvement. C ecil was not so fortunate.
On 6 1-iarch, C ecil :fas summoned to appear before the Lords of 
the Privy Council to  answer charges which had been made by some of the 
coimaanders under him in  the expedition, namely: the Earl of Essex, 
Viscount V alentia, Viscount Cromwell, S ir  Charles Rich, S ir Edward 
Harwood, S ir  Edward Conway, S ir  IlLchael Geere, S ir  John Burroughs, Sir  
John Wattes, and S ir  John C hudleigh.^ Of these o f f ic e r s , only Har­
wood and Burroughs were p ro fession a ls . Prominent among those who did 
not accuse Cecil were S ir T^lliam S t. Leger, S ir George B lundell, S ir  
Richard G reenville, and S ir Thomas Love.^^ C ecil had to  defend him­
s e l f  not only against charges of mismanagement in  the Cadiz expedition, 
but a lso  had, as a Council of War member, to  withstand the in v estig a tio n
^% al. £b. P ., Domestic, 1625-1626, p. l8 2 .
^D alton , L ife  of C ec il, pp. 251-52.
^^Ibid. ,  p. 253 . Note: On p. ix  of G la n v ille ’s Voyage to  Cadiz,
the ed ito r . Rev. Alexander B. Grosart, s ta te s  that among others. S ir  
Thomas Love was passionately strong against C ecil. This i s  not borne 
out in  any of S ir  Thomas’ le t t e r s .
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■wbich the House of Commons was making in to  the conduct and operations 
of the Council. Dr, Meddus, a p r o lif ic  contemporary le t t e r  w riter, 
wrote to Rev. Joseph Mead the follow ing description  of that which 
transpired when C ecil appeared before the Council:
The same Monday afternoon. Viscount Mimbledon and the 
co lon els of the arny came before the lords o f the council, 
where the v iscount, to  h is much prejudice and disadvantage, 
f e l l  in to  a passion, saying, that never men was abused as 
he; that before h is going and sin ce h is  return, there had 
been l ib e l s  and ballads to  h is  disgrace; and that some had 
wished before departure that the voyage might rather not 
prosper than he should have the honour of i t .  Whereupon 
cy Lord Essex asked him whether he were the man that had 
made such wishes against him, and so Colonel Burrows and 
the r e s t  in  order did the l ik e ,  saving only S ir William 
S t. Leger and Sir George B lundell, who of a l l  the rest did 
only adhere unto him.W
The Council of War was in  a most d i f f ic u lt  p o sitio n . They had 
se lected  the leaders of the expedition. Buckingham was the ch ie f  
member o f the Council and the most powerful man in  England. To try  
C ecil was to  try  th e ir  own p o l ic ie s .  C ecil was a member of the Council 
and had been carrying out th e ir  orders. How then would i t  be p ossib le  
to  try  one o f th e ir  own who was protected by th e ir  most powerful mem­
ber? Buckingham had to  protect C ec il, even as he him self was protected  
ty  the King, fo r  an attack on C ecil was tantamount to  an attack on 
him self. Furthermore, C ecil had accepted the expedition 's command 
and resp o n sib ility  which should have been borne by the Duke. Bucking­
ham must have rea lized  th is  as he stood by C ecil, using the great 
power of h is o f f ic e s  to  s t i f l e  the complaintants. I t  now remained to  
be seen i f  the Duke would be as fortunate.
The Council of War, as previously mentioned, was to  appear
^% 11 iam s. Court and Tim es, p.
LOI
before Commons to  answer how they had recommended dispensing the mon­
ie s  granted to the Crown. Dr. Meddus, w riting to the Rev. Joseph 
Mead on 10 March, described th e ir  appearance;
On Tuesday morning, the Council of ¥ar presented themselves 
before the House of Commons, where being demanded whether t h ^  
had issued  the moneys according to  the order in  the sta tu te , 
th e ir  answer was, that they were not bound to give the House 
of Commons an account of what they had done. . . .  On Wednes­
day afternoon, the lawyers of the House discussed the question  
whether the council of war were bound by the sta tu te  to  give  
an account of th e ir  proceedings to  the House of Commons, and 
concluded that the council of war was bound to do i t .  . . .
On Thursday morning, the Commons propounded a new question  
to  the same council: namely, whether in  th is  la s t  action at 
sea, and formerly a lso , th e ir  counsels, about the issu in g  of 
money had been put in  execution, and examined every one of 
them apart. % Lord Grandison’s answer was he was not bound 
to  give an answer. Sir John Ogle required more time to  give  
h is answer, and so did the Earl of Totnes. Whereupon Saturday 
i s  s e t  down as a peremptory day for  them a l l .  Lord Conway 
and S ir  Thomas Button being s ick , a committee i s  sent to  each 
to  examine them. S ir Horatio 7ere, Baron Tilbury, i s  freed  
from a l l  question by the House in  respect of h is absence, and 
the Lord Brooke by reason of h is eye and impotency. But when 
th is  question i s  done, the Commons have f iv e  more questions 
in  readiness in  the Speaker's hand for the same Council of 
War to  answer. % Lord Wimbledon (C ecil) was not as yet  
questioned by them but w ill  be to d a y .^
The Council was faced now with a rea l dilemma. Should they 
refuse to  answer to Commons, the grant of money to the King might be 
delayed or even denied. I f  they gave Commons the whole story , they 
would be involving themselves as w ell as the government, and placing  
themselves a lso  at the mercy of the r e le n t le s s  Commons. I t  was at 
th is  point that Charles rescued them. He directed them to reply to  
Commons as fo llow s:
We have endeavoured to  give a l l  p ossib le  sa tis fa c t io n  to th is  
honourable house, touching the question you have been pleased
^ ^ Ib id ., pp. 8 7 -88 .
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to  propound iinto u s . And, taking in to  our consideration the 
dutie we owe as counsellors of the warre unto h is  Matie, and 
the due respect we have unto th is  house, in  discharge thereof 
we have humbly besought h is K atie’s pleasure therein , whoe 
hath bin gratiously  pleased thus to  d irect u s .
His Katie hath given us leave to  give an accompt of our 
warrants to the Treasury, for  the disbursm ent of the subsi­
d ies la s t  given in  the time of h is Royall fa th er , which i s  
c lea rely  warranted by the Act of Parliament. But, concerning 
or counsells and the follow ing thereof, h is  f e t i e  hath d ir­
ec tly  forbidden us to give any accompt, as being against his 
serv ice  to divulge those se c r e tts , and ecspresly against our 
oath as counsellors of warr.^5
This firm , d ecisive  reply kept the Commons from continuing th e ir  in ­
quiry and protected S ir Edward C ecil from being questioned by th is  bo(fy.
The House of Commons, having fa ile d  to  secure answers from the 
King, now turned i t s  f u l l  fury upon the Duke of Buckingham. Here thqy
would not be put o f f ,  for  they declared publicly  that the Duke was
"a common enençr both of church and s t a t e . T h e  Commons prepared 
impeachment proceedings against the Lord Admiral even though t h ^  fu lly  
rea lized  that Charles would do h is utmost to protect h is fa v o r ite .  
Amerigo S a lv e tt i ,  representing the Grand Duke of Tuscany, wrote to h is  
patron on 27 I4arch, describing some of the principal charges brought 
against the Duke:
The principal accusations brought against h is Excellency, 
moved by a certa in  Doctor Turner, are divided under s ix  heads 
as follow s:
1 s t ,  Whether th e reputation of BtLs j^îajesty's f le e t  
sin ce the Duke o f Buckingham has been Admiral has not dimished 
and the dominion of the neighbouring seas been almost lo st?
2nd, Whether in  consequence of the innumerable and 
profuse donations bestowed on the Duke and h is r e la t iv e s  the 
country has not been impoverished?
^^HLstorical Manuscripts Commission Reports, Eleventh Report,
I ,  5 l ,  on microcard.
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3 r d ly . Whether th e  assum ption t y  th e  Duke and h is  
r e la t iv e s  o f  th e  p r in c ip a l o f f i c e s  o f  th e  kingdom has not 
been th e  cause o f  th e  p resen t d isord ers?
l+thly. Whether th e  s a le  by th e  Duke o f  o f f i c e s  and 
d ig n i t i e s  both  s p ir i t u a l  and tem poral to  unworthy persons  
to  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  can d id a tes o f  m erit i s  not th e  cause o f  
d iso rd er  and u n ju s t ic e ?
5 th ly .  Whether th e  presen ce a t  cou rt o f  h is  mother 
and godfather who are p a p is ts  does not show th a t  he patron­
iz e s  o th ers  o f  th a t  sect?
6 th ly .  Whether b ein g  Grand Admiral and G eneral he 
ought not to  have gone in  person  w ith  th e  f l e e t ,  and whether 
i t s  f a i lu r e  i s  n ot to  be a ttr ib u te d  to  th e  s e le c t io n  o f  
l i t t l e  ex p erien ce  to  command i t ?
I t  i s  sa id  th a t  th e  members o f  Parliam ent w ish  t o  in q u ire  
in to  o th er m a tters , but I  am o f op in ion  th a t  th ey  w i l l  in  th e  
end be o b lig e d  to  be q u ie t  as I  s e e  no chance o f  t h e ir  s u c c e s s ,  
even in  th e  sm a lle s t  d egree , u n le s s  th e  King s id ed  w ith  them 
which no one b e l ie v e s  p o s s ib le .
The p u rsu it  o f  Buckingham grew so  hot th a t  C harles se n t  S ir  John 
E lio t  and S ir  Dudley D igges, th e  two most outspoken members o f  th e  
House, t o  th e  Tower fo r  t h e ir  in fla m a to ry  sta tem en ts . I t  now became 
a c o n te s t  between King and Commons, w ith  each demanding som ething from  
th e  o th er . The King wanted h is  supp ly  and Commons wanted Buckingham 
removed from o f f i c e .  F u rious because two o f  t h e ir  members had been  
im prisoned . Commons r e s o lu t e ly  kept on w ith  t h e ir  impeachment p la n s .  
Amerigo S a lv e t t i ,  w r it in g  to  b is p atron , d e scr ib es  th e  s i tu a t io n  as 
o f  3 A p r il:
A lthough th e  Kit^ l a s t  week inform ed P arliam ent, by word 
o f  mouth, th a t  i t  ought w ithout l o s s  o f  tim e to  d evote i t s  
a t te n t io n  to  th e  q u estio n  o f su pp ly , in s te a d  o f  b r in g in g  
p erson a l charges a g a in s t  th e  Duke o f  Buckingham, i t  e v id e n tly  
w i l l  not abandon th e  cou rse which has been tak en . The members
1:6Ib id ., p. S i.
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on th e  co n tra iy  p ersev ere  z e a lo u s ly  in  t h e ir  in q u ir ie s  in to  
th e  cau ses o f e x i s t in g  burdens. Such in q u ir ie s  n a tu ra lly  
le a d  to  r e f l e c t io n s  on th e  a d m in istra tio n  o f  th e  Duke, and 
many name him in  th e  most open manner as th e  author o f  
e x is t in g  e v i l s .  They are not l i k e l y  to  g iv e  up th e  h ab it  
o f doing s o , t i l l  th ey  have matured th e  term s o f  h is  impeach­
ment, -which "With th e  support o f th e  house o f  L ords, they  w i l l  
submit to  h is  M ajesty p e t it io n in g  him fo r  j u s t i c e .
The King i s  anxious to  prevent t h i s  ca ta stro p h e , p a r tly  
because he has a lread y  d eclared  h is  determ ination  to  p r o te c t  
th e  Duke. .
C harles decided  upon a new t a c t i c ;  b e in g  frank  and fr ie n d ly  
w ith  th e  Commons. S a lv e t t i ,  in  a l a t e r  p o r tio n  o f  h is  rep ort o f  above 
d a te , d e sc r ib e s  t h i s  a c t io n ;
He (C harles) exh orts  th e  Members to  co n sid er  th e  p resen t  
s t a t e  o f h is  a f f a i r s ,  and c a l l s  upon them to  u n ite  to g e th er  
and to  tak e  prompt measures to  a id  him, so th a t  th e  favour­
a b le  season  may not be l o s t  fo r  making a l l  th e  p rep aration s  
n ecessary  fo r  d efen ce  and o f fe n c e , and e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  su ccor­
in g  th e  King o f  Denmark -with p resen t and fu tu r e  su p p lie s  o f
3 0 .000  £  s t e r l in g ,  as w e ll as 20 ,000  t  f o r  th e  Count o f  Mans­
f e l d t ,  b e s id e s  what i s  req u ired  to  pay fo r  th e  m aintenance o f
6 .0 0 0  E n g lish  tro o p s in  H olland.
IiJhat i s  o f s t i l l  more im portance, they  must a ls o  provide  
th e  money req u ired  fo r  th e  c o s t  o f  th e  na-vy and fo r  th e  de­
fe n c e  o f  Ire la n d  which w i l l  amount to  m il l io n s .  % th  regard  
to  th e  statem ent o f  g r iev a n ces . His l'îa jesty  w i l l  hear i t ,  
provided th a t  th e r e  i s  no a tta c k  on h is  government, or on th a t  
o f h is  fa th e r  th e  l a t e  King o f happy memory, and th a t  i t  i s  
expressed  in  a moderate and tem perate m a n n e r . ^7
The House o f  Commons decided  th a t  th ey  -would grant supply to  
C h arles, but on ly  in  th e  amount o f  about th r e e  hundred thousand pounds. 
Furtherm ore, th ey  would not pass th e  a c t  u n t i l  such tim e as th e  King 
would g iv e  them a d ir e c t  rep ly  to  th e  l i s t  o f  g r ievan ces which th ey  
were in  p rocess  o f  p rep arin g . C harles, s e e in g  th a t  th ere  was no o th er  
way to  p r o te c t  th e  Duke, d is so lv e d  Parliam ent on l 5  June.^^
'̂̂ Ib id . ,  p . 53.
^^VS.lliams, Court and Tiroes, p . 112 .
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By t h i s  a c t io n , C harles p reserved  th e  Duke o f  Buckingham in  
h is  se v e r a l o f f i c e s ,  but l o s t  any chance o f  secu r in g  a supply from  
P arliam ent. But more im portant, a lthough  he saved one f r ie n d , C harles 
l o s t  th e  r e sp e c t o f  Parliam ent and o f  h is  p eo p le . T his rash  a c t  to  
save h is  Lord Admiral a ls o  ended th e  parliam entary in q u iry  in t o  th e  
u n c o n st itu t io n a l a c ts  o f  th e  Duke, w herein he made n a tio n a l commit­
ments w ithout th e  approval o f  P arliam ent. One o f th e se  major commit­
ments was th e  Cadiz e x p e d it io n . So, here d ied  th e  in q u ir y  which 
m ight have proved many th in g s  about t h i s  i l l - p la n n e d ,  f r u i t l e s s ,  
inhuman, and c o s t ly  fo ra y  which must be con sid ered  as th e  low  p o in t  
in  E n g lish  naval h is to r y .
CHA.PTER VII 
CCKCLUSICNS
The Cadiz ex p ed itio n  o f 1625 was a s e r ie s  o f  l o g i s t i c a l  and 
t a c t i c a l  b lu n d ers, one compounding an oth er, w ith  th e  r e s u lt  th a t  th e  
whole op era tio n  was a m iserab le  f a i lu r e .  On th e  s t r a te g ic  l e v e l ,  
however, th e  o v e r a l l  o b je c t iv e s  o f  th e  Cadiz ex p ed itio n  must be con­
s id ered  as sound. Had th e  ex p ed itio n  been ab le to  move along th e  
Spanish co a st  d estro y in g  sh ip p in g , i t  would have d e a lt  Spain a heavy 
blow . Had th e  e x p e d itio n  been a b le  to  ta k e  some p ort on th e  c o a s t  o f  
Spain and held  i t ,  th e  f l e e t  would have been a b le  t o  op erate  from a 
san ctu ary . Had th e  ex p ed itio n  been a b le  to  capture th e  trea su re  f l e e t  
in t a c t ,  or in  p a r t , i t  would have cu t o f f  th e  f lo w  o f  Spanish b u ll io n  
used to  f in a n ce  her w ars. T h is would a ls o  have g iven  C harles and 
Buckingham th e  n ecessa ry  funds to  expand t h e ir  aims in  th e P a la t in a te .  
Had th e  ex p ed itio n  succeeded , i t  would have rescued  C harles and Buck­
ingham from th e  d esp era te  p o s it io n  in to  which th e  l a t t e r  had maneuvered 
them.
The ex p ed itio n  f a i l e d ,  however, on th e  p lan n in g  l e v e l ,  th a t  area  
between s tr a te g y  and t a c t i c s .  Had th e  l o g i s t i c a l  p lanning been sound, 
th e  sh ip s  would have s a i le d  w ith  adequate p r o v is io n s , en ab lin g  them to  
go on to  o th er o b je c t iv e s  a f t e r  th e  d eb a c le  a t  Cadiz and in  f l o t a -  
w atch ing.
The ex p ed itio n  was p oorly  planned and execu ted . The s o ld ie r s  
and s a i l o r s ,  p ressed  in t o  s e r v ic e  in  hay, were not emplcyed u n t i l
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October wben th e  f l e e t  put to  s e a . T his i s  not o b je c t io n a b le  in  i t s e l f ,  
fo r  an arny req u ir es  tr a in in g ,  but th e s e  men were not tr a in e d  during  
th e ir  lo n g  five-m on th s sojourn  a t  PLyraouth. The tim e could  w e ll have 
been used to  t r a in  them in to  some semblance o f  a f ig h t in g  f o r c e ,  but 
t h i s  was t o t a l l y  n e g le c te d . T his arny was an u n d isc ip lin e d  rabble  
during i t s  e n t ir e  p eriod  o f  s e r v ic e .  England had y e t  to  le a r n  th a t  
thousands o f  men p ressed  in to  s e r v ic e  a g a in s t  t h e ir  w i l l  did not con­
s t i t u t e  an arqy. The p r o v is io n s , stock ed  on board th e  sh ip s  fo r  th e  
same five-m on th  p er io d , became so s p o ile d  th a t  th e  s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  
became i l l ,  th u s fu r th e r  reducing t h e ir  e f f e c t iv e n e s s .  One cannot cen­
sure th e  p r o v is io n e r s  o f  th e  f l e e t  to o  h arsh ly ; having expended rcy a l 
funds to  purchase r a t io n s  f o r  th e  sh ip s  when ordered in  th e  sp r in g , 
th ey  had no o th er  monies w ith  which to  rep la ce  th e  sp o ile d  p r o v is io n s .  
The f a u l t  h ere la y  in  not s e t t in g  a ta r g e t  date toward which a l l  e l e ­
ments cou ld  work, and then  adhering to  t h i s  d a te . A lso , someone w ith  
an understand ing o f  p r o v is io n in g  should  have checked th e  q u a lity  o f  
th e  p r o v is io n s  p rovid ed .
Some o f  th e  l e s s e r  c o a s ta l p o r ts  o f  P ortu ga l, th en  under Spanish  
r u le ,  should  have been con sid ered  as p o in ts  to  s e iz e  tem p orarily  to  
r e p le n ish  p r o v is io n s  and w ater . No record  can be found o f even such  
a su g g e stio n  b e in g  made. The squadrons cou ld  have made se v e r a l co ­
ord inated  r a id s  to  s p l i t  th e  defend ing  fo r c e s  should  any have been in  
th e  s e le c t e d  a r e a s . N othing in  t h i s  l i n e  o f  approach was su g g ested .
I t  would have been p o s s ib le  to  have th e  f l e e t  op erate  from th e se  
Portuguese p o r ts  w h ile  w atching fo r  th e  w r a ith - lik e  tr e a su r e  f l e e t .  
Drake had done t h is  in  l58?  w ith  a much sm aller  f o r c e ,  even managing
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to  overhaul h is  sh ip s  in  th e  p ro cess  and g iv e  h is  men a r e s t  on shore  
w h ile  r e p r o v is io n in g  th e  f l e e t .
The a d m in istra tio n , p lan n in g , and co n tro l u sed  in  162^ were 
poor during a l l  phases o f  t h i s  o p era tio n . Even had Cadiz been taken , 
th e r e  would have been l i t t l e  found in  th e  way o f  food  and water as 
th e se  r e q u is i t e s  f o r  s u b s is te n c e  must be brought in to  th e  c i t y  from  
th e  m ainland. T his i s  an e x c e l le n t  example o f  poor l o g i s t i c a l  p lan ­
n in g . This must be con sid ered  as  a d ir e c t  r e s u lt  o f  James' p o lic y  o f  
n e g le c t in g  h is  m il ita r y  and naval fo r c e s  fo r  over tw enty y e a r s .  There 
apparently  was no one on th e  e x p ed itio n  used  to  th in k in g  a long th e se  
l i n e s .
The m il ita r y  t a c t i c s  used  were as d ep lorab le  as th e  naval te c h ­
n iq u es. A n ig h t la n d in g  should  have been made on th e  seward s id e  o f  
th e  isthm us le a d in g  to  Cadiz which would have cu t o f f  th e  c i t y  b efo re  
th e  Spaniards would have been aware o f  th e  p resen ce  o f  an E n g lish  
f l e e t .  C onsidering th e  t a c t i c s  which were employed, th e  f l e e t  should  
have a rr iv ed  in  th e  e a r ly  morning to  u t i l i z e  as many d a y lig h t hours 
as p o s s ib le ,  but th ey  m erely blundered in to  th e bay l a t e  in  th e  a f t e r ­
noon, lo s in g  t h e ir  v i s i b i l i t y  in  a few  hours. R apid, d e c is iv e  a c t io n  
should have been taken  im e d i a t e ly ,  but in s te a d  a C ouncil o f  War had 
t o  be c a l le d ,  thus w a stin g  fu r th e r  p rec io u s hours. There were enough 
sh ip s  and tro o p s so th a t  s e v e r a l th in g s  could  have been accom plished  
a t  on ce . One squadron cou ld  have a tta ck ed  F ort P u n ta l, another gone 
a f t e r  th e  sh ip s  in  th e  Trocadero Channel, w h ile  th e  th ir d  could  have 
been p u ttin g  troop s a sh o re . Mass in a c t i v i t y  x-xas th e  a c tu a l r e s u l t .
The e f f e c t  o f  su r p r ise , a ca rd in a l p r in c ip le  on an exp ecü tion  l i k e
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t h i s ,  was allow ed to  s l i p  away.
Another p r in c ip le  o f  war, s e c u r ity ,  was t o t a l l y  ig n o red . T his  
p erm itted  th e  c i t y  to  be r e in fo r c e d  by n ig h t , and had a Spanish  f l e e t  
been in  th e  v ic in i t y  th ey  would have had no d i f f i c u l t y  in  b o t t l in g  up 
th e  E n g lish  f l e e t  in  th e  b ay . Once a sh o re , C e c i l ’ s aim o f  s e iz in g  
th e  Suazo b rid ge  was u n n ecessary , and ex tro n e ly  poor t a c t i c s ,  not 
worthy o f  h is  rank or y ea rs  o f  m il ita r y  ex p er ien ce . He might have 
been cut o f f  had th e  Spanish  been more a g g r e s s iv e . C e c i l ' s  t a c t i c  
was apparently  p red ica ted  upon th e  b r id g e  having been taken in  th e  
r a id  in  1596, a lthough  no a t te n t io n  was p a id  to  i t s  having been taken  
a t  th a t  tim e through a m isunderstanding or an error  on th e p art o f  th e  
commander. The proper t a c t i c  would have been to  defend along th e  
narrow p art o f  th e  isth m u s, supported by th e  f l e e t ' s  guns from e ith e r  
s id e .
Poor naval tech n iq u es  were a ls o  used during th e  watch fo r  th e  
tr e a su r e  f l e e t .  There seems t o  have been l i t t l e  reason  fo r  s e le c t in g  
a p o in t s ix t y  le a g u e s  (one hundred and e ig h ty  m ile s )  w est o f  Cape S t .  
V incent and ordering  th e  f l e e t  to  c r u is e  not over an area o f  one d egree  
on a n orth -sou th  a x i s .  T his i s  roughly seven ty  m ile s , w h ile  th e  sh o r t­
e s t  s t r a ig h t  l i n e  d is ta n c e  from Cape S t .  V in cen t, so u th ea st to  th e  
n ea rest  p o in t on th e  North A fr ica n  C oast, Cape S p a r te l,  near T an g ier , 
i s  roughly one hundred and e ig h ty  m ile s .  T his d is ta n c e  cou ld  have 
e a s i ly  been screened  by th e  p lu s -n in e ty  sh ip s  in  th e  E n g lish  squadrons. 
The f l e e t ,  w est o f  Capè S t .  V in cen t, was not in  a good p o s it io n  to  
in t e r c e p t  th e  Spaniards u n le s s  i t  came in  a  d ir e c t  l i n e  from th e  Azores 
to  C adiz. W th  Spain in v o lv e d  in  a European war, and w ith  news o f
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E n g lish  f l e e t  p rep ara tion s in  th e  -wind, i t  could  be expected  th a t  th e  
tr e a su r e  f l e e t  might s e le c t  an a lte r n a te  r o u te . Inasmuch as th e  Span­
i s h  f l e e t  norm ally stopped a t  th e  A zores each yea r  on i t s  way to  Spain , 
i t  would have made much more sen se  to  th e  E n g lish  f l e e t  to  have s e iz e d ,  
or a t  l e a s t  to  have l a i n  c lo s e  to  th e  A zores to  w a it . C onsidering  
on ly  a p o s it io n  c lo s e  to  Spain to  w ait f o r  th e  f l e e t ,  i t  would have 
been much b e t te r  to  have la i n  in  w a it sou th  o f  Cape S t .  V incent ra th er  
than w est o f  i t .  The p a tro l d is ta n c e  would have been much sh o r te r , 
a ffo r d in g  a b e t te r  chance to  lo c a te  th e  f l o t a .
I t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to  compare th e  a c t io n s  o f  th e  E n g lish  f l e e t  
o f  162$ w ith  modern B r it is h  p r in c ip le s  o f  war. The p r in c ip le s  in clu d ed  
in  th e  fo llo w in g  d is c u s s io n , although a p p lic a b le  to  any period  in  h i s ­
to ry  in  r e tr o s p e c t ,  would n o t, o f  co u rse , have been recogn ized  in  
t h e ir  e n t ir e ty  by th e  1 7 th  century m il ita r y  personnel concerned.^ That 
most o f  th e se  p r in c ip le s  were v io la te d  in  th e  Cadiz ex p ed itio n  i s  
dem onstrable. An o b je c t iv e  was s e le c t e d ,  but th e  p r o je c t  was not  
c a r r ie d  through, f i n a l l y  b e in g  abandoned. The same might be sa id  o f  
o f f e n s iv e  a c t io n .  An o f fe n s iv e  a c t io n  was begun, but a second p lan  
was allow ed to  t a k e ’p reced en ce . A dm in istra tion  was one o f  th e  c h ie f  
item s m issin g  in  t h is  o p era tio n . I t  was p oorly  planned and executed  
from a t a c t i c a l  v iew p oin t and even more so in  i t s  l o g i s t i c a l  a s p e c ts .
A s o l id  example o f  a d m in is tr a tiv e  f a i lu r e  was th e  s o ld ie r ' s  going  
ashore and marching o f f  w ith  empty knapsacks. C ooperation was d e f in ­
i t e l y  la c k in g  between th e  le a d e r s  and t h e  merchant c a p ta in s , a llo w in g
Subcourse 1 /6 2 ,  The R ole o f  th e  Army and Fundamentals o f  Com­
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d is s e n s io n  to  creep  in ,  ending in  sev ere  a ccu sa tio n s  a t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  
o f  th e  ven tu re . C oncentration  o f  fo r c e  was ach ieved  in  th e  m assing o f  
th e  f l e e t  in  one a tta c k  upon C adiz, but was not fo llo w ed  up as on ly  a 
sm all p art o f  th e  fo r c e  was in v o lv e d  in  th e a tta c k , o th er elem ents 
anchored nearby, d id  n o th in g . Economy o f  e f f o r t ,  or u s in g  ju s t  enough 
to  accom plish  c e r ta in  m issio n s was not fo llo w e d . Ivhile th e  a tta c k  on 
Puntal was going  on, other p a r ts  o f  th e  f l e e t  should have had o th er  
m issio n s  in s te a d  o f  m erely w atching and w a it in g . F l e x ib i l i t y  was 
la c k in g  in  th a t th e  fo r c e  cou ld  not do more than one th in g  a t  a tim e , 
although a degree o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  was ach ieved  when th e  a c t io n  a t  Cadiz 
was broken o f f  and a new ven tu re  began. However, i t  was not a spontan­
eous or even pre-p lanned  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  but was a rr iv ed  a t  only a f te r  
d is c u s s io n . S u rp rise  was ach ieved  in  th e  sudden a tta c k  on C adiz, but 
th e  advantage o f  t h i s  p r in c ip le  was l o s t  through th e  m u st-h a v e-a -co u n cil 
-m e e t in g - f ir s t  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  commander. The p r in c ip le  o f  s e c u r ity  
was v io la te d  by not p o s tin g  a squadron, or p art o f  a squadron, o u ts id e  
th e  Bay o f Cadiz to  prevent th e  f l e e t  b e in g  s u r p r is e0  or to  prevent 
Cadiz from b ein g  r e in fo r c e d . N e g le c t  o f  t h i s  l a t t e r  p o in t allow ed  
thousands o f  Spanish  s o ld ie r s  to  g a rr iso n  C adiz, and was th e  c h ie f  
reason  why a lan d -b a sed  a tta c k  was not launched  a g a in s t  th e  w e ll -  
b a stio n ed , w alled  c i t y .  M aintenance o f  m orale was one fa c to r  never  
con sid ered , a lth ou gh  a p o in t  might be s tr e tc h e d  in  co n sid er in g  C e c i l ’ s 
is su a n c e  o f  wine to  h is  t ir e d  and hungry s o ld ie r s  as b ein g  in  t h i s  
c a teg o r y . The w e ll-b e in g  o f  th e  s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  was never con­
s id ered  e ith e r  b e fo re  or  during t h i s  mismanaged v en tu re . E ffo r ts  to  
fe e d  and c lo th e  th e  men were made a f t e r  th e  return  to  England, when
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th e s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  were once more b i l l e t e d  upon th e  r e lu c ta n t  
c i t i z e n s  o f  th e  southern c o a s ta l c o u n tie s , but t h i s  took  alm ost two 
months t o  r e s o lv e ,  doing l i t t l e  in  th e  meantime to  m aintain  m orale.
To have e s ta b lish e d  m orale during t h i s  ven tu re would have required  a 
m irac le  inasmuch as a l l  o f  th e  p ersonnel concerned were th ere  a g a in s t  
t h e ir  w i l l .  L i t t l e  wonder th a t  th e  ex p ed itio n  f a i l e d .
The Cadiz e x p e d it io n , in  th e  com pleteness o f  i t s  f a i lu r e ,  must 
be con sid ered  as th e  a b so lu te  nadir o f  th e  a r t  o f  E n g lish  seamanship. 
There were o th er  f a i lu r e s  which fo llo w e d , as a t  th e  I s l e  o f  Rhe in  
1627; th ere  were d e fe a ts  by th e  Dutch in  th e l61tO 's, but never again  
was th e r e  an ex p ed itio n  which f a i l e d  o f  i t s e l f .  The Cadiz ex p ed itio n  
d efea ted  i t s e l f  in  l6 2 5  through th e  inadequacy o f  i t s  preparation  and 
p lan n in g , and through th e  in e p tn e ss  o f  i t s  le a d e r s .  Zuane P esaro, 
V enetian  Ambassador to  England, summed i t  a l l  up in  a l e t t e r  to  h is  
government, w r itte n  on 2 January l6 2 6 :
. . . th ey  say th a t  th e  k ing  ordered th e  retu rn  upon in ­
form ation  from E ssex , but th e  m in is te r s  are su re  th a t i t  was 
th e  in d iv id u a l d e c is io n  o f  Marshal C e c i l .  The reasons fo r  
t h i s  unexpected  event are bad management, d iv is io n  between 
th e  le a d e r s  and sh o r tn e ss  o f  p ro v is io n s  combined w ith  a fe a r  
o f  u t t e r  l o s s  a t  t h i s  bad season  and th a t t h ^  would never 
r e tu r n .2
No m ention was made t y  Pesaro o f a d e fea t by an eneny. I t  thus may be 
sa id  th a t  th e  enemy which d efea ted  th e  Cadiz e x p e d itio n  came from 
w ith in .
liJho was th e  enemy w ith in?  How can he or i t  be s in g le d  out and 
blamed? Could i t  be Parliam ent fo r  not supporting  C harles and Buck­
ingham in  t h e ir  grand iose p lans? Mol Parliam ent cou ld  not be blamed
2CaL S t . P . ,  V en etian , l6 2 $ - l6 2 6 , p . 269.
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in  any way. Inasmuch as th e  House o f  Commons c o n tr o lle d  th e  purse  
s t r in g s ,  th e  Parliam ent had a r ig h t  to  know how and where the n a t io n 's  
a s s e t s  were to  be expended. C harles would not tak e  them in to  h is  con­
f id e n c e  and t e l l  them o f  h is  p lan s fo r  war. N a tu r a lly , th e  Parliam ent 
resen ted  t h i s  and fou gh t back w ith  th e  only weapon th ey  had, r e fu s a l  
to  grant su p p ly . The Parliam ent had noth ing to  do w ith  th e  war p lan s  
or th e  ex p ed itio n  fo r  th e  sim ple reason  th a t  C liarles refu sed  to  t e l l  
them anything about i t .
C harles must be h eld  r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  h is  stubbornness in  not 
in form ing th e  Parliam ent o f  h is  m il i ta r y  and naval p la n s . Had he done 
so  he would undoubtedly have r e c e iv e d  t h e ir  su pp ort. Perhaps th e  sup­
p ort might not have been o f  th e  magnitude which he and th e  Duke w ished , 
but i t  would have been b e t t e r  than send ing out an ex p ed itio n  in a d e­
q u a te ly  equipped. C onsidering th e  mood and f e e l in g s  o f  th e  E n g lish  
p eop le  toward Spain , i t  would appear th a t  C harles might have had h is  
way had he p laced  h is  con fid en ce  in  h is  Parliam ent ra th er  than in  him­
s e l f  and Buckingham. C harles and h is  id e a s  o f  K ingship were, th e r e ­
f o r e ,  d ir e c t ly  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  th e  Parliam ent not gran tin g  him supply  
w ith  which he cou ld  have ad eq u ately  equipped th e  Cadiz e x p e d it io n .
The departed James must not be overlooked when i t  comes to  
determ ining r e s p o n s ib i l i t y . Through h is  s lip sh o d  p o l i c i e s ,  th e  m i l i ­
ta r y  and naval fo r c e s  had been allow ed to  decay fo r  over tw enty y e a r s .  
C harles was but th e  r e c ip ie n t  o f  th e  n e g le c t  o f  Jam es. However, w h ile  
C harles cannot be blamed fo r  th e .c o n d it io n  o f  th e  armed fo r c e s ,  he 
must bear th e  moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  a llo w in g  h im se lf  to  be i n f l u ­
enced by Buckingham and f o r  not tak in g  h is  Parliam ent in to  h is  c o n fid e n c e .
l l h
The P rivy C ouncil knew o f th e  war p la n s as d id  th e  K ing's Coun­
c i l  o f  War. Orders p e r ta in in g  to  th e  p rep aration s and th e  ex p ed itio n  
i t s e l f  were is s u e d  l y  both  b o d ie s . Inasmuch as Buckingham was th e  
dominant member o f  th e  P rivy  C ouncil and most o f  th e  Council o f  War 
bore some form o f  a lle g ia n c e  to  him, i t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  to  comprehend 
th a t  th e  Duke in f lu e n c e d  both groups. The P rivy  C ou n cil, although  
aware o f  th e  aim o f  th e  e x p e d it io n , should  not b e h e ld  to  account fo r  
i t s  p rep aration  or a c t io n s  because th e  C ouncil o f  War had been appointed  
to  a d v ise  th e  monarch in  m atters o f  war.
One m ^ ber o f  th e  C ouncil o f  War should  be s in g e d  out fo r  par­
t ic u la r  cen su re . S ir  George Carew, la t e r  th e  E arl o f  T otn ess, was 
M aster o f  th e  Ordnance. The Rqyal Ordnance O ffic e  had charge o f  th e  
o rd er in g , purchase, s to r a g e , care  and m aintenance, i s s u e  and rec o v e iy  
o f  a l l  m unitions o f  war both  by lan d  and s e a . IVhen fa u lty  muskets 
were p rov id ed , som ething must have been am iss, lîany o f  th e  muskets 
fu rn ish ed  d id  not have touch  h o le s  to  i g n i t e  powder in  th e  f i r i n g  
chamber, and ammunition provided d id  not f i t  th e  weapons. The Royal 
Ordnance O ffic e  came d ir e c t ly  under th e  Crown, Buckingham, and th e  
P rivy  C ou n cil. No attem pt was made im m ediately , however, to  f in d  f a u l t  
w ith  th e  Ordnance O ff ic e .  Thus, S ir  George Carew not on ly  escaped  
c r i t ic i s m  f o r  h is  p a rt in  p rov id in g  f a u lt y  ordnance fo r  th e  e x p e d it io n ,
3
but he was r a ise d  to  an earldom in  1626.
The C ouncil o f  War as a boc^ probably had l i t t l e  in f lu e n c e  on 
e ith e r  C harles or th e  Duke. T h eirs was an ad v isory  c a p a c ity , and th e
% . E. Aylmer, "Attempts a t  A d m in istra tiv e  R eform ,"'The E n g lish  
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on ly  member known to  have opposed Buckingham was S ir  Robert M ansell, 
th e  s in g le  naval member o f th e  C ou n cil. There i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t  
had M ansell not r e s is t e d  th e  Duke b efo re  P arliam ent, th a t  he, and not 
C e c i l ,  would have commanded th e  Cadiz e x p e d it io n . There i s  no ev id e n c e , 
e i th e r ,  th a t  th e  C ouncil o f  War would have been su c c e s s fu l in  opposing  
Buckingham's p la n s . Most members were appointed through ducal p atron ­
age—who cares to  oppose o n e 's  patron?
The t r a i l  o f  g u i l t  now le a d s  to  th e  Lord Admiral h im se lf . Mas 
th e  Duke o f  Buckingham r e sp o n s ib le  in  any way fo r  th e  f a i lu r e  o f  th e  
Cadiz armada? Y es, he was. The Duke, although  not w ith  th e  exp ed i­
t io n ,  had re ta in e d  fo r  h im se lf  thecpompous t i t l e  o f  "G eneralissim o,"  
w ith  C e c il as h is  deputy. Buckingham p assed  on to  C e c il th e  in s tr u c ­
t io n s  which he had re c e iv e d  from th e  K ing. The p r o v is io n e r s  o f  th e  
f l e e t  were r e sp o n s ib le  to  Buckingham and reported  d ir e c t ly  to  him.
Thus, th e  Duke should have been a c u te ly  aware o f  th e  l o g i s t i c a l  prepar­
a t io n s  made between î-îay and October 1625 . Buckingham as Lord Admiral 
s in c e  I 618, must have known som ething o f  th e  co n d itio n  o f th e  d i la p i ­
dated sh ip s  in  which th e  ex p ed itio n  s a i l e d .  Buckingham had, through  
patron age, been r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  appointm ent o f  th e  sen io r  command­
ers  o f  th e  f l e e t .  The s e le c t io n  o f  th e s e  le a d e r s  was one o f  th e  r e a l  
tr a g e d ie s  o f  th e  e x p e d it io n . The commander, th e  squadron commanders, 
and th e  squadron seconds-in-com m and, were e ith e r  m il ita r y  men or had 
no ex p er ien ce . S o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  lo o k  to  experienced  commanders 
w ith  r e s p e c t ,  as men who know t h e ir  jo b s , and upon whom th ey  can r e ly .  
There were no commanders who had ary exp erien ce in  th e  s o r t  o f  ta sk  
which I s y  b efo re  them. For th e  s e le c t io n  o f  th e se  le a d e r s  Buckingham
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must be d ec lared  g u i l t y .
The abrupt change o f  command from th e  Duke to  S ir  Edward C e c il  
must be con sid ered  as one o f  th e  b a s ic  reasons fo r  th e  e x p e d it io n ’ s  
f a i l u r e .  By removing h im s e lf ,  th e  Lord Admiral took  away th e  one 
s tr o n g , dominant p e r so n a lity  in  th e  o r g a n iz a tio n . Had Buckingham 
s a i le d  w ith  th e  f l e e t ,  i t  would have had a p ow erfu l, fo r c e fu l le a d e r  
used to  b e in g  o b ^ e d . The Duke was w e ll  aware o f  how to  e f f e c t i v e ly  
u se  h is  rank and s t a t io n .  In ste a d , a man new to  th e  m iddle n o b i l i t y  
was s u b s t itu te d . C e c il was outranked h y  s e v e r a l members o f  th e  ven­
tu r e ,  n otab ly  th e  E arls o f  Essex and Denbigh. In  a d d it io n . Lords 
V a le n tia  and Cromwell were v is c o u n ts ,  as was C e c i l ,  but they had y ears  
o f  s e n io r i t y .  These gentlem en would not have dared to  oppose Bucking­
ham, and th e  Lord Adm iral, through h is  o v err id in g  a u th o r ity , would have 
g iv en  th e  f l e e t  a d e f in i t e  purpose or g o a l. There i s  l i t t l e  doubt , 
a l s o ,  th a t  had Buckingham been in  command, th e  r e s t r i c t i v e  shipboard  
C ouncil o f  War would not have e x is t e d .  The Duke planned th e  ex p ed i­
t io n ,  h is  men p ro v is io n ed  i t ,  h is  men executed  th e  p la n , he re ta in ed  
th e  o v e r a l l  command, and so  he must bear th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  i t s  
dism al f a i l u r e .  Had th e  ex p ed itio n  su cceed ed , th e  Lord Admiral would 
have been a n a tio n a l hero fo r  d e v is in g  such a p la n . Inasmuch as i t  
f a i l e d ,  i t  seems j u s t i f i a b le  th a t  he be judged as r e s p o n s ib le .
Can S ir  Edward C ec il be blamed fo r  th e  f a i lu r e  a t  Cadiz? No, 
not d ir e c t ly ,  because h is  a c t io n s  were c o n tr o lle d  by th e  e x p e d it io n 's  
C ouncil o f  War. C e c il might be th e  e a s ie s t  t o  blam e, but not when 
he had to  ab ide ty  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  t h i s  board . Could t h is  C ouncil 
o f  War be h e ld  resp o n sib le?  As a bocfy, y e s ,  but as in d iv id u a ls ,  no. 
This was th e  shipboard group which made th e  d e c is io n s j  as such , t h ^
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should  shoulder th e  blame fo r  t h e ir  o p e r a tio n s . I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
p in p o in t r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  h ere , because a l l  members o f  t h is  C ouncil were 
not alw ays p resen t due to  weather and sep a ra tio n  o f  s h ip s . Some were 
p resen t fo r  some d e c is io n s ,  but not fo r  o th e r s . Even though C e c il  
had been hampered by th e  a c t io n s  o f  t h i s  C ouncil o f  War, he had i n ­
s i s t e d  th a t  a c la u se  be in s e r te d  in  h is  in s tr u c t io n s  whereby he was 
bound by th e ir  d e c is io n s ,  and i t  had been a fo r tu n a te  move by him. He 
cou ld  not be h eld  l i a b l e  fo r  d e c is io n s  made fo r  him, so i t  must be th e  
C ouncil o f  War th a t  r e c e iv e s  th e  blame fo r  d e c is io n s  made and r e s u lt s  
therefrom  a f t e r  th e  f l e e t  s a i le d  from Plymouth.
The Dutch commanders and t h e ir  squadron do not come in  fo r  any 
s o r t  o f  censure on t h i s  voyage inasmuch as th ey  performed more than  
adequately  a t  a l l  t im e s . T h ^  were outnumbered as fa r  as d e c is io n s  
made were concerned and d id  t h e ir  b e s t  under a l l  c ircu m stan ces.
The C aptains o f  th e  merchant sh ip s  which made up most o f  th e  
f l e e t  must come in  fo r  p a r t ic u la r  c r i t ic i s m  fo r  t h e ir  part in  th e  expe­
d i t io n .  b/hen a C ouncil o f  War was h eld  to  make a d e c is io n , th e  mer­
chant ca p ta in s  h eld  th e  ba lance o f  power because o f  th e ir  numbers; 
t h i s ,  a lon g  w ith  t h e ir  e f f o r t s  to  enhance th e  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  some o f  
th e p ro jec ted  o b je c t iv e s  could sway th e  v o te  o f  th e  C oun cil. San 
Lucer was not a ttack ed  because o f  th e  o b je c t io n s  o f  th e  merchant 
ca p ta in s  to  m aritim e hazards; th ey  were a ls o  a b le  to  do th e  same w ith  
regard to  S t .  1-lary P ort, G ib r a lta r , Malaga, and th e  K adeiras. As 
soon as one o f  th e se  was brought up, t h i s  group had many excuses as to  
■why t h ^  could  not go th e r e . Thus, th e  merchant ca p ta in s  c o n tr o lle d  
many o f  th e  a c t io n s  o f  th e  e x p e d it io n . T heir la c k  o f  coop eration  and
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cow ardice a t  Cadiz i s  a m atter o f  reco rd . Drake or Hawkins would 
have so lv ed  t h is  t y  a rope from a yardarm, but C e c il probably would 
have asked th e  C ouncil o f  War to  d ec id e  th e  m atter, and he would have 
been ou tv o ted .
As an immediate consequence o f  t h i s  d eb acle  a t  C adiz, King 
C h arles, Buckingham, and th e  roya l a d m in istra tio n  came under open 
a tta c k  h j  th e  House o f  Commons. Buckingham bore th e  major p a rt o f  
t h i s  c r i t ic i s m  and p erson a l cen su re . C harles had on ly  succeeded in  
b eg in n in g  h is  r e ig n  w ith  a ca ta s tr o p h ic  f a i l u r e .  The r e ig n  began on 
th e  wrong fo o t ;  i t  remained so u n t i l  C harles' dem ise in  16^9. The 
d e fe a t  and d isg r a c e  in  1625 saw th e  Rc^al Navy a t i t s  n ad ir . C harles 
was in te r e s te d  in  th e  Royal Navy, u n lik e  h is  fa th e r , and although  he 
had an extrem ely u n fr ie n d ly  P arliam ent, he attem pted to  r e c t i f y  th e  
co n d itio n  o f  h is  f l e e t .  T his e v e n tu a lly  le d  to  changed in  naval p o l ic y .
Another immediate consequence was th e  impeachment o f  th e  Duke 
o f  Buckingham by th e  House o f  Commons. The Commons recogn ized  th e  
Lord Admiral as th e  source o f  t h e ir  recen t n a tio n a l d isg ra ces  and 
t r ie d  to  have him removed from o f f i c e .  Only th e  K ing's d ir e c t  a c t io n  
o f  proroguing parliam ent saved h is  f a v o r i t e .  A lthough th e  a tta ck s  by 
th e  Commons r e s u lte d  in  a t  l e a s t  two members b ein g  sen t to  th e Tower, 
th e  low er house had lea rn ed  som ething. They had d iscovered  th e ir  
r e a l power la y  in  c o n tr o ll in g  th e  K ing's p u rse , and th a t  th ey  were 
g a in in g  s tr e n g th  and p r iv i le g e s .  They were now in  a much b e t t e r  p o s i­
t io n  to  fa c e  up to  a b so lu te  power and were becoming m en ta lly  a d ju sted  
to  attem pt r e s is ta n c e  to  ro y a l d e c r e e s . C harles r e a l iz e d  t h is  a ls o  
and la t e r  was to  attem pt to  r e t a l ia t e  by not c a l l in g  Parliam ent fo r  
e lev en  y e a r s .
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Mention has been made o f  th e  b i l l e t i n g  o f  s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  
on th e  c i v i l i a n  p op u lace. The c i t i z e n s  were reim bursed by th e  govern** 
ment fo r  housing and fe e d in g  th e  s o ld ie r y ,  but t h i s  in  no way made up 
fo r  th e  in con ven ien ce and m isc h ie f  caused by th e se  rough c h a r a c te r s .
No c o n s id era tio n  was shown as to  whether th e  c i t i z e n  wanted th e s e  
s o ld ie r s  or cou ld  a ffo rd  to  p rovid e fo r  than w h ile  a w a itin g  Crown 
payments, which o fte n  never came. S o ld ie r s  p ressed  fo r  th e  Cadiz 
e x p ed itio n  had been b i l l e t e d  upon th e  c i t iz e n r y  from June in to  O ctober, 
to  th e  u t t e r  m isery and d esp a ir  o f  th e s e  p eo p le . Upon th e  f le e t ^ s  
r e tu rn , th e  same procedure was fo llo w ed  and a ls o  in  succeed ing  expe­
d it io n s  .
The th ir d  Parliam ent o f  Charles* r e ig n  met in  March 1623. In 
A p r il,  S ir  John E l io t  d escrib ed  co n d itio n s  around Plymouth and th e  
abuses by s o ld ie r s  o f  th e  r ig h ts  o f  p r iv a te  c i t i z e n s .^  S ir  W alter 
E rie o f  D o rse tsh ire  spoke o f  th e  s o ld ie r s  s t e a l in g  sh eep , d istu rb in g  
m arkets, ra v ish in g  women, b u rg lary , highway robbery, and ransom, as 
some o f th e  crim es committed th e s e  men in  h is  county.-^ S ir  John 
E lio t  brought in  th e  q u estio n  o f  m a rtia l law  concerning th e  punishment 
o f  s o ld ie r s  fo r  o f fe n s e s  a g a in s t  c i v i l i a n s .  E l io t  b e lie v e d  th a t when 
a s o ld ie r  corm itted  an o ffe n se  a g a in s t  a c i v i l i a n ,  th a t  th e  l a t t e r  
should  have recou rse  to  ordinary p ro c e sse s  o f  law  and not be dependent 
upon th e  s o ld ie r  b e in g  punished by h is  o f f i c e r s .  The q u estio n  was, 
accord in g  to  S ir  John, were s o ld ie r s  a law  to  th em selv es , or were t h ^  
su b je c t  to  th e  law s o f  th e  realm? A fter  continued  d eb ate , they  f i n a l l y
G a r d in e r , H istory  o f  England, I I ,  219-20 .
^Ibid., p. 227.
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d eclared  th a t  th e  e x e r c is e  o f  m artia l law  in  tim e o f  peace was abso­
lu t e l y  i l l e g a l .  S ir  Edward Coke proposed th a t  th e  King be p e t it io n e d  
a g a in s t  th e se  a b u ses, but S ir  Thomas Wentworth argued th a t a b i l l  
should  be drawn up in s te a d , which would r e g u la te  how s o ld ie r s  would 
be quartered  in  th e  fu tu r e . S ir  N athan iel R ich proposed th a t  a p e t i ­
t io n  be used fo r  i t  req u ired  an immediate answer, whereas a b i l l  would 
be s e n t  up a t  th e  end o f  th e  s e s s io n .  The King might r e j e c t  i t  then  
w h ile  having accep ted  supply in  th e  meantime.
F in a l ly ,  a f t e r  more than a month o f  debate, th e  P e t i t io n  o f  
R ight was p resen ted  to  th e  King, co n ta in in g  p r o v is io n s  a g a in s t  forced  
lo a n s ,  a r b itr a r y  im prisonm ent, m artia l law , and compulsory b i l l e t i n g .  
In  e a r ly  June 1628 as sh ou ts o f  applause rocked P arliam ent, th e  Clerk  
spoke th e  words o f  th e  K ing’ s approval, " S o it d r o it  f a i t  comme e s t  
d e s i r e . T h o s e  p o r tio n s  o f  th e  great P e t i t io n  o f R ight o f  1628 which 
p e r ta in  to  th e  q u arterin g  o f  s o ld ie r s  and s a i lo r s  upon th e  c i t i z e n iy  
and e s ta b lis h in g  o f  m a rtia l law  in  peacetim e, can be traced  d ir e c t ly  
to  th e  circum stances surrounding th e  p rep aration s fo r  th e  Cadiz expe­
d it io n  o f  1625 . King C harles had now prom ised to  r e fr a in  from th e se  
p r a c t ic e s  in  th e  fu tu r e . At l a s t  some good had come out o f  th e  even ts  
surrounding t h i s  i l l - s t a r r e d  v en tu re . The P e t i t io n  o f  R ight o f  1628 
became a d e f in i t e  p a r t o f  E n g lish  l i f e ;  i t  i s  an ou tstan d in g  example 
o f  a k in g  bowing b efo re  g r ievan ces o f  h is  p eop le  and h is  p arliam en t.
E v en tu a lly , more good appeared out o f  th e  shadows around th e  
d e fe a t s ,  d is g r a c e s , and f a i lu r e s  in v o lv in g  th e  Cadiz ex p ed itio n  and
^Ibid., p. 291.
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i t s  b i t t e r  a fterm ath . The Royal Navy tms in v e s t ig a te d  in  1626-2? by 
an o f f i c i a l  com m ission, and w h ile  t h i s  body accom plished l i t t l e  in  
th e  way o f  recommendations, i t  was a s te p  in  th e  r ig h t  d ir e c t io n .?
In 1626 , 1629, and 1630- 3U, th e  Rc^al Ordnance O ffic e  was in v e s t ig a te d  
by a commission which had C e c il and Coke as two o f i t s  members, as  
t h i s  o f f i c e ' s  shortcom ings during l6 2 ^ -2 9  were w e ll known.^ While 
t h i s  in v e s t ig a t io n  accom plished l i t t l e ,  i t  d id  rec o g n ize  th a t  som ething  
was wrong w ith  th e  system . These in v e s t ig a t io n s  were but th e  f i r s t  
harb ingers o f  la t e r  reform s, but th e s e  were th e  b eg in n in g s , th e  recog ­
n it io n  th a t  changes must be made. The understanding th a t  som ething  
needs adjustm ent i s  a la r g e  s te p  towards i t s  even tu a l c o r r e c t io n .
A fte r  v iew ing  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  f i r s t  major sea  campaign s in c e  
160b, C h arles, Buckingham, and England r e a l iz e d  th e  s t a t e  in t o  which 
t h e ir  armed fo r c e s  had d e te r io r a te d . I t  was som ething, u n fo r tu n a te ly , 
which cou ld  not be co rrec ted  o v ern ig h t, but on ly  through a c a r e fu l ly  
adm in istered  program over a p er iod  o f y e a r s . I t  would ta k e  t h i s  lo n g  
to  rep la ce  th e  sh a tte red  m orale, th e  a n c ie n t , weary s h ip s , and to  
adequately  t r a in  p erson n el in  le a d e r sh ip , b e t te r  weapons, and equip­
m ent. This program was begun under C h arles' d ir e c t io n .  He had a major 
problem; th e  Crown was poor and in  d eb t, so C harles had to  r e s o r t  to  
"sh ip  monqy" to  secu re th e  d es ired  revenue. During th e  re ig n  o f  C h ar les , 
l6 2 $ - k 9 ,  f o r t y - s ix  sh ip s  were added to  th e  f l e e t ,  tw en ty -fou r  o f  which 
were newly b u i l t ,  n in eteen  were p r iz e s ,  and ordy th r e e  o f  th e  o ld
?Aylmer, "A dm in istrative Reform," p . 23^. 
^ Ib id . ,  pp. 2hh-‘hS,
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sh ip s  were r e b u i l t .  I t  thus may be seen  th a t  th e  emphasis was on 
adding new s h ip s ,  or th o se  a lread y  b u i l t  and in  good c o n d it io n .
Had C harles and th e  House o f  Commons, h is  c h ie f  source o f  
revenue, not been estranged  during most o f  h is  r e ig n , th ere  i s  l i t t l e  
doubt th a t  even more sh ip s  would have been added to  th e  growing f l e e t .  
As l a t e  as l61iL, s ix te e n  y ea rs  a f t e r  th e  f a i lu r e  a t  C adiz, t h i s  event  
was remembered w ith  g rea t b i t t e r n e s s .  I t  was r e fe rred  to  in  th e  
Grand Remonstrance o f  I 6IH, a gr ievan ce  p e t i t io n  to  th e  King, as 
"the d is c r e d ita b le  attem pt on C a d i z . T h e  Commons c le a r ly  recog­
n ized  th a t  England needed a pow erful navy, but w ith  th e  monarch and 
h is  source o f  h is  revenue a t  odds, l i t t l e  cou ld  be accom plished.
Under C h ar les , th e  lau n ch in g  o f  one, or a t  th e  most tw o, w arships in  
a year  was cause fo r  c o n g r a tu la tio n , p r id e , and excitem en t. A fter  
C harles had been put to  death in  16^9 and Parliam ent ru led , tw en ty- 
two new sh ip s  were launched in  a s in g le  y e a r , 16^1;. In th e  ten -y ea r  
p eriod  between 16^9 and l6 5 9 , th e  s ta g g e r in g  number o f two hundred 
and seven  sh ip s  were added to  th e  Royal Navy, o f  which n in e ty -e ig h t  
were newly b u i l t ,  and one hundred and n in e were p r i z e s . T h u s ,  i t  
may e a s i ly  be seen  th a t  Parliam ent recogn ized  th a t  England's s tr e n g th  
la y  in  having an immense navy to  p r o te c t  her shores and carry out her  
c o n tin e n ta l fo r e ig n  p o l ic y .  England had come a lo n g  way s in c e  th e
90ppenheira, A dm in istra tion  o f  th e  Navy, pp.
l^John F o r s te r , The Debates on th e  Grand Remonstrance,  November 
and December, l6 ^ 1 , lÆth an In trodu ctory  Essay on E n g lish  Freedom 
under P lan tagen et & Tudor Sovereigns (London, I'B^O), p . 2lFI '
HOppenheim, A dm in istra tion  o f  th e  Navy, pp. 330-37•
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th e  days o f  James, th e  appeaser, and th e  b eg in n in gs o f  n a tio n a l p r id e  
in  th e  Royal Navy were ev id en t during th e  ten u re o f  th e  Commonwealth.
The E n g lish  had fa ced  th e  hard f a c t  th a t  thqy needed a stron g  navy, 
although i t  was on ly  a f t e r  th e  s tr u g g le  between Grown and Commons had 
ended th a t  she was a b le  to  r e a l iz e  t h i s  g o a l. I t  i s  furtherm ore read­
i l y  apparent th a t  through th e  f a i lu r e s  in  y ea rs  p a s t ,  poin ted  up m ostly  
ty  th e  f a i lu r e  a t  C adiz, th a t  a d if f e r e n t  form o f  o rg a n iza tio n  was 
n ecessary  when assem bling  b a t t le  f l e e t s .  The p a s t  had seen  armed 
merchant v e s s e l s  c a l le d  to  s e r v ic e  to  meet a c r i s i s ,  and th e se  had 
always made up th e  bu lk  o f  th e  E n g lish  b a t t le  f l e e t s .  In  th e fu tu r e ,  
t h is  would not be s o . From th e  tim e o f  th e  Commonwealth, th e E nglish  
Royal Navy was a lw ^ s  a la r g e  and pow erful f o r c e ,  ready to  do b a t t le  
on i t s  own.
The ra id  on Cadiz was a c tu a lly  o f  sm all consequence. The Span­
i s h  had o ffe r e d  p r a c t ic a l ly  no r e s is ta n c e  and th e ir  lo s s e s  were s l i g h t ,  
oth er than th e  damage to  F ort P u n ta l. The c i t y  was not captured , no 
tr e a su r e  was tak en . The Spanish navy was not d estroyed  or even damaged. 
Spain was not cr ip p led  f in a n c ia l ly ,  th e  tr e a su r e  f l e e t s  continued to  
a r r iv e , and her wars co n tin u ed . B eing preoccupied  in  th e  New World, 
in  th e  N eth erlan d s, in  th e  P a la t in a te ,  and in  th e  M editerranean, Spain  
chose not t o  p ick  up th e  w ell-w orn  g a u n tle t  which England had f lu n g  
down. As fa r  as she was concerned, t h i s  lu d icr o u s  ep isod e a t  Cadiz 
meant noth ing o th er than to  in d ic a te  th a t  Spain had l i t t l e  to  fe a r  
from England. A s t a t e  o f  war e x is t e d ,  but not in  a c tu a l combat between  
th e  two powers. So, fo r  England, was i t  a l l  a b i t t e r  fa ilu r e ?
Out o f  th e  even ts circum jacent to  th e  Cadiz ex p ed itio n  o f  l6 2 3
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th e r e  came many u n fo reseea b le  changes, although not a t  th e  tim e nor 
in  th e  area o f  m il ita r y  or naval v i c t o r i e s .  Some o f th e  e v e n t u a l i t ie s  
were open c r i t ic i s m  by th e  I^ lia r a e n t  o f  th e  so v ere ig n , h is  m in is te r s ,  
and th e  roy a l a d m in istra tio n ; in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  th e  conduct o f  
governmental a g en c ie s  le a d in g  to  reform s; reo r g a n iza tio n  and en la rg e­
ment o f  th e  Royal Navy w ith  l e s s  dependence upon merchant v e s s e l s ;  an 
e f f i c i e n t  and w e ll- tr a in e d  boc^ o f  reg u la r  naval personnel to  man 
th e s e  sh ip s; th e  p r o h ib it io n  o f  m a rtia l law  in  peacetim e, and a ban 
on compulsory b i l l e t i n g  o f  s o ld ie r s  on th e  c i t i z e n r y .  Thus, w ithout 
th e  E n g lish  p eop le  b ein g  aware o f i t ,  many w orthw hile reforms were 
generated  out o f  th e ash es o f  t h i s  ca tastro p h e  a t  Cadiz in  lo 2 ^ .
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SIR EDWARD CECIL, VISCOUNT WDŒLEDCN̂
"CECIL, S ir  Edward, V iscount lümbledon (1572- I 638) ,  naval and 
m ilita r y  commander, irns th e  th ir d  son o f  S ir  Thomas C e c il ,  second lo r d  
Burghley and f i r s t  e a r l o f  E xeter , grandson o f S ir  % llia m  C e c il ,  
f i r s t  lo r d  B u r g h l^  and nephew o f S ir  Robert C e c y ll , f i r s t  ea r l o f  
S a lisb u r y , whose d e v ia t io n  from th e  p a tern a l s p e l l in g  o f  th e  name he 
sy s te m a tic a lly  adopted. He was born on 29 Februaiy 1^71-2 , and en tered  
th e  m il ita r y  s e r v ic e  o f  a company o f  E n g lish  f o o t - s o ld ie r s ,  and in  I^ay 
1600 was appointed to  a troop  o f  c a v a l iy ,  which he commanded a t  th e  
b a t t le  o f  N ieu p ort. In I 6OI he commanded a body o f  one thousand men 
r a ise d  in  London fo r  th e  r e l i e f  o f  Ostend, then  b esieg ed  by th e  Span­
ia r d s ,  and on h is  retu rn  in  September was kn ighted  by Queen E liz a b e th .  
In th e  sp rin g  o f  l6 0 2  he was c o lo n e l o f  a regim ent o f  E nglish  h orse  
under P rin ce M aurice, and served  in  th e  ex p ed itio n  in to  Brabant and 
a t th e  s ie g e  o f  Grave. He continued  a c t iv e ly  serv in g  during th e  
y ea rs  im m ediately fo llo w in g , and ach ieved  a h igh  rep u ta tio n  fo r  v a lo u r  
and conduct. In  I 61O he commanded th e  con tin gen t o f fou r thousand men 
under P rince C h r is tia n  o f  A n h alt, a t  th e  s ie g e  o f  J u l ie r s ,  7-17 Ju ly  
to  12-22  A ugust. He was M. P. fo r  Aldeburgh 16OI, fo r  Stamford I 609, 
fo r  C h ich ester  1620 , and fo r  Dover 162^.
"During a l l  th e se  y ea rs  C e c il was markedly supported by th e  
Duke o f  Buckingham; and in  1625, when th e  ex p ed itio n  a g a in st th e  c o a s t  
o f Spain was determ ined on, Buckingham, though nominating h im se lf to  
th e  supreme command, as g en era liss im o , appointed C ec il as h is  deputy, 
w ith  th e  t i t l e  o f  lo r d  marshal and gen era l o f  th e  sea  and land f o r c e s ,  
"the g r e a te s t  command," i t  was s a id ,  " that ary su b jec t hath had th e s e  
hundred years"  (Court and Times o f  C harles I ,  i .  5 3 ) .  Buckingham 
o ffe r e d  indeed  to  procure him an appointment from th e  k ing; but C e c i l ,  
"not to  le s s e n  th e  duke's honour, too^  i t  from h im self"  (C al. S ta te  
Papers, Dorn. 16 tlarch 1 6 2 9 -3 0 ). N otw ithstanding th e se  h igh-sounding  
t i t l e s  th e  p rep ara tion s were wretched in  th e  extrem e. The men were 
raw l e v i e s ,  and th e  o f f i c e r s ,  fo r  th e  most p a r t, no b e t te r ;  th e  f l e e t  
was m ainly composed o f  merchant s h ip s , h a s t i ly  p ressed  in to  s e r v ic e ,  
and commanded ty  men ign oran t o f  war and d isco n ten ted  a t th e  p art  
th ey  were com pelled to  undertake. Even th e  gen era l had never y e t  
h eld  ary independent command, and was t o t a l l y  ign oran t o f  naval a f ­
f a i r s .  N ev erth e less  Buckingham a n tic ip a te d  an easy  su c c e s s . The
^ L e s lie  Stephen and Sidney L ee, e d s . .  D iction ary  o f N ation al 
Biography (London, 1908 , 21 v o l s . )  I l l ,  130l|.-0o.
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k in g  came down to  Plymouth to  review  th e  troop s and th e  f l e e t ,  and i t  
ïfas o f f i c i a l l y  announced th a t C ec il was to  be r a ise d  to  th e peerage 
as V iscount l&mbledon. . . .
"The f a i lu r e  o f  t h i s  c o s t ly  eocpedition gave r i s e  to  much popu­
la r  in d ig n a t io n , th e  w eight o f  which f e l l ,  not u n d eserved ly , on Buck­
ingham. But no censure o f  Buckingham can a b so lv e  C e c il  from th e  
blame which must a tta ch  to  th e  g ross in c a p a c ity  which he d isp layed  
under c ircum stances o f no p e c u lia r  d i f f i c u l t y .  To h is  incom petence 
th e  Spaniards owed i t  th a t every sh ip  in  th e  harbor was not taken  or 
b urnt, th a t  Cadiz was not sacked , and th a t  th e  tr e a su r e  sh ip s were 
not captured . The su p erior  o f f ic e r s  o f  th e  e x p e d it io n , e s p e c ia l ly  
th e  E arl o f  E ssex , d id  not h e s i t a t e  to  p r e fe r  a form al charge o f  m is­
conduct a g a in s t  th e  g e n e r a l. I t  appears to  have been c u r so r ily  exam­
in ed  by th e  Icing in  c o u n c il ,  but no ev idence was taken; th e  favour  
o f th e  Duke o f  Buckingham and C e c i l ' s  d e n ia l o f  every p o in t were h eld  
to  be s u f f i c i e n t  to  >;arrant a f u l l  a c q u it ta l;  and th u s , fa r  from r e ­
c e iv in g  ev e iy  cen su re , h is  c r e d it  a t  cou rt ro se  and continued  to  r i s e  
t i l l ,  a few  y ea rs  l a t e r  and a f te r  th e  more d isa s tr o u s  f a i lu r e  a t  th e  
I s l e  o f  Re, even th e  p eop le  began to  co n sid er  him a s an h ero ic  lead er  
o f  arm ies."  C e c i l ' s  squadron o rg a n iza tio n  fo llo w s :
THE AmiRAL'S SQUAIKON'1
Shipps Commanders Tonnes Seamen Landt
Ann R oyall^ Lord lia r sh a ll 1000 Loo
Sr Tho. Love, Knt
St George^ Lord Delaware 89^ 250
2 Sr R ich ael Gayre, Knt
C onvertive Sr VÈ1 S t Leger ^00 200
Captaine P orter
A ssurance Capt. Osborne 373 69 198
Prudence Capt. Vaughan 350 6h 181
Anne Capt. W ollaston ho 150
R oyall D efence Capt. E lly s 301 57 l6 0
L esser  Saphire Capt. Bond 303 56 158
A ssurance o f  Dover Capt. Barsey 300 58 159
Jonathan Capt. B o te ler 371 69 197
A m itie Capt. Plalyn 203 32 131
Jacob Capt. Gosse 218 3h 13L
Anthonie Capt. Blaque 2U0 1|0 150
Hermyt Capt. Turner 203 32 131
Hopewell o f  New C a s te l l  Capt. -  -  - 179 20 116
Abraham Capt. Doxmies 235 36 13L
Barbara Constant Capt. Hatch 3 5 l 6L 197
Camelyon Capt. Seamour 213 3h 132
Sea V enture Capt. K nivett 2 l6 35 133
iG la n v i l le , Voyage to  C adiz, p. 12^.
^K ing's sh ip .
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Shipps Commanders Tonnes Seamen Landmen
w illiam C apt. I 'h ite 22^ 37 138
R etorne Capt. Bonithon 212 3U 132
H e llen Capt. Mason 200 37 1Ü2
T a lb o tt Capt. Burdon 260 1:7 135
Great Saphire Capt. Baymond(Raymond) U2Q 73 220
Golden Cock Capt. Beamont 250 i 5 i
Globe Capt, Stoakes 290 56 160
George Capt. S tevens 298 56 200
Mary Magdalen Capt. Cooper 2^7 IlO 150
Anne Speedew ell Capt. Polkenhorne 192 32 130
A m itie  o f  Hull^ Capt. F risby 260 30
Shipps 28 Tonnes 9563
Catches 2 Seamen 2087
Landmen lo ik
SIR ROBERT DEVEREOI, EARL OF ESSEX^
"DE7EREUX, R obert, th ir d  Earl o f  Essex (1^91-16^6), parliam en­
ta ry  g en era l, was son o f R obert, second e a r l o f  Essex and F rances, 
daughter o f  S ir  F ran cis  Walsinghara, and widow o f S ir  P h ilip  S idney.
His fa th e r  having been a t ta in te d  in  lo O l, he was r e s to red  in  b lood  
and honour by a c t  o f  parliam ent in  I 6OI4.
"In 1620 Essex commanded a company in  th e  regim ent o f E n g lish  
v o lu n te e r s  which s e t  fo r th  under S ir  Horace Vere to  defend th e  P a la t­
in a t e .  He saw s c a r c e ly  any s e r v ic e ,  as he returned  sp e e d ily  to  England 
to  a tten d  to  h is  parliam entary d u t ie s ,  and on 13 Jan. l6 2 l  he became 
a member o f  th e  c o u n c il o f  war, appointed  to  co n sid er  th e  measures to  
be taken  fo r  th e  d efen ce  o f  th e  P a la t in a te  i f ,  as was th e  exp ected , 
James should  in t e r f e r e  in  p erson . During th e  summer o f th a t year  he 
v i s i t e d  th e  N eth erlan d s, and accompanied th e  P rince o f  Orange to  th e  
f i e l d ,  but he aga in  Returned to  be p resen t a t  th e  w in ter  s i t t i n g  o f  
p arliam en t. In l6 2 5  E ssex was v ic e -a d m ira l in  th e  Cadiz ex p ed itio n ."  
His squadron was as fo llo w s :
THE VICE ADMIRAL'S SQUADRON̂
Shipps 
S w iftsu re^
Commanders
E arl o f  Essex  
Sr Sam. A r g a li ,  Knt
Tonnes Seamen Landmen
876 250
^ P rov ision  sh ip .
2pNB, V, 890.
^ G la n v ille , Voyage to  C adiz, p . 126. 
^K ing's sh ip .
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Shipps Commanders Tonnes Seamen Land
Reformation^ Lo. V iscount V alen cia  
Capt. G ilb e r t
750 250
Rainebowe^ Sr John Chudl^r, knt 650 250
Zouch Fhenix Capt. P h i l lp o t t 319 60 169
Martha Capt. Barber 278 50 II+2
Sea f f lo w e r Capt. Sidenhara 200 '38 1I+2
Mary Anne Capt. Harman 208 33 131
Carnation Capt. Walsingham 209 33 131
Robert Capt. G urling 21+1+ 37 138
True Love Sr J o . Hamden, knt 21+2 1+0 1^0
f fr e in d s h ip Capt. John Harvey 311 57 161+
I'laiy Constant Capt. Mervin B urley 276 50 ll+O
ly g e r Capt. Welden 21+0 ItO i5 o
R etorne C apt. Hagthorp 216 3h 133
Mary Magdalen Capt. Whiddon 21+2 1+0 1I18
Timothy Capt. P aw lett 200 32 132
Venture Capt. Mohun 218 3h 132
Royal Exchange Capt. Edw. Harvy 1+53 83 236
Esperance Capt. I'Jta Reskymer 212 31+ 132
P a tie n t  Adventure Capt. Bargrave 221 36 135
A m itie Capt. Skip+’â t h 232 38 ll+O
Barking Capt. f f i t t o n 177 30 116
Lyon o f  Ipsw ich Capt. Ruckwood 168 30 112
Samuell Capt. W alters 239 38 ll+O
P eter Bonaventure^ Capt. Johnson 213 39
Sara Bonaventure^  
C h r istia n  
Chestnutt-3 
ffo rtu n e^  . 
M i l *  &e John I 
George Willmh
Capt. Carew 200 38
Capt. Sharey
Tho. T en tes, Mr. 
S n ed d a ll, Mr.
167
300
1+00
37
20
20
Shipps 29
C atches 2
Tonnes 8652
Seamen 1771
Landmen 3015
7ŒEL.IAiî FEILDIWG, EARL OF DENBIGH^
”FEILDBîG, V5.11iam, f i r s t  Earl o f  Denbigh (d . l6ij.3)> was th e  
son o f  B a s il  F e ild in g  o f  Newnham Paddox in  Vfenidckshire. He was born
^K ing's s h ip .  
^Munition sh ip .  
^Horse sh ip ,  
b a t c h e s  (K etches) 
% IB, VI, 1151+.
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b efo re  1582, educated a t  Emmanuel C o lle g e , Cambridge, and kn ighted , 
accord ing to  C o llin s  on 23 A p r il 1603, accord ing to  Doyle on h March 
1607 (C o ll in s ,  P eerage, ed . Brydges^ D oyle, O f f ic ia l  Baronage) .  He 
married Susan V i l l i e r s ,  daughter o f S ir  George V i l l i e r s  o f Brookesby, 
L e ic e s t e r s h ir e .  "The p la in  cou n tly  gentlem en who had th e  good lu ck  
to  marry Buckingham's s i s t e r  in  th e  days o f  her poverty" found th a t  
th e  match had made h is  fo r tu n e  (G ardiner, H istory  o f  England, i v .  276), 
He became f i r s t  deputy-m aster, and then m aster o f  th e  g rea t wardrobe 
(23 Jan. 1619, 11 Jan. 1 6 2 2 ). He was crea ted  s u c c e s s iv e ly  Baron 
F e ild in g  (13 D ec. Io20 ) and Earl o f  Denbigh (II4 S e p t. 1622, D o y le ).
He was charged to  f o l lo w  th e  Duke o f  Buckingham and th e  P rince o f  
Wales to  Spain, and s e le c t e d  fo r  th e  honour o f  b r in g in g  word to  Eng­
lan d  when th e  co n tra c t was passed  ( Court and Times o f  James I ,  i i ,
U02, I4I 5 ) .  Without any exp erien ce  e ith e r  o f  m il ita r y  or naval a f ­
f a i r s ,  he was appointed  to  im portant commands. In th e  ex p ed itio n  to  
Cadiz in  1625 he acted  as rea r -a d m ira l, and when C e c il lan d ed , as 
adm iral (The Voyage to  C adiz, Camden S o c ie ty , pp. 5 0 -8 3 )•"  His 
squadron was organ ized  as fo llo w s :
THE HERE ADMIRAl'S SQUADRON̂
Shipps Commanders Tonnes Seamen Land)
p
S t Andrews Earl o f  Denbigh 
Sr John W attes
895 250
Bonaventure^ L o. Cromwell 
Capt. C o llin s
671: 200
Dreadnough^ Sr B e v e r ly  Newcome 1:58 160
A b ig a il C apt. P ovie 309 58 163
T ry a ll Capt. S tr a d lin g 200 33 131
Jane Bonaventure C apt. Rous 182 31 122
S u p p lie C apt. Duppa 183 31 112
Matthew ■ Capt. J o . Reskymer 222 36 135
Convert C apt. Barna. Burley 21:0 36 lli6
Centaure C apt. Jones 189 31 127
Dragon Capt. Qxenbridge 153 S3 30I:
Hopewell C apt. Ilarbery 2kO 1:0 150
Adventure C apt. Browne 106 33 121
Susan Capt. S a c h e v e r ill 21:5 1:0 150
Rose C apt. Pow ell 250 1:0 i5 o
#1 & Thomasin Capt. PLumleigh 188 32 130
Samuell Capt. Cheeke 371 69 197
Alyan C apt. Hake 266 50 11:1
B le s s in g Capt. K ette lb y 210 39 lL2
C onfidence Capt. Dunne 213 3k 132
D esire Capt. Morgan 233 3h 132
^ G la n v ille , Voyage to  Cadiz, p. 
^King’s sh ip .
^Munition sh ip .
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Shipps Commanders Tonnes Seamen Landmen
Isaacke Capt. Peyw ell 207 33 133
Lion Capt. Squibbe 210 33 131
Susan & H ellen Capt. L e v it t 2^3 Lo
h ill ia m  o f  London Capt. Amadas 198 37
Hope" Sr Tho. P ig o tt 277 Lo
ffo x e
Truelove^
Prosperous^ Roger Barton, lir .
Isaackson^ A ustin  C arpenter, iJr
F le e t  Tote
Shipps 28 Tonnes 82L2 26^07
Catches 2 Seamen 1583 5LL1
Landmen 29L9 9983
^ lîu n ition  sh ip . 
^Horse sh ip .  
^C atches.
AFPENDIE B
ROSTER OF RBGDmiTS, GOI*iANDERS, AND OFFICERS OF THE 
l'iJEITARï FORCES ACCOMPANYING THE FLEET, l62S^
1 . Duke o f  Buckingham’s Regiment: Commanded by S ir  John 
Rroude in  th e  absence o f  th e  Duke, Sergeant IJajor: Thor n ix . C aptains: 
G iffo rd , K n o lle s , E lp h eston , Paddon, R e y n e lle s , K irton , Countrey, and 
P reston . L ieu ten a n ts: Bromingham, Prowde, P o tte s ,  N e u e ll , Tremaine, 
C o lw e ll, 1'Jhitehead, Donne, B r e t t , and L ee . Ensigns: Oifen, R u s s e ll ,  
Barse^'-, Greene, Moore, Pennannt, Fearne, Otby, barde, and Bagg.
2 . V iscount bim bledon’ s Regiment: C aptains: S ir  George Blun­
d e l l ,  F arrer, C r o fte s , C hristm as, C risp e , P a p r i l l ,  B rid ges, Gore,
Edward L eigh , Anthony L eigh . L ieu ten a n ts: P ow ell, Booth, B a sse t ,  
Grimshaw, Cheverton, tJormewood, Burthogg, Horner, Browne, F e lto n , 
T a lb o tt . E nsigns: Hawkins, Karbery, G a r li le ,  H a lls , Dodson, L in d s ^ ,  
D isso n , Carewe, P a g it t ,  Dedham, B agn a ll.
3 . V iscount V a le n t ia 's  Regiment: C aptains: Sprj^e, Hammond,
F ennithorp , B r e t t , T aylor, F ish e r , H ackett, Bruce, P orter , Tolkarne. 
L ieu ten a n ts; Frodisham, S e a r le , Judge, B m ^er, A ppleyard, W ilton, 
Brooke, Bemersye, R eynolds, riathewes, and B a rn ett. Engigns: Ogle, 
Bowyer, G r e e n fe ild , B en n ett, Markham, A ppleyard, L eigh , Ogle, B u llo ck , 
and F u lle r to n .
ii. E arl o f -E s se x ’ s Regiment: C aptains: S ir  Thomas Yorke,
H a c k le tt , C a rleton , Tucke, Hone, Shugborough, A lle y ,  C rispe, Leake, 
Bowles j r .  L ieu ten a n ts: Frogmorton, % nton, H a ck le tt , O tt^ ', Spring, 
B arington , C a lv er t, Q uarles, Jarman, G oodridge, and Vernon. E nsigns: 
Pelham, Trye, Gwynne, K elke, W attes, Smith, Ban. L e ig h t , Heighham, 
P o tte s ,  iiathew es, and J en n ison .
5 . S ir  va iliara  S t .  L eg er’s Regiment: C aptains: G ibson, F r ie r ,  
Courtenay, R ichards, Mathews, K ostyne, Reade, Bowles s r . ,  Bucke,
Hoid is  worth. L ieu ten a n ts; Judd, Abraham, S tev en s, Prideaux, Grove, 
P ow ell, Wards, C o le , Sherrock, and Cooper. E nsigns: b h itn ey . H a ll, 
S p i l l in g ,  T refu se , Bockard, Parker, Hookes, Maddison, Bowles, B ruerton , 
and Sidenhara.
6 . S ir  C harles R ich e 's  Regiment: C aptains: S r . John R a t c l i f f ,
S ta n d ish , S tew art, Grej’’, S k e lto n , L eigh ton , W aller, Cooke, S ta v erto n , 
and S t .  L eger. L ieu ten a n ts: Richard L eigh , Drury, W aller, C risp e ,
^ G la n v il le ,  The Voyage to  C ad iz , pp . 122-21;.
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G rover, Gray, VJilliaras, Brand, Parry, Chadwell, and Holdham. E nsigns; 
F r ith , C o it t ,  Hunkes, Bowyer, R am scroft, S to ry , P r ic e , Dudley, Jarves, 
Ibrmwood, and W right.
7 . S ir  Edward Conway's Regiment: C aptains: W illoughby, Clap-
ham, Pelham, R ain sford , h l l l ia m s , A lfo rd , G oring, D ixon, O gle, and 
Kamaond. L ieu ten a n ts: Dawson, Chaworth, Crowne, P ow ell lio r g .,  Huson, 
Heigham, S h e lle y , Moone, belcombe, Markham, and P le s ih g tb n . Ensigns: 
Pinchbecke, O ttqy, W elles , K e ttleb y , C a r t le t t ,  Hudson, C ross, Piaxey, 
A yres, K etherton, and Browne.
8 . S ir  Edward Harwood' s Regiment: C aptains: S ir  Thomas More-
to n , W atkins, Jackson, Abraham, G ibthorp, G ibthorpe, H e a t l^ ,  Dowglas, 
Seymour, m asterson , and Morgan. L ieu ten a n ts: A lcock , Dawson, Hurafreys, 
T i l l i e r ,  Lewkin, B r id g es, B r ig e s , Anderson, Woodward, W escott, Love, 
and Games. E nsigns: A rkeld , Betnara, S tew art, S tan ton , Champnowne, 
L ucas, Hunt, L ucas, S a lt in g s to n e , F oscue, S tev en s , and Eden.
9 . S ir  John Burgh's Regiment: C aptains: S ir  A lexander B r e tt ,
S ir  Edward H anley, B e t te s ,  T e r r e tt , H i l l ,  Bond, L in d sey , Brove, L ind­
se y , G reen veild , and Parkinson. L ieu ten a n ts: W attes, J e f fe r e y e s ,  
Tourney, W attes, Y a te s , A tch inson , O utridd, S e a r le s ,  Jon es, Dodsworth, 
J on es, P o lla r d , and Long. E nsigns: Fanshawe, B lu d d e ll , Watnam, G ibbes, 
F o l ia t t ,  K n o lle s , F ey, Thorpe, Cludd, Thorp, and A ylew orth.
1 0 . S ir  Henry B ru ce's Regiment: C aptains: S ir  Henry K illegrew e,
S c o t t ,  Wood, C ornw ell, G ilp in , A s h l^ ,  G lynne, M eutus, Horton, and 
Y a tes . L ieu ten a n ts: S t .  F au le , Broadribbe, Cowley, Saundilaunce, 
C o ffin , Fox, Honniwood, P ow ell, B a th u rst, J a r v is ,  and Houghton.
E nsigns: G ibbes, Bruce B o sw ell, W illoughby, Lowe, Vaughan, Robinson, 
Hobbes, L il l ia m s , Webb, and G reene.
APPENDIX C
LCRD WIMBLEDON'S FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS, NO. 1^
A copy o f  th o se  in s tr u c t io n s  which were sen t unto th e  Earl 
o f E ssex and g iven  by S ir  Edward C e c i l ,  K night, admiral 
o f  th e  f l e e t ,  l ie u te n a n t-g e n e r a l and marshal o f  h is  
m a jesty 's  lan d  fo r c e  now a t s e a , to  be duly performed 
by a l l  commanders, and t h e ir  ca p ta in s and m asters, and 
oth er in f e r io r  o f f i c e r s ,  both  by sea  and la n d , fo r  th e  
b e t te r  government o f  h is  m a jesty 's  f l e e t .  Dated in  th e  
Sound o f  Plymouth, aboard h is  m a jesty 's  good sh ip  th e  
Anne R cya l, th e  th ir d  o f  O ctober, 1625.
1 .  F ir s t  above a l l  th in g s  you s h a l l  provide th a t God be duly
served tw ice  ev e iy  day by a l l  th e  land  and sea  companies in  your s h ip ,
according to  th e  u su a l prayers and l i t u r g y  o f  th e  Church o f England,
and s h a l l  s e t  and d isch a rg e  every watch w ith  th e  s in g in g  o f  a psalm
and prayer u su a l a t  s e a ,
2 . You s h a ll  keep th e  company from sw earing, blasphem ing, 
drunkenness, d ic in g , ca rd in g , ch ea tin g , p ick in g  and s t e a l in g ,  and th e  
l i k e  d iso r d e r s ,
3 . You s h a ll  tak e care to  have a l l  your company l i v e  ord erly  
and p ea cea b le , and s h a l l  charge your o f f i c e r s  f a i t h f u l ly  to  perform  
t h e ir  o f f i c e  and duty o f  h is  and t h e ir  p la c e s .  And i f  any seaman or 
s o ld ie r  s h a l l  r a is e  tu m u lt, mutiny or co n sp iracy , or commit murder, 
q u a rre l, f ig h t  or draw weapon to  th a t  end, or be a s le e p e r  a t  h is  
watch, or make n o is e , or not betake h im se lf  to  h is  p la ce  o f  r e s t  a f t e r  
h is  watch i s  o u t, or s h a l l  not keep h is  cab in  c le a n ly , or be d isco n ­
te n te d  w ith  th e  p rop ortion  o f  v ic tu a ls  a ssig n ed  unto him, or s h a ll  
s p o i l  or w aste them or any o th er n ecessary  p r o v is io n s  in  th e  s h ip s ,
or s h a l l  not keep c le a n  h is  arms, or s h a l l  go ashore w ithout le a v e ,  
or s h a l l  be found g u i l t y  o f  any o th er  crim e or o f fe n c e , you s h a l l  
u se  due s e v e r ity  in  th e  punishment or reform ation  th e r e o f  according  
to  th e  known orders o f  th e  s e a ,
ii. For any c a p ita l  or heinous o ffe n c e  th a t s h a ll  be committed 
in  your sh ip  by th e lan d  or sea  men, th e  land  and sea  commanders s h a l l  
jo in  to g e th e r  to  tak e  a due exarnination th e r e o f  in  w i t i n g ,  and s h a ll  
acq u ain t me th e r e w ith , to  th e  end th a t  I  may proceed in  judgment a c ­
cord ing  to  th e  q u a lity  o f  th e  o f fe n c e .
^C orbett, F ig h tin g  I n s tr u c t io n s , pp, 5 2 -6 l .
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5 . No sea  ca p ta in  s h a ll  meddle w ith  th e  p u n ish in g  o f  lan d  
s o ld ie r s j  but s h a l l  le a v e  them to  t h e ir  commanders; n e ith e r  s h a l l  th e  
land  commanders meddle id.th th e  pun ish ing  o f  th e  seamen.
6 . You s h a l l  w ith  th e  m aster tak e a p a r t ic u la r  account o f  th e  
s to r e s  o f  th e  boatsw ain  and carp en ters o f  th e  ship> exam ining t h e ir  
r e c e ip t s ,  expenses and rem ains, not su ffe r in g  any unnecessary w aste  
to  be made o f  t h e ir  p r o v is io n s , or any work to  be done which s h a l l  
not be needfu l fo r  th e  s e r v ic e .
7 .  You s h a ll  e v e iy  week ta k e  th e  l i k e  account o f  th e  purser  
and steward o f  th e  q u a n tity  and q u a lity  o f  v ic tu a ls  th a t are sp en t, 
and provide fo r  th e  p r e se r v a tio n  th e r e o f  w ithout a iy  su perflu ou s ex­
p en se. And i f  any person be in  th a t  o f f i c e  su sp ected  fo r  th e  w astin g  
and consuming o f  v ic t u a l s ,  you s h a l l  remove him and acquaint me th e r e o f ,  
and s h a ll  g iv e  me a p a r t ic u la r  account from tim e to  tim e o f  th e  exp en se, 
goodness, q u a n tity  and q u a lity  o f  your v ic t u a l s .
8 . You s h a l l  l ik e w is e  ta k e  a p a r t ic u la r  account o f  th e  m aster 
gunner fo r  th e  sh o t , powder, m unition and a l l  o th er manner o f  s to r e s  
conta ined  in  h is  in d en tu re , and s h a ll  not s u ffe r  any part th e r e o f  to  
be s o ld ,  embezzled or w asted , nor any p ie c e  o f  ordnance to  be shot 
o f f  w ithout d ir e c t io n s ,  keep ing a ls o  an account o f  ev e iy  se v e r a l p ie c e  
sh o t o f f  in  your s h ip , to  th e  end I  may know how th e  powder i s  sp en t.
9m You s h a ll  s u f fe r  no boat t o  go from your sh ip  w ithout sp ec­
i a l  le a v e  and upon n ecessary  c a u se s , to  fe tc h  ■ ŝater or some oth er  
n eed fu l th in g , and then  you s h a ll  send some o f  your o f f ic e r s  or men 
o f  t r u s t ,  fo r  whose good ca rr ia g e  and speech retu rn  you id .ll  answer.
1 0 . You s h a ll  have a s p e c ia l  care to  prevent th e  dreadfu l a c c i ­
dent o f  f i r e ,  and l e t  no can d les be used  ■without la n te r n s , nor any a t  
a l l  in  or about th e  powder room. L et no tobacco be taken between th e  
d ecks, or in  th e  cab in s or in  any p a rt o f  th e  sh ip , but upon th e  f o r e ­
c a s t le  or upper deck , where s h a l l  stand  tubs o f  water fo r  them to  
throw t h e ir  ash es in to  and empty t h e ir  p ip e s .
1 1 . L et no man g iv e  o ffe n c e  to  h is  o f f i c e r ,  or s t r ik e  h is  equal 
or in f e r io r  on board, and l e t  mutinous persons be punished in  most 
sev ere  manner.
12 . L et no man depart out o f  h is  sh ip  in  which he i s  f i r s t  
en tered  w ithout le a v e  o f  h is  commander, and l e t  no cap ta in  g iv e  him 
enterta inm ent a f t e r  he i s  l i s t e d ,  upon pain  o f  s e v e r ity  o f  th e  law  in  
th a t  c a se .
1 3 . I f  any f i r e  should happen in  your sh ip , n otw ithstan d in g  
your care  (which God f o r b id ! ) ,  then  you s h a ll  shoot o f f  two p ie c e s  o f  
ordnance, one p r e se n tly  a f t e r  th e  o th er , and i f  i t  be in  th e  n ig h t you  
s h a l l  hang out four la n te r n s  w ith  l i g h t s  upon th e  y a rd s , th a t  th e  next 
sh ip s  to  you may speed to  succour you .
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lU . I f  th e  sh ip  should happen to  spend a m ast, or sp r in g  a 
le a k , which by in c r e a s in g  upon you may grow to  p resen t danger, then  
you s h a l l  shoot o f f  two p ie c e s  o f  ordnance, th e  one a good w h ile  a f t e r  
th e  o th er , and hang out two l i g h t s  on th e  main shrouds, th e  one a 
man's h e ig h t over th e  o th e r , so as t h ^  may be d is c e r n ib le .
1 5 . I f  th e  sh ip  should happen to  run on ground upon any danger 
(which God fo r b id !)  then  you s h a l l  shoot o f f  fou r  p ie c e s  o f  ordnance 
d i s t i n c t l y ,  one a f t e r  th e  o th er; i f  in  th e  n ig h t, hang out as many 
l i g h t s  as you can, to  th e  end th e  f l e e t  may tak e n o t ic e  th e r e o f .
1 6 . You s h a ll  favour your topm asts and th e  head o f  your main­
mast by b earing  in d if f e r e n t  s a i l ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  fo u l  weather and in  a
head sea  and when your sh ip  goeth  by th e  vd.nd; l e s t ,  by th e l o s s  o f  a
mast upon a n e e d le ss  adventure, th e  s e r v ic e  i s  deprived  o f  your help  
when th ere  i s  g r e a te s t  cause to  u se  i t .
1 7 . The whole f l e e t  i s  to  be d iv id ed  in to  th r e e  squadrons: th e
ad m ira l' s squadron to  wear red  f la g s  and red  pennants on th e  main to p ­
m ast-head; th e  v ic e -a d m ir a l's  squadron to  wear b lu e f la g s  and b lu e  
pennants on th e  fo r e  topm ast-heads; th e  rea r -a d m ira l's  squadron to  
wear w h ite  f la g s  and w h ite  pennants on th e  raizen topm ast-heads.
1 8 . The adm irals and o f f ic e r s  are to  speak w ith  me tw ice  a day, 
morning and even in g , to  r e c e iv e  riy d ir e c t io n s  and commands, which th e  
r e s t  o f  th e  sh ip s  are du ly  to  perform . I f  I  be ahead I  w i l l  s ta y  fo r
them, i f  to  leew ard I  xd .ll bear up to  them. I f  fo u l  weather should
happen, you are not to  come to  near me or ary o th er sh ip  to  hazard
any danger a t  a l l .  And when I  have h a ile d  you , you are to  f a l l  a s te r n , 
th a t  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  sh ip s  in  l i k e  manner may come up to  r e c e iv e  ny 
commands.
1 9 . You s h a l l  make in  every sh ip  two ca p ta in s o f  th e watch, or 
more ( i f  need b e ) ,  who s h a l l  make ch o ice  o f  s o ld ie r s  or seamen to  them 
to  search  every watch in  th e  n igh t between th e  d eck s, th a t no f i r e  or  
cand le be c a rr ied  about th e  sh ip  a f t e r  th e  watch i s  s e t ,  nor th a t no 
can d le  be burning in  any cab in  xdthout a la n te r n , nor th a t n e ith er  
but x fh ils t  t h ^  are making them selves reacfy, and to  se e  th e  f i r e  put 
out in  th e  cook 's  room, fo r  th ere  i s  no danger so in e v ita b le  as th e  
s h ip 's  f i r i n g .
20 . You s h a l l  cause th e  landmen to  le a r n  th e  names and p la ce s  
o f  th e  ropes th a t  thqy may a s s i s t  th e  s a i lo r s  in  t h e ir  labours upon th e  
d eck s, though th ey  cannot go up to  th e  to p s  and y a rd s .
2 1 . You s h a ll  t r a in  and in s t r u c t  such s a i lo r s  and m ariners as 
s h a l l  be found f i t  to  th e  u se o f th e  m usket, as you do your landmen, 
and r e g is t e r  t h e ir  names in  a l i s t  by th em selv es , making no d if fe r e n c e  
fo r  m atter o f  d is c ip l in e  between th e  s a i lo r s  and s o ld ie r s  aboard you .
22 . You s h a l l  not g iv e  chase nor send aboard any sh ip  but by 
order from me, or ny x/ice-adm iral or rear-ad m ira l; and i f  you come near
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arçr sh ip  in  your course b elon g in g  to  any p rin ce  or s t a t e  you s h a l l  make 
s ta y  o f  h er , and b rin g  her to  me or th e  next o f f i c e r ,  w ithout ta k in g  
anyth ing from them or t h e ir  companies by fo r c e , but sh a ll  charge a l l  
your company from p i l la g in g  between decks or breaking up any h o ld , or 
em bezzling any goods so s e iz e d  and tak en , upon p ain  o f s e v e r ity  o f th e  
law  in  th a t  c a s e .
23 . You s h a ll  f a l l  a s tern  o f  me and th e  adm irals o f  your s e v ­
e r a l squadrons unto th e  p la c e s  a ssig n ed  unto you, and fo llo w  th e ir  
l i g h t s  as a fo r e s a id , r e c e iv in g  such in s tr u c t io n s  from me or them in  
th e  morning what course to  h o ld . And i f  you s h a ll  a t  any tim e be 
separated  from th e  f l e e t  l y  fo u l w eather, chase or othertd .se, you s h a l l  
shape your course fo r  th e  southward cape upon th e  co a st o f Spain in
th e  la t i t u d e  o f  37 , one o f  th e  p la c e s  o f  rendezvous; i f  you m iss me
th e r e , then  s a i l  d ir e c t ly  fo r  th e  Bay o f G ales or S t .  Lucar, which i s  
th e  other p la c e  a ss ig n ed  fo r  rendezvous.
2 i|. You must have a s p e c ia l  care  in  tim es o f  calms and foggy
w eather to  g iv e  such a b erth  one unto th e  o th er as t o  keep your sh ip s  
c le a r ,  and not come fo u l one o f  an oth er. E s p e c ia lly  in  fo g s  and m ists  
you s h a l l  sound w ith  drum or trum pet, or make a n o ise  w ith your men, 
or shoot o f f  m uskets, to  g iv e  warning to  o th er sh ip s  to  avoid  the
danger o f  boarding or coming fo u l one o f  an oth er.
25 . I f  you or any o th er  two or th ree  o f  th e  f l e e t  d isco v er
any s a i l  a t  sea  to  th e  windward or leew ard o f  th e  adm iral, which th e
adm iral cannot d isc e r n , i f  she be a grea t sh ip  you s h a ll  s ig n if y  th e  
same by s tr ik in g  or h o is t in g  o f  your main t o p s a i l  so o ften  as you con­
c e iv e  th e  sh ip  to  be hundred ton s o f  burthen; and i f  you d isco v er  a 
sm all sh ip  you s h a l l  g iv e  th e  l i k e  s ig n s  bjr s t r ik in g  your fo r e  t o p s a i l ;  
but i f  you d isco v er  many sh ip s you s h a l l  ^ r ik e  your main t o p s a i l  o fte n  
and put out your en sign  in  th e  m aintop; and i f  such sh ip  or f l e e t  go 
la r g e  b e fo re  th e  i-dnd, you s h a l l  a f t e r  your s ig n  g iven  do th e l i k e ,  
t i l l  you p e r c e iv e  th a t  th e  adm iral and th e  r e s t  o f  th e squadrons have 
seen  your s ig n  and your so stand ing; and i f  you went la r g e  a t  th e  tim e  
o f  d isco v ery  o f  such sh ip  or f l e e t ,  you s h a ll  fo r  a l i t t l e  tim e h a le  
a f t  your sh e e ts  and then  go la r g e  a g a in , th a t  th e  r e s t  o f th e  f l e e t  
and squadrons may know th a t  you go la r g e  to  show th a t  th e  sh ip  or 
f l e e t  d iscovered  keeps th a t  co u rse .
26 . I f  th e  sh ip  or f l e e t  d iscovered  have t h e ir  ta ck s  aboard 
and stand  upon a wind, then  i f  you had your tack  aboard a t  th e  tim e o f  
th e  d isco v ery  you s h a l l  bear up fo r  a l i t t l e  tim e, and a f t e r  h a le  a f t e r  
your sh e e ts  again  to  show us what course th e  sh ip  or f l e e t  h o ld eth .
27> I f  you d isc o v e r  ary sh ip  or f l e e t  by n ig h t , and th ey  be 
( t o )  windward o f  you , th e  genera l or adm irals, you s h a ll  p r e se n t ly  bear 
up to  g iv e  us knowledge i f  you can speak w ith  her; i f  n ot, you may 
keep your l u f f  and shoot o f f  a p ie c e  o f  ordnance by which we ih a l l  
know you g iv e  ch ase , to  th e  end th a t  th e  r e s t  may fo llo w  a c co r d in g ly .
2 8 . For a gen era l r u le  l e t  no man presume to  shoot o f f  any
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p ie c e s  o f ordnance but in  d isco v ery  o f  sh ip s or f l e e t  by n igh t or 
b ein g  in  danger o f  th e  enemy, or o f  f i r e ,  or o f  s in k in g , th a t i t  may 
be unto us a most c e r ta in  in t e l l ig e n c e  o f  some m atter o f  im portance.
29 . I f  any man s h a l l  s t e a l  ary v ic tu a ls  by breaking in to  the  
hold or o th erw ise , he s h a l l  r e c e iv e  th e  punishment o f  a t h i e f  and 
murderer o f  h is  f e l lo w s .
3 0 . No man s h a l l  keep any f e a s t in g  or drink ing between meals
or drink any h e a lth  upon th e  s h ip 's  p r o v is io n s ;  n e ith e r  s h a ll  th e  stew ­
ard d e l iv e r  any cand le to  any p r iv a te  man or fo r  any p r iv a te  u se .
3 1 . In  fo u l weather ev e iy  man s h a ll  s e t  h is  s a i l  to  keep com­
pany w ith  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  f l e e t ,  and not run to o  fa r  ahead by day but 
th a t he may f a l l  a s te r n  th e adm iral b efo re  n ig h t .
32 . In  ca se  th e  f l e e t  or any p art o f  us should  be s e t  upon, 
th e se a -c a p ta in  s h a ll  appoint s u f f i c i e n t  company to  a s s i s t  th e  gunners, 
a f t e r  which ( i f  th e  f ig h t  req u ire  i t )  th e  cab in s between th e  decks 
s h a l l  be taken  down, (and) a l l  beds and sacks employed fo r  bulwarks.
The m usketeers o f  every sh ip  s h a ll  be d iv id ed  under ca p ta in s  or other  
o f f i c e r s ,  some fo r  th e  f o r e c a s t l e ,  some fo r  th e  w a is t ,  and o th ers  fo r  
th e  poop, where th ey  s h a l l  ab ide i f  th ey  be not o th erw ise  d ir e c te d .
33 . An o f f i c e r  or two s h a l l  be appointed  to  take ca re  th a t  no 
lo o s e  powder be c a r r ie d  between ( th e  decks) nor near any l in s to c k  or 
match in  hand. You s h a l l  saw d iv e r s  hogsheads in  two p a r ts , and, 
f i l l i n g  them w ith  w ater, s e t  them a lo f t  th e  d eck s. You s h a l l  d iv id e  
your ca rp en ter s , some in  h o ld , i f  any sh o t come betw een wind and w ater, 
and th e  r e s t  between th e  decks, w ith  p la te s  o f  le a d , p lu gs and a l l  
th in g s  n ecessary  la i d  by them. You s h a l l  a ls o  la y  ty  your tubs o f  
w ater c e r ta in  wet b la n k e ts , to  c a s t  upon and c lo a k  any f i r e .
3I+. The m aster and boatsw ain  s h a l l  appoint a conven ient number 
ô f  s a i lo r s  to  every s a i l ,  and to  every such company a m aster 's  mate 
or a q uarterm aster, so as when every man knows h is  charge and h is  
p la c e , th in g s  may be done w ithout n o ise  or con fu sio n ; and no man ( i s )  
to  speak but th e  o f f i c e r s .
3 5 . No man s h a l l  board ary enemy's sh ip , e s p e c ia l ly  such as 
command th e  k in g 's  s h ip s , id-thout s p e c ia l  order from me. The lo s s  o f  
one o f  our sh ip s  xd.ll be an encouragement to  th e  enemy, and by th a t  
means our f l e e t  may be engaged, i t  b e in g  a grea t dishonour to  lo s e  
th e  l e a s t  o f  our f l e e t .  I f  we be under th e  l e e  o f  an enemy, every  
squadron and sh ip  s h a l l  labour to  reco v er  th e  wind ( i f  th e  adm iral 
endeavour i t ) . But i f  we f in d  an enemy to  leew ard o f  us th e  whole 
f l e e t  s h a l l  fo llo w  in  th e ir  se v e r a l p la c e s ,  the adm irals w ith  th e  head 
o f  th e  enetiy, th e  v ic e -a d m ir a ls  w ith  th e  body, and th e  rear-adm ira ls  
w ith  th e  sternraost sh ip s  o f  th e  ch a se , (or  o th er  le a d in g  sh ip s  which 
s h a ll  be appointed) w ith in  m usket-shot o f  th e  eneny, g iv in g  so much 
l ib e r t y  to  th e  le a d in g  sh ip  as a f t e r  her b road sid e d e liv e r e d  she may 
s ta y  and tr im  her s a i l s ;  then  i s  th e  second sh ip  t o  g iv e  her s id e .
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and th e  th ir d  and fo tir th , vjith th e  r e s t  o f  th a t  d iv is io n ;  which done 
th ey  s h a ll  a l l  tack  as th e  f i r s t  sh ip  and g iv e  t h e ir  o th er s id e s ,  
keeping th e  enemy under p erp etu a l v o l l e y .  This you must do upon the  
windermost sh ip  or sh ip s o f an eneny, which you s h a ll  e i th e r  b a tte r  
in  p ie c e s ,  or fo r c e  him or them to  bear up, and so en tan g le  them or  
d r iv e  them fo u l one o f  another to  t h e ir  u t te r  co n fu sio n .
3b. Your m usketeers, d iv id ed  in to  quarters o f  th e  sh ip , s h a ll  
not d isch arge  t h e ir  sh ot but a t  such a d is ta n c e  as t h e ir  commanders 
s h a ll  d ir e c t  them.
37 « I f  th e adm iral or adm irals g iv e  ch ase, and be th e  head­
most man, th e  next sh ip  s h a l l  tak e up h is  boat i f  o th er  order be not 
^ v e n ,  or i f  ary o th er sh ip  be appointed to  g iv e  ch a se , th e  next sh ip  
( i f  th e  ch asin g  sh ip  have a boat a t  her s te r n ) s h a ll  tak e i t .
3 8 . Whosoever s h a ll  show h im se lf a coward upon any la n d in g  or
o th erw ise , he s h a l l  be disarmed and made a labourer or c a r r ie r  o f
v ic tu a ls  fo r  th e  arny.
3 9 . No man s h a ll  lan d  anywhere in  any fo r e ig n  p a rts  w ithout 
order from me, or ty  th e sergean t major or o ther o f f i c e r  upon p a in  o f  
d eath .
I4O. Wheresoever we s h a l l  lan d  no man s h a ll  fo r c e  any woman 
upon p a in  o f  d eath .
U l. You s h a ll  avo id  s le e p in g  upon th e  ground and th e d rin k in g  
o f  new w in es , and e a tin g  new f r u i t s ,  and fr e s h  f i s h  u n t i l  i t  has been 
s a lt e d  th ree  hours, and a ls o  forb ear  s le e p in g  upon th e  deck in  th e  
n igh t tim e , fo r  fe a r  o f  th e  seren e  th a t f a l l s ,  a l l  which w i l l  breed  
dangerous f lu x e s  and d is e a s e s .
kZ.  IVhen th e  adm iral s h a ll  hang out th e  arms o f  England in  th e
mizen shrouds, th en  s h a l l  th e  c o u n c il o f  war come aboard; and when 
th a t  s h a ll  be taken  in  and th e  S t ,  George hung in  th e  main shrouds, 
th a t  i s  fo r  a gen era l c o u n c il .
For any orders upon th e  lan d  ( i f  God send us th ith e r )  we s h a ll  
e s ta b l is h  them. For m atter o f  s a i l in g  or d is c ip l in e  a t  sea  i f  th ere  
be cau se you s h a l l  r e c e iv e  o th er  d ir e c t io n s ,  t o  which I  r e fe r  you .
l ik e w is e  i t  i s  ordered between th e  seamen and th e  landmen th a t  
a f t e r  th e  ca p ta in  o f  th e  sh ip  i s  cab in ed , he s h a ll  i f  p o s s ib le  lod ge  
th e  ca p ta in  o f  th e  fo o t  in  th e  same ca b in , a f te r  th e  m aster o f  th e  sh ip  
i s  cab ined  th e l ie u te n a n t ,  and a fter  th e  m aster 's  m ates th e  en s ig n .
APjRENDIX D
LORD WIMBLEDCN'a FIGHTING INSTRUGTICNS, NO. 2̂
In s tr u c t io n s  when we come to  f ig h t  w ith  an enemy, sen t by 
th e  L ieutenant-G eneral unto th e  Earl o f E ssex , a t  se a , 11 
October l6 2 5 .
1 .  That you s h a ll  see  th e  admiral make way to  th e  admiral enemy, 
so l ik e w is e  th e  v ice -a d m ira l and th e  rear-ad m ira l, and then every sh ip  
( i s )  to  s e t  upon th e  next accord ing  to  h is  order, y e t  to  have such a 
care th a t  th o se  th a t come a f t e r  may be ready to  second one another 
a f t e r  th e  manner here fo llo w in g .
2 . I f  we happen to  be encountered by an enemy a t se a , you sh a ll  
then  appoint a s u f f i c ie n t  company to  a s s i s t  th e  gunners. You s h a ll  
p u ll  down a l l  th e  cab ins b e tw ix t th e  decks and u se th e  beds and sacks 
fo r  bulw arks, and s h a ll  appoint your muskets to  se v e r a l o f f i c e r s ,  some 
to  make good th e  f o r e c a s t l e ,  some th e  w a is t ,  and o th ers a b a ft th e  mast, 
from whence they s h a l l  not s t i r  t i l l  th ey  be o th erw ise  d ir e c te d , n e ith er  
s h a l l  they  or th e  gunners sh oot a sh ot t i l l  t h ^  be commanded by th e  
c a p ta in .
3 . You s h a l l  appoint a c e r ta in  number o f  m ariners to  stand by 
s a i l s  and m aintops, th a t  every o f  them knowing h is  p la c e  and duty th ere  
be no con fu sion  or d iso rd er  in  th e  command; and s h a ll  d iv id e  carpenters  
some in  h o ld , some b etw ix t th e  d eck s, w ith  p la t e s  o f  le a d , p lu g s , and 
oth er th in g s  n ecessa iy  fo r  sto p p in g  up breaches made w ith  great sh o t;  
and saw d iv e r s  hogsheads in  h a lv es  and s e t  them upon th e  deck f u l l  o f  
w ater, w ith  wet b lan k ets by them to  c lo a k  and quench any f i r e  th a t  
s h a ll  happen in  th e  f ig h t .
It. No man s h a ll  board any enençr's sh ip s  w ithout s p e c ia l order, 
but every sh ip  i f  we be to  leew ard s h a l l  labour to  recover  th e  vjind.
I f  we be to  windward o f  them, then  s h a l l  th e  whole f l e e t ,  or so many 
o f  them as s h a ll  be appointed , fo llo w  th e  le a d in g  sh ip  w ith in  m usket- 
sh o t o f  th e  enenç»-, and g iv e  them f i r s t  th e  chase p ie c e s ,  then th e  
b road sid e, afterw ards a v o l le y  o f  sm all sh o t; and when th e  headmost 
sh ip  hath done, th e  next sh ip  s h a l l  observe th e  same cou rse , and so  
every sh ip  in  order, th a t  th e  headmost may be ready to  renew th e f ig h t  
a g a in s t  such tim e as th e  sternraost hath  made an end; by th a t means 
k eep in g  th e  w eather o f  th e  enemy and in  co n tin u a l f ig h t  t i l l  th ey  be 
sunl{ in  th e  s e a , or forced  by b earin g  up to  en tan g le  th em selves, and 
to  come ( fo u l)  one o f  another to  th e ir  u t t e r  co n fu sio n .
^ C orbett, F ig h tin g  I n s tr u c t io n s , pp. 6 1 -6 2 .
APPENDIX: E
.CRD WMBLEDCU'S FIGHTING INSTRUCTICNS, NO. 3^
At a C ouncil o f  War holden aboard th e  Anne R oyal, Tuesday 
th e  11th  o f  O ctober, 1625. '
The C oun cil, b e in g  assem bled, entered  in to  co n su lta tio n  touching  
th e  form o f a s e a - f ig h t  performed a g a in s t  any f l e e t  or sh ip s o f the  
King o f  Spain or o th er  eneny, and tou ch in g  some d ir e c t io n s  to  be ob­
served  fo r  b e t te r  p rep aration  to  be made fo r  such a f ig h t  and th e  
b e t te r  managing th e r e o f  x-rhen we should  come to  a c t io n .
The p a r t ic u la r s  fo r  t h i s  purpose co n sid era b le  were many; insomuch 
th a t  no p e r tin e n t  c o n su lta t io n  cou ld  w e ll be had concern ing th e  same 
w ithout some p r in c ip le s  in  w r it in g , whereby to  d ir e c t  and bound th e  
d is c o u r s e . And th e r e fo r e , by th e  s p e c ia l  command o f my lo r d  lie u te n a n t -  
g e n e r a l, a form o f  a r t i c l e s  fo r  t h is  s e r v ic e  (drawn o r ig in a l ly  by S ir  
Thomas Love, K t .,  tr ea su rer  fo r  t h i s  a c t io n , cap ta in  o f  th e  Anne Royal 
and one o f  th e  co u n c il o f  war) was p resen ted  to  th e  assem bly, and 
se v e r a l tim es read over to  them.
A fter  th e  rea d in g , a l l  th e  p a rts  th e r e o f  were w e ll weighed and 
examined, whereby i t  was observed th a t  i t  in tended  to  en jo in  our f l e e t  
to  advance and f ig h t  a t  se a , much a f t e r  th e  manner o f  an army a t la n d , 
a ss ig n in g  every sh ip  to  a p a r t ic u la r  d iv is io n ,  rank, f i l e ,  and s ta t io n ;  
which order and r e g u la r ity  was not on ly  improbably but alm ost im p o ssib le  
to  be observed by so grea t a f l e e t  in  so u n certa in  a p la ce  as th e  se a .  
Hereupon some l i t t l e  doubt arose whether o r .n o t t h i s  form o f  a r t ic le s  
should  be confirm ed; but then  i t  was a lle g e d  th a t  th e  same a r t i c l e s  had 
in  them many other p o in ts  o f  d ir e c t io n ,  p rep ara tion , and cau tion  fo r  a 
s e a - f ig h t ,  which were agreed by a l l  men to  be most reason ab le and 
n ecessa ry . And i f  so s t r i c t  a form o f  p roceeding to  f ig h t  were not or 
cou ld  not be p u n ctu a lly  observed , y e t  might th e se  a r t i c l e s  b eget in  
our commanders and o f f i c e r s  a r ig h t  understanding o f  th e  conception  
and in te n t  th ereo f; which vi.th  an endeavour to  come as near as could  
be to  perform , th e p a r t ic u la r s  might be o f  great u se  to  keep up from 
co n fu sio n  in  th e  g en era l. N e ith er  cou ld  th e  l im it in g  o f  every se v e r a l  
sh ip  to  such a rank or f i l e  (and) to  such c e r ta in  p la ce  in  th e same, 
b rin g  upon th e  f l e e t  in tr ic a c y  and d i f f i c u l t y  o f p roceed in g , so (lon g )  
as ( i f  th e  proper sh ip s were absent or not ready) th o se  in  th e  next 
p la ce  were l e f t  a t  l i b e r t y ,  or ra th er  commanded, to  supply t h e ir  rooms 
and m aintain  th e  in s t r u c t io n s ,  i f  not a b s o lu te ly , y e t  as near as they- 
co u ld . In  con c lu sio n  th e r e fo r e  th e  form o f a r t i c l e s  which was so
lo o r b e tt . F ig h tin g  I n s tr u c t io n s , pp. 63- 7 2 .
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p resen ted , read and considered  o f ,  was w ith  some few  a lt e r a t io n s  and 
a d d it io n s  r a t i f i e d  by ny lo rd  lie u te n a n t-g e n e r a l and by th e whole 
co u n c il as a c t o f  t h e ir s  passed and confirm ed, and to  be duly observed  
and put in  ex ecu tio n  by a l l  c a p ta in s , m ariners, gunners, and o f f ic e r s  
in  every sh ip , and a l l  o th ers to  whom i t  might ap p erta in , a t  th e ir  
p e r i l s ,  le a v in g  on ly  to  my lo r d  l ie u te n a n t  th e  naming and ranking o f  
th e  sh ip s  o f  ever^  ̂ d iv is io n  in  order as th ey  should proceed fo r  th e  
ex ecu tio n  o f  th e  same a r t ic le s ;  which in  co n c lu sio n  were th e s e , touch­
in g  th e  whole f l e e t  in  genera l and th e  ad m ira l's  squadron in  p a r t ic u la r ,  
namely:
1 .  That when th e  f l e e t  or sh ip s  o f  th e  enemy should be d isco v ­
ered th e  adm iral o f  our f l e e t  m th  th e  sh ip s  o f  h is  squadron should  
put th em selves in t o  th e  form undermentioned and d escr ib ed , namely th a t  
th e  same squadron should be separated  in t o  th r e e  d iv is io n s  o f  n ine  
sh ip s  in  a d iv is io n ,  and so should advance, s e t  fozT'jard, and charge 
upon th e  enemy as h e r e a fte r  more p a r t ic u la r ly  i s  d ir e c te d .
That th e s e  n in e sh ip s should d isch arge  and f a l l  o f f  th ree  and 
th r e e , as th ey  are f i l e d  in  t h i s  l i s t .
Anne Royal . Admiral
Prudence . . . . . Captain Vaughan
Royal D efence • Captain E l l i s
Barbara Constance , Captain Hatch
T albot . Captain Burdon
Abraham . . . . • Captain Downes
Golden Cock Captain Beaumont
Amity . . . . . Captain Malyn
Anthony . . . . • Captain Blague
That th e s e  n ine sh ip s  should  second th e adm iral o f  t h is  squadron
th ree  and th r e e , as t h ^  are f i l e d  in  t h i s  l i s t .
S t .  George 
L esser  Sapphire 
Sea V enture .
A ssurance
Camelion
Return
Jonathan  
1'S.lliam , 
Hopewell
V ice-adm iral 
C aptain Bond 
Captain Knevet
Captain Osborne 
Captain S^raour 
Captain Bonithon
Captain B u tler  
Captain White 
Capt — — — — —
That th e s e  n ine sh ip s  should second th e  v ice -a d m ira l o f  t h is  
squadron th ree  and th r e e , as t h ^  are  f i l e d  in  t h i s  l i s t .
Ih3
C onvertine  
Globe .
Assurance o f  Dover
Great Sapphire 
Anne
<J ac ob • • »
George .
Hermit . 
i-iary aagdalen
R ear-adm iral 
C aptain Stokes  
C aptain Bargey
C aptain Raymond 
Captain W ollaston  
C aptain Gosse
C aptain Stevens  
Captain Turner 
C aptain Cooper
These th r e e  sh ip s  should f a l l  in to  th e  rear o f  th e  th ree  fo r ­
mer d iv is io n s ,  to  charge where and when th ere  should be o cca sio n , or 
to  h elp  th e  engaged, or supply th e  p la c e  o f  any th a t  should be un ser­
v ic e a b le .
H ellen  . . . . .  C aptain Mason 
Amity o f  H ull . . .  C aptain Frisby
Anne Speedw ell . .  . Captain Polkenhorne
2 . That th e  adm iral o f  th e  Dutch and h is  squadron should take
p la ce  on th e  starboard  s id e  o f  our adm iral, and observe t h e ir  own
order and method o f  f ig h t in g .
3 . That th e  v ice-ad ra ira l o f  our f l e e t  and h is  squadron should,
make th e  l i k e  d iv is io n ,  and observe th e  same order and form as th e
a d m ira l's  squadron was to  ob serve, and so  should  keep th em selves in  
th e ir  se v e r a l d iv is io n s  on th e  larboard  s id e  o f  th e  adm iral, and th ere
advance and charge i f  o cca s io n  were when th e  adm iral d id .
it. That th e  rear-adm ira l o f  th e  f l e e t  and h is  squadron should
a ls o  put them selves in to  th e  l i k e  order o f  th e  a d m ira l's  squadron as
near a s  i t  might b e , and in  th a t  form should  a tten d  fo r  a reserv e  or 
su p p ly . And i f  any squadron, sh ip  or sh ip s  o f  ours should happen to  
be engaged by over-charge o f  th e  enem ies, lo s s  o f  masts or y ard s, or 
oth er  main d is t r e s s  needing s p e c ia l  succour, th a t  th en  th e  rear-adndral 
w ith  a l l  h is  fo r c e , or one o f  h is  d iv is io n s  p rop ortion ab le  to  th e  o c­
c a s io n , should come to  t h e ir  rescu e; which b ein g  accom plished they  
should  retu rn  to  th e ir  f i r s t  order and p la c e  a ss ig n ed .
5 . That th e  d is ta n c e  between sh ip  and sh ip  in  every squadron 
should  be such as none m ight h inder one another in  advancing or f a l l i n g  
o f f .
6.":lThat th e  d is ta n c e  between squadron and squadron should be  
more or l e s s  as th e  order o f  th e  enemy's f l e e t  or sh ip s should r e q u ir e ,  
w hereof th e  cap ta in s  and commanders o f  our f l e e t  were to  be very  con­
s id e r a te ,
7 .  That i f  th e  enemy's approach happened to  be in  such s o r t  as 
th e  adm iral o f  th e  Dutch and h is  squadron, might have opportun ity  to  
b eg in  th e  f i g h t ,  i t  should be laxirful fo r  them to  do so u n t i l  th e  admiral
Ih h
could  corne up, u s in g  th e  form, method, and care p rescr ib ed .
8. That i f  th e  eneqy should be forced  to  bear up, or to  be 
en tan gled  among th em selv es , whereby an advantage might be had, then  
our rear-adm ira l and h is  squadron w ith  a l l  h is  d iv is io n s  should la y  
hold th e r e o f  and p rosecu te  i t  to  e f f e c t .
9 . That th e  r ea r -a d m ira l's  squadron should keep most s t r i c t  
and s p e c ia l watch to  see  what squadrons or sh ip s d is t r e s s e s  o f  our 
f l e e t  should  need ex tra o rd in a iy  r e l i e f ,  and what advantage might be 
taken  upon th e  eneny, th a t  a speedy and p resen t cou rse  might be taken
to  perform th e  s e r v ic e  en jo in ed .
1 0 . That i f  any sh ip  or sh ip s  o f  th e  eneny should  break out or
f l y ,  th e  adm iral o f  ar̂ r squadron which should  happen to  be in  th e  next 
and most con ven ien t p la c e  fo r  th a t  purpose should  send out a competent 
number o f  th e  f i t t e s t  sh ip s  o f  h is  squadron to  ch a se , a s s a u lt ,  or take  
such sh ip  or sh ip s  so breaking ou t; but no sh ip  should undertake such
a chase w ith ou t th e  command o f  th e  adm iral, or a t  le a s tw is e  th e  admiral 
o f  h is  squadron.
1 1 . That no man should shoot ary sm all or g rea t sh ot a t  th e
eneny t i l l  he came a t th e  d is ta n c e  o f  c a l ib e r  or p i s t o l  sh o t , whereby 
no sh o t might be made f r u i t l e s s  or in  v a in ; w hereof th e  ca p ta in s  and 
o f f i c e r s  in  every sh ip  should have an e s p e c ia l  c a r e .
1 2 . That no man should presume or attem pt t o  board any sh ip  o f  
th e  enemy w ithout s p e c ia l  order and d ir e c t io n  from th e  adm iral, or a t  
le a s tw is e  th e  adm iral o f  h is  squadron.
1 3 . That i f  ary o f  our f l e e t  happened to  be ( to )  leew ard o f  th e  
eneny, ev e iy  o f  our sh ip s  should  labour and endeavour what t h ^  might 
to  tak e a l l  op p ortu n ity  to  get to  xîindward o f  them, and to  hold th a t  
advantage having once obtained  i t .
II4. That th e  ca p ta in s and o f f i c e r s  o f  every sh ip  should have an 
e s p e c ia l  care as much a s  in  them la y  to  keep th e  enemies in  con tin u a l 
f ig h t  w ithout ary r e s p it e  or in te r m iss io n  to  be o ffe r e d  them; which, 
w ith  th e  advantage o f  th e  vrind i f  i t  m ight be had, was thought th e  
l i k e l i e s t  way to  en fo rce  them to  bear up and en tan g le  th em selv es , or 
f a l l  fo u l o f  another in  d iso rd er  and co n fu sio n .
1 5 . ' That an e s p e c ia l care should be had in  every sh ip  th a t  th e  
gunners should load  some o f th e ir  p ie c e s  w ith  ca se  sh o t, h an d -sp ik es, 
n a i l s ,  bars o f  ir o n , or w ith  what e l s e  might do most m isch ie f to  th e  
enemy's men, upon every f i t  op p ortu n ity , and to  come near and la y  th e  
ordnance w e ll to  pass fo r  th a t  purpose, which would be apt to  do great  
s p o i l  to  th e  eneny.
1 6 . That th e  cab ins in  every sh ip  should be broken down so fa r  
as was r e q u is i t e  to  c le a r  th e  way o f  th e  ordnance.
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17 . That a l l  beds and sacks in  every sh ip  should be d isp osed  
and used as bulwarks fo r  defence a g a in s t  th e  shot o f  th e  enemy.
l 3 .  That th ere  should  be te n , e ig h t ,  s i x ,  or four men to  a tten d  
every p ie c e  o f  ordnance as th e  m aster gunner should choose out and 
a ss ig n  them to  t h e ir  s e v e r a l p la c e s  o f  s e r v ic e ,  th a t  ev e iy  one o f them 
ndght know what belonged p rop erly  to  him to  do. And th a t t h is  ch oice  
and a s s ig n a t io n  should be made w ith speed so as we might not be taken  
unprovided.
1 9 . That th e r e  should  be one, tw o, or th r e e  men o f  good under­
stan d in g  and d i l ig e n c e ,  according to  th e  burden o f every sh ip , fo r th ­
w ith  appointed  to  f i l l  cartouches o f  powder, and to  carry them in  cases  
or b a r r e ls  covered to  th e ir  p la c e s  a ss ig n e d .
20 . That th e  hold  in  every sh ip  should  be rummaged and made 
predy, e s p e c ia l ly  by th e  s h ip 's  s id e s ,  and a carp en ter w ith  some man 
o f  t r u s t  appointed  to  go fo r e  and a f t e r  in  hold to  seek  fo r  shot th a t  
may come in  under w ater; and th a t  th e r e  should  be provided in  r e a d i­
ness p lu g s , p ie c e s  o f  sh ee t le a d , and p ie c e s  o f  elm board to  stop  a l l  
le a k s  th a t  might be found w ith in  board or w ith o u t.
21 . That in  every sh ip  where any s o ld ie r s  were aboard th e  men 
should  be d iv id ed  in to  two or th ree  p a r ts , w hereof on ly  one part should  
f ig h t  a t  once and th e  r e s t  should be in  h o ld , to  be drawn up upon 
o cca sio n  to  r e l ie v e  and rescu e  th e  form er.
22. That th e  men in  every sh ip  should  be kept as c lo s e  as 
reasonab ly  might be t i l l  th e  enemy's f i r s t  v o l le y  o f  sm all shot should  
be p a s t .
23. That th e  m ariners in  every sh ip  should be d iv id ed  and 
separated  in to  th ree  or fou r p a rts  or d iv is io n s ,  so as eveiy  one might 
know th e  p la c e  where he was t o  perform h is  duty fo r  th e  avo id in g  of  
co n fu sio n .
2h.  That th e  m aster or boatsw ain  o f  evei^r sh ip , by conmjand o f  
th e  ca p ta in , should appoint a s u f f i c i e n t  and s e le c t  number o f  seamen 
to  stand  by and a tten d  th e  s a i l s .
25. That more e s p e c ia l ly  th ey  should  by l i k e  command appoint 
s u f f i c i e n t  helmsmen to  s t e e r  th e  sh ip .
26 . That th e  s a i lo r s  and helmsmen should in  no so r t  presume to  
depart or s t i r  from th e ir  charge.
27. That th e  raainyard, foreyard , and t o p s a i l  sh ee ts  in  every  
sh ip  should  be s lu n g , and th e t o p s a i l  yards i f  th e  >jind were not to o  
h igh ; hereby to  avoid  th e  sh o o tin g  down o f  s a i l s .
28. That th ere  should be b u tts  or hogsheads sawn in to  two p arts  
f i l l e d  w ith  s a l t  w ater, s e t  upon th e  upper and low er decks in  s e v e r a l
p la c e s  conven ient in  every sh ip , T-jith b u ck ets, gowns, and b lankets to  
quench and put out w i ld - f ir e  or o th er f i r e  i f  need be.
29 . That i f  a f ig h t  began by day and continued  t i l l  n ig h t, 
every sh ip  should be c a r e fu l to  observe th e  adm iral o f her squadron; 
th a t  i f  th e  admiral f e l l  o f f  and forb ore  th e  f ig h t  fo r  th e  p resen t  
every o th er sh ip  might do th e  l i k e ,  r e p a ir in g  under her own squadron 
to  amend anyth ing am iss, and be ready to  charge again  when th e  admiral 
should b eg in .
3 0 . That i f  any o f  th e  sh ip s b e lon g in g  to  any squadron or d iv i ­
s io n  happened to  be absent or not ready in  conven ient tim e and p la ce  
to  keep and make good th e  order h ere in  p r e sc r ib e d , then  ev e iy  squadron 
and d iv is io n  should m aintain  th e s e  d ir e c t io n s  as near as thqy cou ld , 
although  th e  number o f  sh ip s  in  every d iv is io n  were th e  l e s s ,  w ithout  
a tten d in g  th e  coming in  o f a l l  th e  sh ip s  o f  every d iv is io n .
31 . And th a t th e se  te n  s h ip s , in  regard o f  th e  m unition  and 
m a te r ia ls  fo r  th e  arny and th e  h orses which were c a r r ie d  in  them, 
should  atten d  th e  rear-adm ira l and not engage th em selves w ithout order, 
but should  remain and expect such d ir e c t io n s  as m ight come from our 
adm iral or rea r -a d m ira l.
Captain Johnson 
Captain Carew 
Captain Wharey 
Captain L ev e tt  
Captain Amadas 
S ir  Thomas F ig o t t ,  Knt.
P eter  Bonaventure 
Sarah Bonaventure 
C h r is tia n  
Susan and E llen  
k lll ia m  o f  London 
Hope .
C hestnut 
Fortune 
Fox
Truelove
There was no d if fe r e n c e  between th e  a r t i c l e s  fo r  th e  admir­
a l ' s  squadron and th o se  fo r  th e  v ic e -a d m ir a l’ s and r e a r -a d m ir a l's , save  
in  th e  names o f  th e  sh ip s  o f  every d iv is io n ,  and th a t  th e ir  squadrons 
had not any p a r t ic u la r  r e se r v e , nor above f i v e  or s ix  sh ip s a p iece  in  
th e  th ir d  d iv is io n ,  fo r  want o f  sh ip s  to  make up th e  number o f  nine; 
th e  m unition and h orse sh ip s  which belonged to  th e ir  squadrons b ein g  
unapt to  f i g h t ,  and th e r e fo r e  d isp osed  in to  a s p e c ia l  d iv is io n  o f  ten  
sh ip s  by them selves to  a tten d  th e gen era l r e se r v e .
At th e  r i s in g  o f  th e  c o u n c il a m otion was made to  have some o f  
th e  b e s t  s a i l e r s  o f  our f l e e t  chosen out and a ssig n ed  to  l i e  o f f  from 
th e  main body o f  th e  f l e e t ,  some to  sea  and some to  shoreward, th e  
b e t t e r  to  d is c o v e r , ch ase , and tak e  some sh ip s or boats o f  th e  en en y 's;  
which might g iv e  us in t e l l ig e n c e  tou ch in g  th e P la te  F le e t ,  whether i t  
were come home or no, or when i t  would be expected  and in  what p la c e ,  
and touch ing such o th er m atters w hereof we might make out b e s t  advan­
ta g e . But noth ing h ere in  was now r e s o lv e d , i t  b ein g  con ceived , as i t  
seemed, th a t we might soon enough and more opportunely co n sid er  o f  
t h i s  p r o p o s it io n  and s e t t l e  an order th e r e in  when we came nearer to  
th e  e n e iy ’s c o a s ts ;  so th e  co u n c il was d is s o lv e d .
A pm roix F
COIMCIL OF mR miBERS^
20 October I 62S
S ir  Edward C e c i l ,  V iscount iJimbledon, Lord L ieu ten an t General
Mr. W illiam  de N assau, Admiral o f  th e  H ollanders
S ir  Robert Devereux, Earl o f  E ssex , V ice  Admiral
Nr. Laur. R e v e ll ,  V ice  Admiral o f th e  H ollanders
S ir  I'Jilliam F e ild in g , Earl o f Denbigh, Rear Admiral
S ir  Henry Power, V iscount V a le n tia , M aster o f  Ordnance
S ir  Thomas Cromwell, V iscount L eca le
S ir  Henry West, Lord Delaware
S ir  W illiam  S t .  L eger , Sergeant Major General
C aptain S ir  Thomas Love
C olonel S ir  C harles R iche
C olonel S ir  Edward Conway
C olonel S ir  Edward Harwood
C olonel S ir  John Burgh
C olonel S ir  Henry Bruce
C olonel S ir  John Proude
S ir  George B lu n d e ll, Quarterm aster General
C aptain S ir  Samuel A rg a li
Captain S ir  B everley  Newcombe
Captain S ir  John Wattes
Captain S ir  John Ghudley (C hudleigh)
Captain S ir  M ichael Gayer 
C aptain R a le igh  G ilb e r t  
C aptain Thomas P orter  
John G la n v i l le ,  S ecretary
^ G la n v ille , Voyage to  C adiz, pp. 3ér37 .
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